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FEDERAL DOLLARS FOR ALL HUMANKIND:
USING PROCUREMENT LAW TO INCREASE DIVERSITY
IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY
NICOLE WILLIAMSON*

ABSTRACT
This Article explores how to employ federal government contracting programs to increase gender and racial diversity within
the space industry. Part II of the Article touches briefly on the
importance of diversity generally and examines the underrepresentation of women and minorities within the $325 billion
industry surrounding outer space activities. Part III provides a
high-level overview of federal government contracting, in particular focusing on Small Business Administration programs intended to benefit small businesses, minority-owned businesses,
and women-owned businesses. Part IV concentrates on contracting within the space industry. Part V offers three suggestions to increase contract awards to women and minority
business owners, thereby advancing toward the ultimate goals of
encouraging women and minorities to start small businesses, directing capital toward disadvantaged groups, and increasing
mission success through diverse perspectives and involvement.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

I

N FISCAL YEAR 2019, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) procurement obligations totaled over
$19.5 billion1 as the agency worked with private partners to advance its vision of reaching for new heights and revealing the
unknown for the benefit of humankind.2 Of the billions of contracting dollars the agency awarded, a significant portion went
to large, established businesses such as the approximate $1.7 billion, $1.3 billion, and $915 million awarded to The Boeing
Company (Boeing), Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed
Martin), and Jacobs Technology, Inc. (Jacobs), respectively.3
Even beyond contract awards to long-time government contractors, newer space industry actors have increasingly sought out
and won NASA’s heart and dollars. For example, in 2019, NASA
awarded $914 million in contracting dollars to Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX),4 the unconventional recent entrant to the federal contracting world, whose work with NASA
has solidified into a formidable partnership.
Indeed, in 2019 alone, NASA’s work with SpaceX included a
considerable number of contracts to advance some of the
agency’s most awe-inspiring missions. NASA entered into a $50.3
million contract with SpaceX to provide launch services for the
Imaging X-Ray Polarimetry Explorer (IXPE) mission, which
seeks to measure polarized X-rays from some of the universe’s
most mysterious and fascinating phenomena like black holes
and neutron stars.5 The agency also entered into a similar
launch services contract of $69 million for the Double Asteroid
1 Fiscal Year 2019, 2019 NASA ANN. PROCUREMENT REP. 1, 6 [hereinafter NASA
FY19 Procurement Report], https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
annual_procurement_report_2019_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH2P-76BD].
2 Our Mission and Values, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/careers/our-missionand-values [https://perma.cc/FV3X-23KJ].
3 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 20.
4 Id.
5 Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Awards Launch Services Contract for Groundbreaking Astrophysics Mission (July 8, 2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-launch-services-contract-for-groundbreaking-astrophysics-mission [https://perma.cc/ZH5P-4RUP].
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Redirection Test (DART) mission.6 Each additional launch services contract award rests on the existing baseline of a $3.1 billion commercial crew partnership to send astronauts to the
International Space Station (ISS) directly from U.S. soil,7 among
several other ongoing agreements.
Yet beyond massive dollar awards to aerospace industry giants
and newer innovators, NASA contracts with no shortage of small
businesses—in fact, forty-nine small business firms feature
amongst the agency’s top 100 contractors by dollar value.8 In
the same one-year period that NASA deepened its launch services partnership with SpaceX, the agency also entered into
12,914 contract actions with small businesses.9 NASA’s relationships with small businesses, including minority-owned small
businesses (MOSBs) and women-owned small businesses
(WOSBs), provide enormous benefits to both the agency and to
individual business owners seeking opportunities for investment
and experience. For example, NASA’s Ames Research Center
has worked with woman-owned Earth Resources Technology for
earth science data modeling and analysis, geospatial data management, and safety engineering.10 Glenn Research Center benefits from the services of Logical Innovations, Inc., a minorityowned and economically disadvantaged small business providing strategic operational support, training, and software development.11 Similarly, in 2014, WOSB MORI Associates, Inc. was
awarded a ten-year, $200 million contract to provide IT infra6 Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Awards Launch Services Contract for Asteroid Redirect Test Mission (Apr. 11, 2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-awards-launch-services-contract-for-asteroid-redirect-test-mission [https://perma.cc/H7BD-J7RA].
7 Jeff Foust, The Long Countdown to Commercial Crew’s Liftoff, SPACENEWS (July 5,
2020), https://spacenews.com/the-long-countdown-to-commercial-crews-liftoff/
[https://perma.cc/H8W6-AAHR]. Since the retirement of the Space Shuttle program in 2011, the United States had not sent astronauts directly to the ISS from
U.S. soil—American astronauts traveled on Russia’s Soyuz vehicle—until recently. Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA Astronauts
Launch from America in Historic Test Flight of SpaceX Crew Dragon (May 30,
2020), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-astronauts-launch-from-americain-historic-test-flight-of-spacex-crew-dragon [https://perma.cc/PMS7-AURQ]. In
May 2020, SpaceX successfully launched U.S. astronauts from NASA Kennedy
Space Center in Florida to the ISS. Id.
8 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 20.
9 Id. at 16.
10 NASA OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, NASA OSBP SPOTLIGHT: WOMEN-OWNED
SMALL BUSINESSES 10 (2014), https://osbp.nasa.gov/docs/OSBP_WOSB_SPOT
LIGHT_Rev2-TAGGEDv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z897-KY8P].
11 Id. at 12.
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structure support to the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory.12
Moreover, NASA investment helps businesses grow. After seeking advice from NASA in March 2011 with a company of only
two employees, Kegman, Inc. founder Susan “Susie” Glasgow
was able to win her first NASA contract in September 2011 to
support the Kennedy Space Center Doppler Radar Wind
Profiler.13 Through performance of this government contract,
Glasgow expanded her business to sixteen employees and, in
the last few years, secured four prime contracts to revenues of $1
million.14 In this way, NASA contracts often contribute to the
growth of a significant number of MOSBs and WOSBs.
Given the enormity of NASA’s $19 billion in yearly contracting dollars, allocated to both large corporations and a variety of small businesses, the agency has a considerable
opportunity to shape investment in the space industry. This
raises important questions: how does NASA award contracting
dollars, and how can those dollars be allocated with social policy
in mind to support and uplift various actors in the space industry? To what extent might the potential to secure government
contracts encourage women, minorities, and others traditionally
underrepresented in outer space work to become more involved
with NASA and the space industry?
This Article seeks to increase the involvement of women and
minority business owners in the space industry by encouraging
NASA and other agencies procuring space technology to employ
existing “affirmative action” government contracting programs
more frequently and efficiently. Part II highlights the lack of
gender and racial diversity in the space field. It notes the concerning low involvement of women in private aerospace work—
just over 24% women—and the underrepresentation of women
and minorities at NASA in scientific, mission-driven positions
and top leadership. Part III provides a primer on the legal
framework regulating contracts with the federal government
and the general mechanics of agency contract awards. The section provides brief background on the Small Business Administration (SBA) and its small business contracting programs,
examining in particular the WOSB program and the SBA 8(a)
Business Development Program (8(a) Program) for socially and
economically disadvantaged business owners. Part IV examines
12
13
14

Id. at 9, 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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these contracting programs within the context of the space industry, analyzing how agencies such as NASA and the Department of Defense (DoD) have met, or at times have fallen short
of, government-wide goals for contracting with WOSBs and
MOSBs. Finally, Part V proposes potential solutions to increase
the number of women-owned businesses (WOBs) and minorityowned businesses (MOBs) to which NASA awards procurement
dollars, from improving on SBA program inefficiencies to implementing legislation intended to increase diversity in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields more
generally.
II.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE IMPORTANCE OF
DIVERSITY

It is indisputable that diversity matters.15 Both private employers16 and the federal government17 recognize that diverse workplaces form an essential part of a successful enterprise. Though
diversity remains difficult to define, diversity is, at its core, “the
collective amount of differences among members within a social
unit.”18 Within a work environment, scholars define workplace
diversity as “variation of social and cultural identities among
people existing together in an employment or market setting.”19
Most essential is that the term refers to the collective—“[a]n individual cannot be diverse, but groups of individuals (e.g., the
CARY FUNK & KIM PARKER, WOMEN AND MEN OFTEN AT ODDS OVER WORKEQUITY 72 (2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/01/09/diversity
-in-the-stem-workforce-varies-widely-across-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/Y99H-6B4J].
Eight in ten Americans say it is at least somewhat important to have racial and
ethnic diversity in today’s workplaces, including around half who categorize this
as “extremely” (26%) or “very” important (27%). Id.
16 See generally Matti F. Dobbs, Managing Diversity: Lessons from the Private Sector,
25 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 351 (1996).
17 The federal government has recognized the importance of diversity in federal workplaces, including the military. See Hugh B. McClean, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Military Contracting, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 745, 749
(2017) (“The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a racially integrated military is
a matter of national security.”).
18 GEORGE GOTSIS & ZOE KORTEZI, CRITICAL STUDIES IN DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
LITERATURE: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 1 (2015) (quoting David A. Harrison &
Hock-Peng Sin, What is Diversity and How Should it Be Measured?, in MARGARET S.
STOCKDALE & FAYE J. CROSBY, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WORKPLACE
DIVERSITY 3–30 (2006)).
19 Id. at preface.
15

PLACE
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scientific research workforce) can possess diversity.”20 Promoting full inclusion means that workplaces must include employees from backgrounds that are traditionally underrepresented as
well as those backgrounds that are already well represented in
the field.21
A.

WHY PURSUE WORKPLACE DIVERSITY?

There are untold benefits to workplace and industry diversity
across a multitude of measures. Perhaps most important for the
success of space missions is the increase in creative thinking. Scientific research often involves group problem-solving.22 As researchers have noted, “the ability to see the problem differently,
not simply ‘being smart,’ often is the key to a breakthrough.”23
Individuals of varying backgrounds do, on average, tend to “approach work and problem solving differently”—differences
which spur the innovation needed to drive advancement.24 Sixtyfive leading American businesses, as amici in the Supreme Court
case Grutter v. Bollinger,25 stressed that diverse workplaces result
in greater creativity, which often presents more unique and effective solutions to the new problems that arise in a quickly
growing marketplace, achieved by integrating different
perspectives.26
In addition to increased creativity and innovation, diverse
workspaces take better advantage of the presumed natural distribution in talent across racial, ethnic, and gender lines, amongst
other identities. Research reveals no evidence that brilliant, scientific minds are unequally represented across socially constructed lines of identity.27 By maintaining a system that
discourages women and minorities from entering certain fields,
such as STEM, in addition to the gross underrepresentation of
Kenneth Gibbs, Jr., Diversity in STEM: What It Is and Why It Matters, SCI. AM.
(Sept. 10, 2014), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/diversity-in-stemwhat-it-is-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/W9QL-FES2].
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The Supreme Court upheld the narrowly tailored use
of race in admissions decisions, noting the benefits of educational diversity. Id. at
343.
26 Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056, at *7.
27 Gibbs, supra note 20 (quoting Francis Collins, Director, National Institute of
Health).
20
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women and minorities in many career fields, industries lose access to top talent.28 Former National Institute of Health Director
Francis Collins described such underrepresentation as resulting
in an “inescapable conclusion that we are missing critical contributors to our talent pool.”29
For the private sector, workplace diversity also drives profit. A
McKinsey & Company study found that “[c]ompanies in the top
quartile for racial and ethnic diversity are 35 percent more likely
to have financial returns above their respective national industry
medians.”30 Gender wise, “[c]ompanies in the top quartile for
gender diversity are 15 percent more likely” to see higher financial returns.31 In addition to company-wide diversity, a diverse
leadership team matters32—a finding of particular interest for
this Article’s study of businesses owned by women or minorities.
Diversity plays as an essential part of competing in today’s marketplace and an increasingly diverse nation.33
The increased creativity, talent, and profit derived from diverse workplaces creates stronger contractors that can build better products through ingenuity and reinvestment of profit into
research and design. The government in turn reaps the benefits
of efficiency and better products or services, which drive overall
mission success. Such ingenuity is all the more crucial when applied to the creative thinking necessary to plan for the vast
unknowns of space. Given the importance of diversity, the next
sections examine diversity statistics within the space industry and
in the NASA workforce.34
Id.
Id.
30 Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton & Sara Prince, Why Diversity Matters, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Jan. 1, 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/
our-insights/why-diversity-matters [https://perma.cc/2FH5-5K64].
31 See id. (“More diverse companies . . . are better able to win top talent and
improve their customer orientation, employee satisfaction, and decision making,
and all that leads to a virtuous cycle of increasing returns.”).
32 See id. (“[F]or every 10 percent increase in racial and ethnic diversity on the
senior-executive team, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) rise 0.8
percent.”).
33 Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Respondents, supra note 26, at *2.
34 This Article addresses diversity in a variety of environments, from industrywide diversity (the gender and racial diversity of the space industry at large) to
workplace diversity (the percentage of women and minority employees at NASA,
by job function and seniority) and programmatic diversity (the success of SBA
initiatives in ensuring appropriate diversity in the federal government contracting arena). The Author recognizes that these environments are not analogous—comparisons do not fully account for the complexity of addressing
28
29
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SPACE INDUSTRY

What is the space industry, and why does it struggle with diversity? How do challenges in involving diverse voices differ in the
private and public sectors? At its core, the “space industry” refers
to “the economic sector providing goods and services related to
space.”35 Many limit the definition to its “purest” form, the narrower subset of space actors providing hardware (typically
“launchers and satellites”), ground equipment, or sub-components for those items.36 More broadly, the space industry rests
within the overall aerospace industry—the “assemblage of manufacturing concerns that deal with vehicular flight within and beyond Earth’s atmosphere”37—and the space economy, which can
include any private or public actor providing space-enabled
products and services, from space hardware to space tourism.38
This Article will adopt a broad conception of the space industry,
with a slight focus on scientific and technical positions over the
business, marketing, legal, creative, and other skills and positions crucial to driving the overall space economy.
Overall, aerospace suffers from a lack of gender diversity.
Studies indicate that only 24% of aerospace employees are women, with little change in recent years.39 While several prominent women lead major space industry entities—for example,
Gwynne Shotwell, President and Chief Operating Officer for
SpaceX, and Leanne Caret, head of Boeing’s defense and space
division40—the industry as a whole still faces immense challenges. As lamented by an influential woman in space:
diversity in such disparate environments, and the extent to which the meaning
and goal of “diversity” vary in each environment.
35 EUROPEAN SPACE POLICY INST., YEARBOOK ON SPACE POLICY 2008/2009: SETTING NEW TRENDS 49 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Wolfgang Rathgeber, Blandina Baranes
& Christophe Venet eds., 2011).
36 Id.; see also Jeff Foust, What is the “Space Industry?”, SPACE REV. (July 14, 2003),
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/34/1 [https://perma.cc/7XNXAH9N].
37 Stanley I. Weiss, Aerospace Industry, ENCYCL. BRITANNICA (July 26, 1999),
https://www.britannica.com/technology/aerospace-industry [https://perma.cc/
S5GV-LHX6] (including the full range of vehicles from balloons, airplanes, missiles, space launch vehicles, and spacecraft).
38 See generally id.
39 Christian Davenport, At NASA, 2019 Was the Year of the Woman, Yet Women are
Still a Big Minority at the Space Industry, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/26/nasa-was-year-woman-yet-wo
men-still-are-big-minority-space-agency/ [https://perma.cc/L66C-FRDZ].
40 Id.
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“[a]erospace is still heavily male and white, and we’re not moving very quickly.”41
Given the crux of space activity—the need for expertise in
STEM fields to build space hardware and orchestrate complex,
technical operations for space missions—much of core space industry work requires some experience with STEM. However, women are vastly underrepresented in STEM fields overall.42 While
women fill close to half the total “college-educated workforce”
in the U.S. economy, in 2017 women held less than 30% of
STEM jobs,43 which is approximately “half as many women [ ]
working in STEM jobs as one might expect if gender representation in STEM professions mirrored the overall workforce.”44 For
women of color in academia, despite earning a higher percentage of doctorates in science than minority men, only 3% of minority women were employed in STEM academic positions in
2006.45 Out of “7,000 computer-science doctoral faculty in 2006,
only sixty were African American women,” and “numbers for
Hispanic and Native American women were too low to [even]
report.”46 Beyond mere statistics on underrepresentation, women in male-dominated fields often experience a host of negative experiences, such as isolation, harassment, or bullying,
which serve to dissuade entry or continued work in the field—
further worsening representation.47 The lack of women in
STEM serves as one cause of low female involvement in the
space industry: women are vastly underrepresented in STEM
overall.
41 Id. (quoting Mary Lynne Dittmar, President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Coalition for Deep Space Exploration).
42 Quick Take: Women in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM),
CATALYST (Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Catalyst Data], https://www.catalyst.org/re
search/women-in-science-technology-engineering-and-mathematics-stem/
[https://perma.cc/TC6E-XZSA].
43 Id. In terms of scientific research and development, women worldwide accounted for only 29.3% of those employed in 2016. Id.
44 DAVID BEEDE, TIFFANY JULIAN, DAVID LANGDON, GEORGE MCKITTRICK,
BEETHIKA KHAN & MARK DOMS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. ECON. & STA. ADMIN., ESA
ISSUE BRIEF NO. 04-11, WOMEN IN STEM: A GENDER GAP TO INNOVATION 2 (2011).
45 Marcy H. Towns, Where are the Women of Color? Data on African American, Hispanic, and Native American Faculty in STEM, 39 J. COLL. SCI. TEACHING, Mar. 2010,
at 8.
46 See CATHERINE HILL, CHRISTIANNE CORBETT & ANDRESSE ST. ROSE, WHY SO
FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICS 15–17
(2010).
47 Id. at 24 (“Women cited feelings of isolation, an unsupportive work environment, extreme work schedules, and unclear rules about advancement and success
as major factors in their decision to leave.”).
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Racial and ethnic minorities are similarly underrepresented
in STEM. Hispanic employees comprise 16% of the total U.S.
workforce but only 7% of STEM workers; for African Americans,
only 9% are employed in STEM out of a total of 11% of the U.S.
workforce.48 For sectors of the STEM workforce requiring a
bachelor’s degree or higher, only 6% are Hispanic and 7% are
Black.49 In contrast, Asian-Americans are overrepresented at
13% of the STEM workforce, which is above their 6% share of
the workforce overall.50 For occupations particularly relevant to
space research and development, Black and Hispanic STEM majors are most underrepresented: the two populations represent
together “only 14% of chemists and materials scientists, 10% of
atmospheric and space scientists, . . . and 6% of astronomers
and physicists.”51 Apart from Asian Americans, the low employment figures for minority employees in STEM fields give rise to
concern, indicating that racial minorities face untold barriers to
entering into STEM occupations, including those positions underlying much of the work in the space industry. In addition to
hindering the opportunities of individual employees, low female
and minority representation dampens the overall creativity of
STEM workforces.52
C.

DIVERSITY

AT

NASA

NASA has demonstrated a commitment to diversity. As
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center expressed, “[i]n order to
remain at the forefront of scientific research, we need diversity
of thinking, education, skills, and cultural backgrounds to effec48 FUNK & PARKER, supra note 15, at 8. The overall STEM data from this study
may be somewhat skewed given a broader definition of STEM encompassing a
large number of health fields. Id. at 3. For example, the data includes health
technician and nursing jobs, amongst which Black and Hispanic employees are
overrepresented—37% of licensed nurses are Black or Hispanic. Id. at 34. Figures
for physical sciences demonstrate much lower minority employment. Id.
49 Id. at 24.
50 Id. at 34–35.
51 Id.
52 See Vann Newkirk III, Boosting Science with Diversity, PBS (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/stem-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/
GQH5-HB4M]. “Collective knowledge productivity depends on people knowing
different things and seeing things different ways. . . . [T]he questions that scientists ask and the tools they use are a product of their background and personality. . . . [D]iversity improves scientific productivity, discovery, and fairness of
results.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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tively compete in this global marketplace.”53 Indeed, NASA recognizes that “[d]iversity is a business imperative and is crucial to
our continued success.”54 However, today’s vision for diversity
notwithstanding, NASA has a long history of discrimination in
hiring and promoting women and minorities, from science positions to its astronaut class.55 Employment figures for the agency
demonstrate that diversity issues persist even as NASA official
policy seeks out and encourages diversity.
As measured in NASA’s 2017 Diversity Report, women account for 34% of NASA’s workforce.56 Yet women make up only
23% of scientific employees (those in NASA’s science and engineering labor force), and half of NASA’s female employees are
employed in professional administrative positions.57 In terms of
minorities, African Americans account for 11.6% of the total
NASA workforce,58 which does not immediately suggest underrepresentation.59 However, Black employees account for only
1.3% of combined senior level and senior scientific and professional employees.60 Furthermore, while Black employees comprise 10% of the overall federal STEM workforce, at NASA, only
53 Sharon Wong, Diversity—Making Space for Everyone at NASA/Goddard Space
Flight Center Using Dialogue to Break Through Barriers, 47 HUM. RES. MGMT. 389, 390
(2008).
54 Id.
55 See generally Kim McQuaid, “Racism, Sexism, and Space Ventures”: Civil Rights at
NASA in the Nixon Era and Beyond, in SOCIETAL IMPACT OF SPACEFLIGHT 421 (Steven
J. Dick & Roger D. Launius eds., 2007); Devlin Healey, Note, There are No Bras in
Space: How Spaceflight Adapted to Women and How Women Adapt to Spaceflight, 19
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 593 (2018); Marina Koren, Why Women Weren’t Allowed to be
Astronauts, ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/03/women-in-space/498833/ [https://perma.cc/YYY6-LK2M].
This section’s discussion of NASA’s need for more gender and racial diversity is
not intended to diminish the impact of the groundbreaking hard work by women
and minorities at NASA over the years. Black women have been a fundamental
part of NASA’s history and success. See, e.g., MARGOT LEE SHETTERLY, HIDDEN
FIGURES: THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE BLACK WOMEN
WHO HELPED WIN THE SPACE RACE (2016).
56 FY17 Annual Report and Update, 2017 NASA OFF. OF DIVERSITY & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY STRATEGIC PLAN: FY2017-19, at 1, 4 [hereinafter NASA FY17 Diversity
Report], https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fy_2018_nasa_md715_report_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD7C-BHD2].
57 Id.
58 Id. at 3.
59 Typically, underrepresentation is measured by a difference of two percentage points, “regardless of statistical significance,” between the percent of the minority in the overall U.S. population and the percent of employees. Id.
60 Id.
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6% of science and engineering employees are Black.61 Instead,
most Black employees are concentrated in professional administrative positions.62
Hispanic and Asian Americans are slightly better situated in
the NASA workforce, but both groups still face significant challenges. Though NASA’s 7% Hispanic employees in scientific
and engineering positions matches the overall federal STEM
workforce, Hispanics face major barriers when it comes to securing senior leadership positions.63 Only 3.8% of senior level and
senior scientific and professional employees are Hispanic, and
the minority group accounts for only 5.5% of NASA supervisors.64 Asians, often highly represented in STEM, indeed make
up 7.5% of NASA’s workforce; however, challenges remain in
securing appropriate representation in leadership, with only 5%
representation in NASA senior executive service positions.65
This data suggests that women and minorities face challenges in
obtaining employment with NASA, encounter setbacks in receiving promotions to leadership positions, and may face negative
externalities associated with underrepresentation in the
workplace.
The workplace diversity of a federal agency matters not only
for the agency’s own productivity and work environment, but
also because agency diversity has been shown to have a measurable impact on the award of contracts to WOSBs and MOSBs. A
recent study analyzed data from the Small Business Innovation
Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs,
which NASA often uses to award research and development
grants to startups engaging in feasibility studies (Phase I) that
hopefully lead to implementation awards (Phase II).66 The study
found that the “likelihood of a Phase II transition for all Phase I
awardees is increased by about 10 and 8% for every 1% increase
in racial/ethnic and gender diversity, respectively, at the agencylevel.”67 An agency like NASA’s racial, ethnic, and gender diversity “exhibits a consistently positive and highly significant relaId.
Id. (“[F]ifty-seven percent are in [professional administrative] positions.”).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Amol M. Joshi, Todd M. Inouye & Jeffrey A. Robinson, How Does Agency
Workforce Diversity Influence Federal R&D Funding of Minority and Women Technology
Entrepreneurs? An Analysis of the SBIR and STTR Programs, 2001–2011, 50 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 499 (2018).
67 Id. at 512.
61
62
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tionship with the likelihood of successful transition from Phase I
to Phase II for all grantee firms. This means that all else being
equal, Phase I awardees are more likely to obtain follow-on
Phase II funding if the granting agency is more diverse.”68
Therefore, agency diversity matters significantly for whether or
not WOBs or MOBs are selected for future work.
While the present Article’s proposed approach to improving
diversity in government contracting might not directly impact
employment figures at NASA, an overall increase in space industry diversity could have incidental effects on NASA employment
figures. For example, private companies that secure lucrative
government contracts may have increased hiring needs to fulfill
their contract obligations. The availability of these new private
space industry employment opportunities, which are likely to be
well-paying, stable jobs, might encourage more minority undergraduates to pursue degrees in STEM. More minorities interested in STEM would also increase the number of minorities in
the candidate pool from which NASA selects employees. Furthermore, these private sector job opportunities might allow minorities more room for advancement. NASA data indicates that
women and minorities have a harder time securing promotions
than their white male counterparts,69 and only half of NASA employees agree that promotions in their work are based on
merit.70 Smaller, innovative companies might provide more
room for advancement,71 permitting NASA to later hire these
seasoned employees into higher-level positions. Government
contracts thus have the potential to diversify the entire space
industry, both public and private.

Id. at 513.
NASA FY17 Diversity Report, supra note 56, at 17 tbls.2–4.
70 Id. at 16.
71 See Ready for Liftoff: The Importance of Small Businesses in the NASA Supply Chain:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agric., Energy, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Small
Bus., 114th Cong. 12 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 NASA Small Business House Hearing] (statement of George Davis, President and Founder, Emergent Space Technologies) (“Aerospace is a very top-down, military style chain of command . . .
[but at a small business,] I can just go walk into the president’s office and have a
conversation with him.”). Greater opportunities for interpersonal interactions
and individualized attention, combined with a more collaborative workstyle, suggests a higher likelihood of advancement. See id.
68
69
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PROCUREMENT LAW PRIMER: UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS

As Part II indicated, the space industry has historically struggled with a lack of diversity, with few women and minorities
holding traditional STEM jobs at the heart of the industry.
Given that diverse workforces yield more creative solutions and
greater profits,72 and also help to remedy past discrimination,73
diversifying the space workforce is crucial to building a stronger
and more inclusive industry. Government contracts have immense potential to serve this diversifying function.
A.

WHY GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS?

Historically, socially disadvantaged businesses (socially DBs)
faltered on the path to prosperity “not . . . solely because of lack
of size or other competitive disadvantages, but also because of
racial discrimination.”74 Government contracting programs can
partially alleviate the longstanding impact of discrimination.
Through government contracting programs, minority business
enterprises gain experience, industry expertise, and opportunities for expansion stemming from government investment.75
This experience also increases the likelihood of success in the
private sector: minority businesses that “excel and prosper in
public procurement are arguably more likely to be successful in
the private market because of the similar skills required in both
fields.”76 In fact, studies show that the strongest and most competitive WOBs are ones that have contracted with the federal
government.77 In turn, these newly strengthened businesses go
on to support their communities by hiring minority employees
See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Respondents, supra note 26, at *7.
73 The government itself has affirmed that there may be benefits to remedying
past discrimination. See, e.g., McClean, supra note 17, at 746–47. For example, the
government defends the SBA 8(a) program, discussed in Part III.D, on remedial
grounds, arguing that the SBA 8(a) program “eliminates barriers to business development created by past discrimination.” Id.
74 Trent Taylor, Note, The End of an Era? How Affirmative Action in Government
Contracting Can Survive After Rothe, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 853, 872 (2010).
75 Id. at 855.
76 Id. at 869.
77 Kathleen Mee, Note, Improving Opportunities for Women-Owned Small Businesses
in Federal Contracting: Current Efforts, Remaining Challenges, and Proposals for the Future, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 721, 727 (2012); see also Denise Benjamin Sirmons, Federal
72
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and sourcing from minority suppliers, multiplying the effects of
government investment.78 Overall, diversity in government contracting serves to increase public trust in the government’s ability to support its citizens’ success,79 achieve efficiency and best
value in procurement,80 and yield better and more creative solutions. The remainder of this section provides an overview of federal government contracting mechanics and how federal
programs aimed at small businesses can help develop WOSBs
and MOSBs.
B.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS OVERVIEW

“The U.S. government is the largest customer in the world.”81
The federal government spends approximately 40% of its “discretionary spending” on contracts for goods and services supporting its vast multitude of projects—a total of over $586
billion in fiscal year 2019.82 Moreover, federal government
spending continues to increase,83 with total spending increasing
Contracting with Women-Owned Businesses: An Analysis of Existing Challenges and Potential Opportunities, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 725, 733 (2004).
78 Taylor, supra note 74, at 870.
79 Id. at 869–70.
The amicus curiae brief of several former high-ranking officers and
civilian leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps also
argued for greater diversity in the military forces. The officers asserted that greater diversity in leadership roles results in greater
“public confidence in the fairness and integrity of public institutions” and enhances “their ability to perform their vital functions
and missions.” Accordingly, diversity in public procurement not
only will increase diversity among government contractors, but also
will lead to greater public trust of the Government because of the
Government’s demonstrated commitment to diversity and equality.
Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. in Support of Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)).
80 Id. at 869 (“Unique approaches in problem solving and product design are
essential to achieving efficiency and the best value in procurement. Creativity is
especially important in proposals involving competitive negotiations, which seek
the proposal that offers the best solution and is by far the most preferred method
of fixed-price contracting.”).
81 Contracting Guide, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-guide [https://perma.cc/ZB78-FDWQ].
82 A Snapshot of Government-wide Contracting for FY 2019 (Infographic), U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: WATCHBLOG (May 26, 2020) [hereinafter Federal Government Contracting for FY 2019], https://blog.gao.gov/2020/05/26/a-snapshot-ofgovernment-wide-contracting-for-fy-2019-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/76TJB9X4].
83 Compare id. (depicting government spending), with Federal Government Contracting for Fiscal Year 2018 (Infographic), U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.: WATCHBLOG (2019) [hereinafter Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018], https://

2020]

DIVERSITY IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY

437

by $100 billion between 2015 and 2018.84 Overall, this renders
federal government contracting an enormous endeavor in terms
of scope, dollar amounts, and complexity.
Several statutes regulate how the government acquires goods
and services. The primary and most fundamental set of regulations is the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which went
into effect in April 1984.85 The FAR, intended to establish uniform, government-wide procurement procedures, governs all
purchases by federal executive agencies, unless otherwise excluded.86 The regulations enable the government “to deliver on
a timely basis the best value product or service . . . maintaining
the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy objectives.”87 Applicable FAR provisions “are incorporated into every federal government procurement contract and have the same effect as if
they were set forth in the contract itself,” with contract terms
that legally bind both parties.88 Beyond this 53-part regulatory
system, many agencies also have their own FAR supplements,
such as the NASA FAR Supplement or the DoD FAR Supplement.89 With each agency’s supplement included, the total FAR
exceeds 5,000 pages.90
Contracting officers (COs), agency officials with the authority
and responsibility to contract for goods and services,91 retain
sole authority to enter into, sign, modify, or terminate contracts
on behalf of the government.92 COs oversee the major phases of
the acquisition process: “(1) acquisition planning and market
research; (2) solicitation of offers and selection of sources . . . ;
blog.gao.gov/2019/05/28/federal-government-contracting-for-fiscal-year-2018infographic/ [https://perma.cc/M9DX-K2FU] (depicting government spending
lower than that of fiscal year 2019).
84 Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-244SP, CONTRACTING DATA ANALYSIS: ASSESSMENT OF
GOVERNMENT-WIDE TRENDS 5 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/
683273.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DH9-UWM9].
85 Stephen W. Feldman, Federal Acquisition Regulation, 4 GOV’T CONT. GUIDEBOOK, at § 2:12 (Oct. 2019), Westlaw GCGUIDE.
86 Id.
87 FAR 1.102(a) (2020).
88 Feldman, supra note 85, § 2:12.
89 Richard D. Lieberman & Jason D. Morgan, The Basics of Government Contracts—A Primer, 47 CONT. MGMT. Aug. 2007, at 33.
90 Id.
91 FAR 2.101.
92 FAR 1.601(a), 43.202, 52.249-2(a).
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and (3) contract performance and administration.”93 In particular, COs play a major role in ensuring FAR provisions are closely
followed in the award of government contracts.94
Federal statutes stipulate that most contracts be awarded competitively. Per the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
(CICA), all government contracts are subject to full and open
competition through the use of competitive procedures, apart
from certain exceptions.95 The two primary competitive procedures include (1) sealed bidding through an invitation for bids;
or (2) negotiated procurement using a request for proposals.96
Exceptions arise in situations such as sole source procurements,
where the good or service is only available from a single vendor
(or a limited number of vendors), emergency situations, “or
where full and open competition would compromise national
security.”97 The small business set aside programs discussed below also receive exemption from CICA.98

93 See Anna S. Molina, The Sisyphean Course of Combatting Gender Discrimination in
the Federal Marketplace for Prime Contracts: Rolling the Boulder of Small Business Size, 22
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 109, 115 (2015) (citing FAR 2.101).
94 FAR 1.602-2.
95 41 U.S.C. § 253; see also FAR 6.101. CICA intended for all procurements to
be competed as full and open so that any qualified company would be able to
submit an offer. 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1)(A). CICA aimed to increase competition
for procurements to enable cost reduction and increased opportunities for small
businesses to win federal contracts. Id. § 253(b)(1)(A).
96 Lieberman & Morgan, supra note 89, at 35, 37. “Sealed bidding is employed
when an agency is able to articulate all of the specifications, terms, and conditions of the contract in the IFB, except for price. In this method, contractors
provide the missing term—price—in the form of a sealed bid.” Id. In contrast,
[n]egotiated procurements are used where the procuring agency
seeks “best value,” meaning that the agency will award the contract
on the basis of evaluation factors, including but not limited to
price. . . . Once the CO receives the initial proposals from offerors,
he or she will then conduct an evaluation using the evaluation factors and may make an award, if it is the best value. Otherwise, the
CO will whittle the field to a “competitive range” of three to four
contractors.
Id.
97 Id. at 35.
98 See FAR 6.203–.207 (permitting the award of contracts on a basis other than
full and open competition for small business and minority set aside programs).
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THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND SMALL BUSINESS
CONTRACTING PROGRAMS

The Small Business Act of 1953 (SBAct) established the
SBA.99 The SBAct recognized the imperative need to assure
American economic security and well-being through the encouragement and development of small business activity.100 In support of this initiative, Congress declared it sound policy for the
government to:
aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total
purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services
for the Government . . . be placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain
and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.101

The SBA helps American small businesses102 by securing access
to funding, providing counseling and training on proper business management, and advocating for small business concerns
through research, policy analysis, and congressional testimony.103 In terms of government contracting, the SBA oversees
the federal agency-wide goal of awarding 23% of federal government prime contract awards to small businesses each fiscal year,
as mandated by Congress.104 The agency in turn advises, encour-

About SBA: Organization, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/
about-sba/organization [https://perma.cc/6M46-YTZ7].
100 See Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. 85-536, § 2, 67 Stat. 232, 232 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 631).
101 Id.
102 There is no uniform definition for what constitutes “small.” See Federal Contracting Guide: Size Standards, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-guide/size-standards [https://perma.cc/6DYS55BQ]. Instead, the SBA sets size standards, which “define the largest size a business can be to participate in government contracting programs and compete for
contracts reserved or set aside for small businesses. Size standards vary by industry
and are generally based on the number of employees or the amount of annual
receipts the business has.” Id.
103 See About SBA: Organization, supra note 99.
104 Id.; U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FY 2019 GOALING GUIDELINES 3 (2018), https:/
/www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/resources_articles/
FY19_Small_Business_Goaling_Guidelines_Draft_2018-08_Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6NJK-UEUB].
99
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ages, and monitors all federal agencies in meeting this
benchmark.105
1.

Small Business Set Asides

Small businesses benefit from SBA programs that permit COs
to give priority to small businesses when procuring goods and
services. This preferential consideration, termed a “small business set-aside[ ],”106 is a competitive award reserved “exclusively”
for participation by “small business concerns.”107 With few exceptions, contracts with an anticipated dollar value between
$10,000 and $250,000 are automatically set aside for small businesses.108 This restriction offers smaller companies a unique opportunity to secure government contracts without competition
from larger businesses that, based on size, might be better
equipped to spread costs to undercut a small business’s proposal. For acquisitions over $250,000, a CO shall set aside an acquisition provided that certain conditions are met, most
fundamentally when: (1) the CO has a “reasonable expectation
that: (1) [o]ffers will be obtained from at least two responsible
small business concerns; and (2) [the a]ward will be made at fair
market prices.”109 Where a total set-aside is not appropriate for a
given acquisition, the contracting officer also is expected to set
aside only a portion of the acquisition—in essence, leaving
room for small businesses where it would not otherwise be feasible to award the whole contract to a smaller entity.110

105 See id. (“Every Federal agency with procurement authority is responsible for
contributing towards meeting the Federal government-wide small business procurement goals. Each agency must provide the maximum practicable opportunity
to small businesses to win awards and must work to improve its procurement
processes to meet the goals.”).
106 See FAR 19.203(e) (“Small business set asides have priority over acquisitions
using full and open competition.”).
107 FAR 19.501(a)(1).
108 FAR 2.101, 19.502–2(a). Contracts valued between $10,000 and $250,000
are automatically reserved exclusively for small business concerns and “shall be
set aside for small business unless the contracting officer determines there is not
a reasonable expectation of obtaining offers from two or more responsible small
business concerns that are competitive in terms of fair market prices, quality, and
delivery.” Id.
109 FAR 19.502–2(b).
110 Partial set-asides exclude construction contracts. FAR 19.502–3(a).
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Social Policy-Oriented Small Business Set-Asides: The HUBZone,
SDVOSB, WOSB, and SBA 8(a) Programs

The federal government has made a commitment to employing government contracts to better support and empower certain groups. To that end, it is government policy to:
provide maximum practicable opportunities in its acquisitions to
small business, veteran-owned small business [VOSB], service-disabled veteran-owned small business [SDVOSB], HUBZone small
business [HUBZone], small disadvantaged business [small DB],
and [WOSB] concerns. Such concerns must also have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate as subcontractors in
the contracts awarded by any executive agency, consistent with
efficient contract performance.111

The SBA veteran and “affirmative action” small business programs, like the general small business program, allow for setasides that exempt acquisitions from “full and open competition.”112 These set-asides permit consideration of minority business concerns before considering more generalized small
business concerns: COs use their discretion to utilize any of the
above-mentioned programs before the traditional small business
set-aside.113 However, there is parity amongst the programs,
meaning that COs assign no automatic “order of precedence” in
deciding which program to employ.114 Instead, an agency
chooses amongst the four programs based on market research
(a determination of whether there are any “socioeconomic firms
capable of satisfying the agency’s requirement”) and current
progress in advancing toward contracting goals for each
program.115
Each of the SBA’s four programs effectuates different, important policy goals through relatively similar mechanisms. The
HUBZone set-aside program, established through the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, “limits competition for certain contracts to businesses in historically underutilized business
FAR 19.201(a).
FAR 19.203(d).
113 FAR 19.203; U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., WOMEN OWNED SMALL BUSINESS
(WOSB) PROGRAM–A PRIMER FOR CONTRACTING OFFICERS (SUPP. WORKBOOK)
(Nov. 2013), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2018-02/cowosb_work
book.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UKA-RRZQ].
114 FAR 19.203(a).
115 FAR 19.203(d).
111
112
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zones.”116 The goal of the program is “to provide federal contracting assistance . . . to increase employment opportunities,
investment, and economic development in such areas,”117 which
are typically geographic areas with low income levels, high poverty, high levels of unemployment, disaster areas, or qualified
Indian lands.118 In July 2020, there were 7,461 actively certified
firms in the HUBZone program.119 The current federal goal is
for each agency to award 3% of prime contracts to HUBZone
businesses.120 The SDVOSB set-aside program serves a similar
set-aside function for VOSBs and requires at least 51% business
ownership by a service-disabled veteran.121 The government
seeks to award at least 3% of all annual federal contracting dollars to SDVOSBs.122 The WOSB and SBA 8(a) Programs, of chief
importance for this paper, are discussed more thoroughly
below.
D.

WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM

There are over 11 million WOBs in the United States.123 In
fact, “[i]f all the women-owned businesses in the United States
were their own country, they would have the fifth largest gross
domestic product (GDP) in the world, preceding France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom.”124 “Women own a quarter of all
non[-]farm businesses in the United States,”125 employing nearly
9 million people.126 As changing cultural factors have permitted
FEDERAL CONTRACTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: HUBZONE PROGRAM, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-assistance-programs/hubzone-program [https://perma.cc/HK9U-S8JS]; see also U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41268, HISTORICALLY UNDERUTILIZED
BUSINESS ZONE EMPOWERMENT CONTRACTING (HUBZONE) PROGRAM (July 7, 2020)
[hereinafter SBA HUBZONE PROGRAM], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41268.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FZ2-SSB2].
117 13 C.F.R. § 126.100 (2019).
118 SBA HUBZONE PROGRAM, supra note 116, at 1, 8.
119 Id. at 15.
120 Id. at 20.
121 Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-assistance-programs/
service-disabled-veteran-owned-small-businesses-program [https://perma.cc/
Z5JJ-A8AX].
122 SBA HUBZONE PROGRAM, supra note 116, at 20.
123 AM. EXPRESS, THE 2017 STATE OF WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES REPORT 3
(2017) (defining a WOB as one that is “at least 51% owned, operated, and controlled by one or more females.”).
124 Mee, supra note 77, at 723.
125 Id. at 724.
126 AM. EXPRESS, supra note 123, at 3.
116
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women greater autonomy and access to education and employment, women have increasingly taken on business ownership
roles. From 1997–2017, the number of WOBs grew by 114%—a
growth rate 70% higher than the 44% national growth rate for
all businesses.127 The growth rates for women of color are substantially higher, with the number of firms owned by women of
color expanding by 467% during that same period.128 While the
largest industry area for women-owned firms is in services such
as hair salon or pet care services, about 1.5 million womenowned firms engage in services ranging from law to accounting,
public relations, or scientific functions.129
Despite dramatic increases in business ownership by women,
significant challenges remain. Women face a marked disadvantage based on gender discrimination that prevented women
from owning or growing businesses throughout history.130 When
women have started businesses, barriers often render attaining
the same level of revenue generation as men more difficult—on
average, WOBs generate just a quarter of the sales of maleowned businesses.131 Studies on the survival of new businesses
have found that “over a four-year period, seventy-two percent of
men-owned firms survived compared to only sixty-six percent of
WOBs.”132 Figures for WOBs demonstrate that while ownership
is a first step, more work needs to be done to ensure WOBs enjoy the same access to capital, opportunities, and continued
growth as male-owned businesses.
Based on this need, women stand to greatly benefit from government contracting opportunities. However, government contracting with women has historically been severely lacking:
“WOBs comprise 28.7% of all the nonfarm businesses in the
United States, but they only represent 8.3% of all federal prime
Id.
Id. at 5.
129 Id. at 8. About 2.8 million, or 23% of all women owned firms, are in the
“other services” category, which includes services like hair and nail salons or pet
care businesses. Id. This is the top industry area for women. Id. Approximately
12% of women-owned firms are in the professional, scientific, or technical services category. Id. Currently, the most rapidly growing industry for WOBs is the
construction business. Id.
130 See generally Wendy Gamber, A Gendered Enterprise: Placing Nineteenth-Century
Businesswomen in History, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 188 (1998); S. COMM. ON SMALL BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 113TH CONG., 21ST CENTURY BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S ENTREPRENEURSHIP (rev. ed. 2014) (Maj. Rep.) (authored by Maria Cantwell, Comm.
Chairwoman).
131 Mee, supra note 77, at 725.
132 Id.
127
128
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contractors and they are awarded less than 2.5% of all federal
prime contracting dollars.”133 The sections below examine the
slow start of the federal WOSB program and the government’s
inadequate efforts to achieve WOSB contracting goals.
1.

History of WOSB Federal Government Contracting

Despite a long history of gender discrimination in the United
States, women were not the original focus of SBA affirmative action programming. When Congress first amended the SBAct to
create the SBA 8(a) Program, the primary focus was on “socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals”—which tacitly included women of color, but did not explicitly include women on
the whole.134 In 1979, President Carter signed Executive Order
12138 requiring federal agencies to “take affirmative action in
support of women’s business enterprise,”135 which included federal procurement.136 Yet, women did not truly receive support in
securing federal procurement dollars until the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA).137 The FASA established
the goal of awarding at least 5% of all federal prime contracting
dollars to WOSBs each fiscal year.138 This 5% goal was sorely
needed—in 1989, only 1% of federal contracting dollars were
being awarded to WOBs.139
While the FASA was a legislative victory, it did not do much to
actually implement improvements in contracting awards to
WOSBs. Even after five years with FASA’s 5% contracting goal
for WOSBs in place, in 2000, WOSBs only received 2.3% of what
was at the time $200 billion in annual federal contract awards.140
FASA’s initial enactment left COs with no tools or guidance to
meet the 5% goal and no true incentive.141
Instead, legislation in 2000 and subsequent rulemaking in
2010 went further to advance opportunities for WOBs.142 Congress enacted the Equity in Contracting for Women Act
Id. at 727.
See Molina, supra note 93, at 124.
135 Exec. Order No. 12138 § 1-101(b), 3 C.F.R. § 393 (1979).
136 Molina, supra note 93, at 124.
137 Id.; Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355
§ 7106(a)(2)(A), 108 Stat. 3243, 3375 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 644).
138 Molina, supra note 93, at 125.
139 Id. at 124–25.
140 Patricia A. Meagher, The Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contracting Program: Ten Years in the Making, 46 PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2011, at 17.
141 Mee, supra note 77, at 729.
142 Id. at 729, 732.
133
134
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(ECWA) in 2000, which amended the SBAct to create a WOSB
program.143 The ECWA called for the SBA to first conduct a
study to identify which industries most sorely suffered from underrepresentation of WOBs.144 It then authorized COs to set
aside contracts for the WOSB program specifically in those industries the SBA had previously identified as lacking in WOSB
representation.145 The success of the ECWA’s passage, however,
was diminished with a change in presidential administration and
new priorities for the SBA.146 While the SBA did conduct an initial study in 2001 to identify in which industry areas WOSBs
were underrepresented, this study was never published.147 A
study by the RAND Corporation, commissioned by the SBA several years later, now serves as the basis for measuring representation of WOSBs in industry areas.148
The SBA’s 2010 rulemaking, which finally implemented the
WOSB program ten years after its initial creation, was a hardfought victory that finally increased opportunities for women.149
The final rule150 sets out eighty-three industries in which WOSBs
Unlike other small business programs in which Contracting Officers (COs) were enabled to reserve (or “set aside”) some contracts
for specific types of businesses, no similar program existed with regard to WOSBs. The House Committee recognized that without a
specifically targeted WOSB program, the Government would never
achieve the five percent goal. In light of this recognition, the legislature drafted and enacted the ECWA.
Id. at 730.
143 Equity in Contracting for Women Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. I § 302,
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-684 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(C)); see also FAR
19.1500(a).
144 Meagher, supra note 140, at 17.
145 Id.
146 See id.
147 Id. In 2003, SBA sought an independent review, and in 2005, the National
Academy of Sciences declared the SBA study flawed based on poor methodology.
Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. Spurred in part by a 2004 meeting with the SBA administrator who purportedly declared the ECWA’s goals (helping women-owned businesses) “meaningless,” the U.S. Women’s Chamber of Congress sued the SBA for the undue
delay in implementing the program. See id. The final rule was issued by SBA on
October 7, 2010. Id. at 18; 75 Fed. Reg. 62,258 (Oct. 7. 2010).
150 In the SBA’s 2007 proposed rule, the agency set out only a small set of
industries/NAICS codes to which the WOSB program would apply. See Lillian F.
McManus, Note, The Anatomy of a Helping Hand: Women-Owned Small Businesses and
Federal Contract Procurement, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 625, 632 (2012). Senator John Kerry “called it ‘a slap in the face to women business owners’ and accused the SBA of ‘cherry picking data’ in order to create a highly exclusive
program.” Id. (quoting Sharon McLoone, SBA Upsets Lawmakers with Contracting
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are either underrepresented or substantially underrepresented,
measured by both the share of contracting dollars awarded and
the share of total contracts awarded to WOSBs.151 At the time
the rule took effect on February 4, 2011, the WOSB Program
was generally well received.152
2.

Current WOSB Program Functioning

The WOSB Program helps meet the federal government-wide
goal of awarding 5% of all prime contracting dollars to WOSBs
each year.153 Program regulations distinguish between awards to
economically disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs) or WOSBs, for
which COs may set aside acquisitions when the acquisition is “assigned a [North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)] code in which SBA has determined that WOSB concerns
are underrepresented in Federal procurement,” and for those businesses, for which COs may set aside acquisitions when the acquisition is assigned a NAICS code for which “WOSB concerns are
substantially underrepresented.”154 The WOSB Program also permits COs to award WOSB sole source set-asides before considering other small business set-asides, provided certain conditions
are met.155
Two shortcomings limit the ability of the WOSB Program to
fully support the needs of women business owners. First, the fedPlan, WASH. POST. (Dec. 28, 2007), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/small-business/2007/12/sba_upsets_lawmakers_with_cont.html [https://perma.cc/HT8EE3JL]).
151 Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg.
62,258, 62,258 (Oct. 7, 2010) (codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 121, 124, 125, 126, 127,
134).
In the 2010 final rule, the SBA identified eighty-three North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes that would be eligible for the WOSB federal contracting program. Of these
industries, forty-five were identified as industries in which WOSBs
were underrepresented and thirty-eight were identified as industries in which WOSBs were substantially underrepresented. This
rule took effect on February 4, 2011, and since then COs overseeing contracts that fall within one of the eighty-three NAICS codes
identified by the rule have been able to implement the WOSB federal contracting program.
Mee, supra note 77, at 732–33 (citing Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,258, 62,262); see also Meagher, supra note
140, at 18.
152 Meagher, supra note 140, at 18.
153 Id.
154 FAR 19.1505(a)(2) (emphasis added).
155 See FAR 19.1505(c).
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eral government has consistently fallen short of actually meeting
the 5% WOSB contracting goal.156 Though the government
overall has come close, for example reaching 4.75% of contracts
in 2018,157 in an entire decade (2009–2019) the government
only met its WOSB contracting goal in a single year—2015.158
This significantly shortchanges WOSBs,159 as even a 1% increase
in award of contracting dollars would mean an additional approximately $5.5 billion allocated to women business owners.160
Second, the WOSB Program only permits set-asides for
EDWOSBs and WOSBs in certain NAICS-coded industries.161
Many commenters to the original rule criticized162 the selection
processes for the NAICS codes under which WOSBs may receive
set-asides, and “expressed their desire for the SBA to include all,
or at least more, NAICS codes in the program instead of only
156 Jessie Bur, Agencies Improved on Small Business Goals, But Can Do More, FED.
TIMES (June 26, 2019), https://www.federaltimes.com/acquisition/2019/06/26/
small-businesses-get-a-fair-share-of-contracts-but-improvements-remain/ [https://
perma.cc/NQB5-JZ6R].
157 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., GOVERNMENT-WIDE PERFORMANCE FY18 SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENT SCORECARD (2019), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
2019-06/G_W.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG59-3JYG].
158 Bur, supra note 156.
159 It is worth noting, however, that often individual agencies will meet their
contracting goal. See Molina, supra note 93, at 134. For example, in 2014, twentytwo out of twenty-four federal agencies met their 5% WOSB goal; however, the
DoD, the “largest buyer in the executive branch,” did not, skewing the overall
agency-wide contracting goal. Id. In fact, the DoD decreased overall contract
awards to small businesses while awarding significantly higher value contracts,
suggesting that the agency is procuring large contracts from large companies—
leaving little room for small business empowerment goals. Id. As DoD procurements often source from aerospace industry actors, this holds significance in
terms of diversifying the space industry. See Molina, supra note 93, at 134; Top 10
Defense Contractors, BLOOMBERG GOV. (June 26, 2020), https://about.bgov.com/
top-defense-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/P7R5-HLQB] (listing major aerospace industry actors, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin).
160 In fiscal year 2018, the federal government spent $550 billion on contracts.
Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83. One percent of $550
billion is $5.5 billion.
161 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/federal-con
tracting/contracting-assistance-programs/women-owned-small-business-federalcontracting-program [https://perma.cc/8TAC-CXZL].
162 The SBA itself acknowledged that “dozens of comments” supported a “dramatic expansion of the list.” McManus, supra note 150, at 632. Such an expansion
would put the WOSB on equal footing with the SBA’s other affirmative action
programs. Id. (quoting Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Program, 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,259).
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the specified eighty-three codes.”163 Limiting set-asides to only
specific industry areas impedes COs from considering a WOSB
set-aside even when the industry area may still effectively need
the support of the WOSB Program. These shortcomings indicate the need for further work to implement the WOSB Program and strengthen its impact.
E. CONTRACTING WITH MINORITIES: SOCIALLY AND
ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED BUSINESSES AND THE
SBA 8(A) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
1.

History

The U.S. federal government has a long history of affirmative
action in government contracting, having first set out the 8(a)
Program in the SBAct of 1953.164 This section gave the SBA the
“authority to enter into subcontracts with small businesses for
the acquisition of goods and services ‘whenever it determines
such action necessary.’”165 Support for minorities coalesced in
1968 when President Johnson urged the SBA to create a program under its SBAct 8(a) authority that would assist minority
businesses, known as those owned by “‘socially or economically
disadvantaged’ persons.”166 Based on this missive, in 1969 the
SBA transformed the 8(a) Program from one focused mostly on
stimulating low-income areas to one aimed at assisting disadvantaged business owners.167 The goal was to help “small concerns
owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable
businesses capable of competing effectively in the market
place.”168
After the establishment of support for minorities in the 1960s,
the SBA 8(a) Program grew throughout the 1970s and 80s. In
1971, executive orders by President Nixon prompted implementation of additional policies, including technical and management assistance to relevant firms and coordination across
Mee, supra note 77, at 734.
15 U.S.C. § 637(a).
165 Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, A Decade Later: Adarand and Croson and the Status of
Minority Preferences in Government Contracting, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (2009)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)).
166 Id. (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.8–1(c)(1)(7) (1997)).
167 Antoine Marshall, Pathways for Procurement: Operating Minority Business Programs After Rothe, 6 S. REGION BLACK STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 1, 9 (2012).
168 Id. (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.8–1(b) (1970)).
163
164
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federal agencies.169 Congress built upon these changes in 1978
amendments to both the SBAct and the Small Business Investment Act. The amendments reformatted the 8(a) Program to
concentrate on set-asides to “socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns,” and set a goal of awarding 5% of
the total value of all contracts to small DBs.170
Presently, much of the debate about the 8(a) Program concerns its constitutionality following several court opinions: in
particular, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,171 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,172 and Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of
Defense.173 These cases suggest that for affirmative action programs in federal government contracting to survive strict scrutiny, the government must produce evidence of discrimination
to justify a present need in each industry in which it awards contracts.174 Though the legal landscape remains unclear post-Rothe,
for now affirmative action contracting programs withstand con169 Christopher R. Noon, The Use of Racial Preferences in Public Procurement for
Social Stability, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 611, 613 (2009) (citing Exec. Order No. 11,625,
3 C.F.R. § 213 (1971); Exec. Order No. 11,458, 3 C.F.R. §§ 779, 780 (1969)).
170 Patricia C. Bradley, Affirmative Action or Passive Participation in Perpetuating
Discrimination? The Future of Race-Based Preferences in Government Contracting, 2008
ARMY LAW., Feb. 2008, at 25–26 (quoting An Act to Amend the Small Business Act
and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757
(1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
171 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the Court applied strict scrutiny in evaluating state and local contracting programs that considered race in awarding contracts. See id. at 493, 508, 511. The Court “essentially abolished most minority
preference business programs for public contracting at the state and local levels
that were in effect at the time of the decision.” See Marshall, supra note 167, at 16.
172 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarand extended the Croson strict scrutiny analysis for
race-based contracting programs to federal programs. See id. at 221–22, 238–39.
After Adarand, Congress revised the SBA to survive the Court’s strict scrutiny review. Zehrt, supra note 165, at 12–14. Most Circuits have since concluded that
“Congress had a strong evidentiary basis in deciding that remedial action was
necessary to eradicate the effects of race discrimination in government contracting.” Id. at 16.
173 545 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Federal Circuit struck down an act that
set a 5% goal for awarding defense contracting dollars to socially and economically disadvantaged individuals each year and permitted awarding contracts to
this group at prices 10% above fair market cost. See id. at 1026–27. The court’s
criticism of the statute concerned the quality and means of gathering evidence of
necessity. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 862–63.
174 McClean, supra note 17, at 747–48 (“If the government fails to meet its
evidentiary burden . . . it risks exposure to Equal Protection challenges. While the
[8(a) Program] remains constitutional on its face, the risk of as-applied challenges stalled its use in particular industries [and] reduced its overall
effectiveness.”).
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stitutionality provided proof exists as to the necessity of the program and the narrow tailoring of its design and use.175
2.

Current Functioning

Section 8(a) of the SBAct authorizes the SBA “to enter into
[prime] contracts with other [federal] agencies and award subcontracts for performing those contracts to firms eligible for
program participation.”176 The 8(a) Program functions by empowering the SBA to work with agencies to match agency “requirements with the capabilities of 8(a) participants.”177 The
program permits “set-asides, partial set-asides, and reserves of
Multiple Award Contracts” for the 8(a) Program, and awards
may be either sole source or competitive.178 Competition is required where there is a reasonable expectation that two eligible
participants will submit offers, and where the anticipated dollar
award, for non-construction contracts, exceeds $4 million.179
Qualification for the program, which involves certification as an
8(a) participant by the SBA, requires firms to be small businesses and at least 51% owned and controlled by U.S. citizens
who are economically180 and socially disadvantaged,181 among
other requirements.182 The regulations presume that members
of designated racial groups are socially disadvantaged.183 Once
Marshall, supra note 167, at 28.
FAR 19.800(a).
177 FAR 19.803.
178 13 C.F.R § 124.501(a)–(b) (2019).
179 Id. § 124.506(a)(2).
180 Id. § 124.104(a) (“Economically disadvantaged individuals are socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has
been impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportunities as compared
to others in the same or similar line of business who are not socially
disadvantaged.”).
181 Id. § 124.103(a) (“Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have
been subject to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within American society
because of their identities as members of groups and without regard to their
individual qualities. The social disadvantage must stem from circumstances beyond their control.”).
182 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: 8(a) Business Development Program, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (2020), https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting
-assistance-programs/8a-business-development-program [https://perma.cc/A
236-4M5Z].
183 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b) sets out a rebuttable presumption that certain individuals are socially disadvantaged, including Black-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native-Americans, Asian Pacific-Americans, Subcontinent Asian-Americans,
and “members of other groups designated from time to time by SBA.” Id.
§ 103(b)(1). An individual not a member of these groups may “establish individ175
176
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admitted, businesses may remain in the program for up to nine
years.184
Generally, efforts to support MOBs have been more effective
than several of the other affirmative action contracting programs, including the WOSB program. For example, in fiscal
year 2018 the federal government as a whole exceeded its goal
of awarding 5% of contracting dollars to small DBs by awarding
$46.5 billion, or 9.65%, of prime contracts to small DBs.185
There is a large disparity in which agencies meet the federal 5%
SBA 8(a) goal, in part based on the number of small businesseligible actions agencies have available.186 For example, in 2018
the Department of Energy awarded only 0.79% of procedure
dollars to SBA 8(a) businesses; the Department of Education
only 1.65%, and the Social Security Administration only
2.28%.187 The most successful agencies have been the SBA itself,
the Department of the Interior, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.188 Notably, the DoD, the nation’s largest contracting
agency, awarded only 3.4% to the SBA 8(a) Program in 2018,
though at $10.1 billion, the dollar value was relatively high.189 In
any case, each agency must strive to meet yearly program goals
for the program to be most effective.
The federal government has for years developed programs intended to benefit WOBs and MOBs to remedy historical disadvantage, empower business owners, and stimulate the economy
ual social disadvantage by a preponderance of the evidence.” See id.
§ 124.103(c)(1).
184 Id. § 124.2.
185 Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Federal Government Achieves Small
Business Contracting Goal for Sixth Consecutive Year with Record-Breaking $120
Billion to Small Businesses (June 25, 2019), https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/sbanewsroom/press-releases-media-advisories/federal-government-achieves-smallbusiness-contracting-goal-fifth-consecutive-year-record-breaking [https://
perma.cc/DE7G-AK4W]; U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 157. All SBA 8(a)
certified firms are socially DBs, but not all socially DBs are SBA 8(a) certified. See
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 157. Generally, agency figures are higher for
small DBs, the broader category, than for the SBA 8(a) program specifically. Id.
This figure is for the broader category. Id.
186 8a Application Package “Bestseller”, EZ8A, https://www.ez8a.com/8a-certifica
tion-package.aspx [https://perma.cc/AL4W-9ZNV].
187 Id.
188 Fact Sheet: Small Disadvantaged Business Federal FY 2018 Prime Contracting, U.S.
SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (2020), https://www.sba.gov/document/support-small-disad
vantaged-business-federal-prime-contracting-factsheet [https://perma.cc/4EMRQEH4].
189 8a Application Package “Bestseller”, supra note 187.
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by providing more opportunities for small businesses. These
programs, part of the immense set of regulations controlling the
complex government contracting system, provide essential financial assistance to deserving businesses. Greater use of SBA
affirmative action programs within industries such as the space
industry could provide the financial investment needed to attract more women and minorities to an industry in dire need of
diversity.
IV.

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND THE SPACE
INDUSTRY

The government engages in an astronomical amount of contracting each fiscal year and manages both to abide by a uniform
set of regulations in engaging in diverse, complex procurements, and to concentrate on social policy-oriented affirmative
action goals in the process. How does this government contracting framework unfold in the space industry? This section
examines government contracts within the space industry and
how NASA in particular conducts procurements.
A.
1.

SPACE PROCUREMENTS GENERALLY

Unique Landscape

Fulfilling a government contract for any activity involving
outer space presents unique challenges for both COs and contractors themselves. COs face two issues: acquiring products that
will withstand the unforgiving and ever-mysterious environment
of outer space itself,190 and the practical difficulties that arise
from such large acquisitions.191 From a technological standpoint, space acquisitions involve a high degree of technical complexity.192 Space systems also grow more complicated than
This includes “the harsh launch environment (i.e., shock and vibration)
and space environment (i.e., thermal, radiation, and vacuum).” YOOL KIM, ELLIOT AXELBAND, ABBY DOLL, MEL EISMAN, MYRON HURA, EDWARD G. KEATING,
MARTIN C. LIBICKI, BRADLEY MARTIN, MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, JERRY M. SOLLINGER,
ERIN YORK, MARK V. ARENA, ARV BLICKSTEIN & WILLIAM SHELTON, ACQUISITION OF
SPACE SYSTEMS: PAST PROBLEMS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES VOLUME 7, at 41–43
(2015).
191 See id. at 39 (“The[se] include low-quantity buys, the limited industrial base,
very stringent standards for components (e.g., space qualified), high technological complexity, and inability to repair hardware on-orbit cost-effectively.”).
192 See id. at 42. Technological
[c]omplexity in space systems may be attributed to the fact that
space system hardware cannot be repaired once launched. . . . But
other complexities result from immature technologies, a high de190
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terrestrial projects given “that space system hardware cannot be
repaired once launched”193—rendering stringent standards for
components and rigorous testing before launch all the more important.194 The nature of the acquisition process itself, such as
the practice of making expensive but low-volume purchases,
means that contractors producing space equipment often lack
the benefit of repeated production to improve research and design—a so-called “learning curve” benefit.195 Thus, the high
complexity and infrequent purchasing contribute to a small industrial base,196 making the inclusion of new or small businesses
more difficult.
Despite the difficulties of product development for space activity, contracting with private actors will likely dramatically increase given the privatization trend within the space industry.
Today, the vast majority of space activity is “driven by governments with private industries acting as contractors.”197 Rather
than the model employed during the height of the Space Race,
whereby NASA employees themselves drove the scientific innovation behind most launches and programs, or even more recent models of the agency procuring goods as a “customer,”

Id.

gree of integration with other complex components, subsystems,
and systems, and complex failure modes. As a result, complex systems can be more difficult to integrate, model, and test than lesscomplex systems.

Id.
See id. at 43 (“High reliability . . . requires high engineering margins and
rigorous testing.”).
195 Id. at 40.
Purchasing in low volumes [means] there is little learning curve
benefit. The last of the production run, although less costly than
the first, will not have the cost reduction that accompanies large
runs. Second, low volumes make it hard to break out all or even
major parts of the design for competition or second-sourcing as a
way to reduce cost, because the learning cost of a new contractor
cannot be absorbed in a small production run.
Id.
196 Id. at 41.
The high qualification standards required for space system parts
have limited the growth of supplier base and competition, particularly when the qualification process itself requires special infrastructure. Quality requirements for government satellites can be more
demanding than those for commercial satellites to ensure high reliability and hence long life for increasingly complex parts.
Id.
197 ALESSANDRA VERNILE, THE RISE OF PRIVATE ACTORS IN THE SPACE SECTOR, at
xxv (Eur. Space Pol’y Inst. ed., 2018).
193
194
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NASA now has shifted “from their position of almighty customer
having full control of all the details of the development of systems, to a position of consumer, making extensive use of all
readily-available capacities developed in full autonomy by industry.”198 This framework has notable advantages: the government
benefits from substantial cost savings; in turn, private industry
benefits from lucrative government funding while maintaining
full control of design and product development.199 Given the
ever-increasing use of private companies to fulfill agency goals,
contracting between space companies and agencies such as
NASA and DoD will likely remain the framework for space industry activity, and thus merits additional scrutiny on how and to
whom federal contracting dollars are awarded.
2.

Space Actors
As the New York Times articulated,
our day-to-day lives depend on the herds of satellites occupying
orbital space, the world community’s commons. They are integral to communications, social media, business transactions, military operations and surveillance, surveys for charting world
resources and climate and the G.P.S. devices that help us keep
track of ourselves and others.200

Given the multitude of benefits outer space provides, it is no
wonder that a wide variety of federal agencies regulate and oversee outer space actors.
The space industry is best “understood as a tripartite structure
with civilian, military, and commercial components.”201 For noncommercial space activity, three main government agencies design and operate spacecraft: (1) the DoD, which operates space
craft for military purposes;202 (2) NASA, which controls all civilian governmental space activities; and (3) the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which operates enviId. at 10.
Id.
200 John Noble Wilford, 3, 2, 1, and the Last Shuttle Leaves an Era Behind, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/science/space/
09wilford.html [https://perma.cc/X37Z-JUWW].
201 Gabrielle Daley, Note, Building a Ladder to the Stars: A Competition Policy for
the New Space Race, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 339, 343 (2019).
202 MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW, at xv (2014). These
purposes include “communications, reconnaissance, early warning [technology],
and meteorology.” Id.
198
199
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ronmental and weather monitoring satellites.203 Each agency receives sizable appropriations from Congress to procure and
launch satellites for their missions.204 Numerous other agencies
also oversee and regulate space activity, such as (1) the Federal
Aviation Administration, which “regulates the launch and reentry of commercial spacecraft”; (2) the Federal Communications
Commission, which “licenses and coordinates usage of the radio
frequency spectrum by private satellites”; and (3) other agencies, such as those that regulate environmental protection, intellectual property, or export control.205 As NASA and DoD most
frequently engage in space procurements, DoD procurements
are discussed briefly in this section, and NASA procurements below in Part IV.B.
The DoD has the largest space budget of any federal
agency.206 In 2008, DoD investment in major space programs totaled $6.1 billion: $3.2 billion allocated for research, development, test, and evaluation; $1.2 billion directed towards
procurement of space products; and $1.6 billion spent on
launch activity.207 Given the military’s need for particular capabilities, the DoD frequently procures more complex and unique
products than any other agency, resulting in acquisition requirements unlike any products in the commercial sector.208 Therefore, DoD satellite acquisitions typically involve developing new
technologies to meet the agency’s “stringent needs.”209 Due to
this particularity, the DoD rarely enters into firm, fixed-price
contracts, as such contracts require advance knowledge of satellite design and cost, which is more typical of mature technologies than prototypes.210 Instead, the agency pursues costreimbursement contracts that more flexibly accommodate

Id. at xv–xvi.
E.g., Comm. on Appropriations Together with Minority Views, Department
of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2020, H.R. REP. NO. 116–84, at 156, 187, 226, 236,
251–52, 273, 276 (2020).
205 KLEIMAN, supra note 202, at xvi.
206 Id. at xv.
207 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-315R, BRIEFING ON COMMERCIAL
AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND ACQUISITION PRAC12 (2010), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10315r.pdf [https://
TICES
perma.cc/CQ6Z-M3UJ].
208 Id. at 2.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 3.
203
204
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launch delays, changing needs, and the diverse array of other
organizations involved.211
As the agency with the federal government’s largest budget,
the DoD is well situated to direct federal procurement dollars
towards WOSBs and MOSBs in the space industry. In fact, in
fiscal year 2018, DoD prime contract awards to small businesses
represented 59% of all federal small business contracting
awards.212 In terms of diversity, the DoD has, as a general trend,
increasingly awarded more of its contracting dollars to small
businesses, WOSBs, and socially DBs.213 In 2018, the DoD received an “A” on its SBA scorecard.214 Overall, the agency has
historically done better in terms of race than gender. For example, the agency exceeded its 2018 goal of awarding 5% of contracting dollars to small DBs, with 8.76%, or $26.1 billion,
awarded.215 However, the DoD failed to meet its 5% goal for
WOSBs, totaling only 4.1%, or $12.2 billion.216 While shortcomings in supporting WOSBs may in part stem from inefficiencies
in the WOSB program itself, the DoD can certainly do more to
improve awards to WOSBs. Meeting goals for both WOSBs and
MOSBs would better foster diversity amongst DoD space industry contractors.
B.

NASA

AND

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

NASA is no stranger to government contracts. With 35,929
procurement actions in fiscal year 2019,217 NASA ranks fifth
amongst civilian federal agencies for most contracting dollars
awarded.218 Since 2015, NASA’s obligations have grown steadily,
leading to total obligations that have expanded from $21 billion
Id.
Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Achieves Small Business Contracting Goal
for Fifth Consecutive Year (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.businessdefense.gov/
News/News-Display/Article/2031580/dod-achieves-small-business-contractinggoal-for-fifth-consecutive-year/ [https://perma.cc/AN6N-7EXV].
213 Small Business Program: Goals and Performance, DEP’T OF DEF., https://busi
ness.defense.gov/About/Goals-and-Performance/ [https://perma.cc/387XMMYA].
214 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF DEF.: FY18 SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENT
SCORECARD (2019), https://business.defense.gov/Portals/57/Documents/Score
card%20FY2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2AG-EFRW].
215 Id. The agency fell below its subcontracting goal of 5% to small DBs at only
4.10%. Id.
216 Id. The agency did meet its goal of directing 5% of subcontracting dollars
to WOSBs with 5.1% awarded in 2018. Id.
217 See NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 6.
218 See Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83.
211
212
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in 2015 to $35.9 billion in 2019.219 As NASA plans to return to
the Moon and eventually travel to Mars,220 the agency faces new
procurement needs to tackle the scientific feats that will carry
humans to new frontiers. How has NASA typically involved small
businesses, women-owned, and minority-owned small businesses
in contracting?
1.

Small Businesses

NASA has committed to promoting and integrating “all small
businesses into the competitive base of contractors that pioneer
the future of space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research.”221 In practice, NASA has in fact incorporated
numerous small businesses—awards to small business firms totaled over $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2019,222 of which the agency
awarded $1.6 billion through the set-aside program.223 NASA’s
top 100 contractors in 2019 included 49 small business firms, of
which “21 were disadvantaged firms at the time of the award.”224
Furthermore, NASA awards contracts to entities in all fifty states,
which allows for widespread support of local economies.225
Each award to a small business provides an enormous support
to that business’s growth and development. Historically, longterm, large-scale NASA projects provided small businesses the
opportunity to build upon their initial research to provide secondary technologies to the commercial market.226 For example,
a small business that originally developed LED chips to grow
plants on the International Space Station later transformed
these chips for use in a handheld medical device that provided
relief for muscle and joint pain.227 Initial government contracts
therefore provided small businesses with innovative, marketable
NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 6.
Press Release, Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., NASA’s Moon to Mars
Plans, Artemis Lunar Program Gets Fast Tracked in 2019 (2019), https://
www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-s-moon-to-mars-plans-artemis-lunar-programgets-fast-tracked-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/2VT9-CG49].
221 OSBP Vision & Mission, NASA OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, https://
www.osbp.nasa.gov/vision.html [https://perma.cc/4XAR-H9MW].
222 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 16.
223 Id. at 17.
224 Id. at 20.
225 See 2016 NASA Small Business House Hearing, supra note 71, at 1 (statement of
Rep. Carlos Curbelo, Comm. Chairman).
226 E.g., id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Grace Meng).
227 Id.
219
220
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technology that constituted a new revenue source for sustained
business growth.228
However, while NASA has committed to, and remains actively
involved in, contracting with small businesses, opportunities
may be shrinking. Small businesses testifying before Congress
noted “a diminishing supply of small business set-asides.”229
These smaller companies testified to shrinking opportunities
given NASA’s increasing reliance on large, private sector partners, many of whom perform manufacturing themselves rather
than sub-contracting to smaller businesses,230 and concern over
NASA’s budget, which fluctuates based on Congress’s perception of NASA mission success.231 Moreover, awards to small businesses amounted to 21% of total dollars awarded in 2018232 and
22% in 2019;233 while these figures demonstrate that NASA has
met its small business contracting goals in recent years, this success indicates that opportunities remain for NASA to set more
ambitious goals, such as setting a goal closer to the federal government-wide goal of allocating 23% of awards to small businesses.234 In sum, NASA has evoked a commendable
commitment to working with small businesses, but work remains
to uphold this stated vision.
2.

NASA and the SBA 8(a) and WOSB Programs

NASA has generally made progress towards supporting women and racial minorities through SBA contracting programs.
Through the SBA 8(a) Program, NASA awarded $698 million to
small DBs in fiscal year 2019.235 This amounts to an increase
over 2015’s $551 million.236 Through the WOSB program,
NASA awarded $783 million to WOSB firms, including $410 million to women-owned small DBs (those typically owned by miId.
Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-262SP, NASA: ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR PROJECTS 5, 9–10 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/
699373.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B2K-TWGH].
232 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA PROCUREMENT ANNUAL REPORT:
FY 2018, at 14 (2018), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/an
nual_procurement_report_2018_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV8M-JHUG].
233 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 16.
234 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra note 157.
235 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 17.
236 Id. at 19.
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nority women).237 NASA’s investment in these small businesses
provides much needed capital to develop companies and ensure
their continued survival.
In addition to supporting WOBs and MOBs through contract
awards, NASA has developed its own mentorship program designed to improve minority contracting. The NASA Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP)
encourages NASA prime contractors to assist eligible Protégés,
thereby enhancing the Protégés’ capabilities to perform on
NASA contracts and subcontracts, fostering the establishment of
long-term business relationships between these entities and
NASA prime contractors, and increasing the overall number of
these entities that receive NASA contract and subcontract
awards.238

Eligible protégés include firms participating in SBA programs
for minorities, women, and veterans (small DBs, HUBZone,
WOSBs, and VOSBs/SDVOSBs), Historically Black College or
Universities (HBCUs), minority institutions, and a small handful
of other firm categories.239 This program, which operates separately from any other federal program, provides a unique opportunity for small businesses to enhance their opportunities to win
contracts and subcontracts, and demonstrates NASA’s support
of these firms.
Space industry procurements are amongst the most complicated and lucrative of government contracts. NASA and the
DoD spend billions of dollars on procurement in support of
their missions. On the whole, both agencies fare well in terms of
awarding contracting dollars to WOSBs and MOSBs and in implementing programs to support these businesses their contracting efforts. However, both agencies fall short of contracting
with WOBs, suggesting that further efforts must be undertaken
to improve program success.

Id. at 17.
Business Development and Technology: Mentor-Protégé Program (MPP), NASA
OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, https://osbp.nasa.gov/mpp/index.html [https://
perma.cc/WRW7-N4KJ].
239 Id.
237
238
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THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING DIVERSITY
IN THE SPACE INDUSTRY THROUGH CONTRACT
AWARDS

A.

COMBATTING FRAUD TO ENSURE PROGRAMS TRULY AID
TARGETED POPULATIONS

Though the majority of SBA program participants qualify for
assistance programs and truthfully pursue contracts with the
government, SBA programs do experience significant instances
of fraud and abuse.240 In particular, contractors may commit
fraud by falsely certifying as a woman-owned business, by inducing the SBA to erroneously award SBA 8(a) Program certification, or by claiming small business status when a business
exceeds size eligibility.241 These practices direct valuable contracting dollars away from intended program beneficiaries,242
and therefore constitute one major area where the SBA and
space procurement agencies could institute reforms to reserve
more contract awards for women and minority business owners.
1.

New Changes to WOSB Certification Stand to Help WOSBs

To qualify as a WOSB, firms must satisfy three requirements:
(1) “be a small business”; (2) “be at least 51% owned and controlled by women who are U.S. citizens”; and (3) have women
managing “day-to-day operations” and “making long-term decisions.”243 Economically disadvantaged WOSBs must meet the
same requirements, and must also demonstrate that the owner’s
net worth, gross adjusted income, and personal assets fall below
a certain dollar amount.244
240 Sarah Westwood, Feds Gave $400 Million in Contracts to Ineligible Firms, WASH.
EXAM’R (Sept. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/feds-gave-400million-in-contracts-to-ineligible-firms [https://perma.cc/BHZ5-6FHG]; Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Dist. Colo., $3.6 Million Settlement Resolves Procurement Fraud Investigation Against Colorado and Maryland Construction Companies Involved with SBA’s Minority Disadvantaged Business Development Program
(Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/36-million-settlement-re
solves-procurement-fraud-investigation-against-colorado-and [https://perma.cc/
J6FK-KVPX].
241 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., FY2018 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 5, 16–18 (2017), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
2019-08/SBA_OIG_FY_2018_CBJ_5-17-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP5J-2WW5].
242 Id.
243 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, supra note 161.
244 Id.
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Historically, the WOSB program was not an SBA certification
program—that is, the SBA did not investigate into WOSB eligibility and did not certify firms as eligible participants in the program. WOSBs could certify their eligibility in two ways: by selfcertifying through providing documentation or by obtaining
certification from a third-party certification company approved
by the SBA.245 After self-certifying, the process merely required
COs seeking to award contracts to WOSBs to verify that the entity was (1) registered in the System for Award Management; (2)
had listed its self-certification in the system; and (3) had submitted documents verifying its eligibility by the time of initial offer.246 This method of self-certification absolved the SBA of any
responsibility for determining eligibility for the program by instead taking program applicants at their word—a highly trusting
method easily abused by dishonest firms.247 Self-certification was
thus an easy means for contractors to fraudulently assert WOSB
eligibility and deprive the program of funds for bona fide WOSB
firms.248
However, the SBA recently, and at long last, implemented
changes to WOSB certification that should address many of the
infirmities plaguing self-certification. Based on program modifications enacted by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015, the SBA announced in January 2020 that it was
developing new regulations.249 The SBA’s new WOSB regulations, published in May 2020 and initially implemented in July

Id.

To qualify as an economically disadvantaged business within the
women’s contracting program, a business must: meet all the requirements of the women’s contracting program; be owned and
controlled by one or more women, each with a personal net worth
less than $750,000; be owned and controlled by one or more women, each with $350,000 or less in adjusted gross income averaged
over the previous three years; and be owned and controlled by one
or more women, each $6 million or less in personal assets.

FAR 19.1503(b), (c)(1).
FAR 19.1503(b).
247 U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 18-18, AUDIT REPORT: SBA’S WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS FEDERAL CONTRACTING PROGRAM 4
(2018), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/oig/SBA-OIG-Report-18-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA2Y-6QBH].
248 Id.
249 Press Release, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., SBA Issues New Regulations for Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contracting Program (May 11, 2020), https:/
/www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-newsroom/press-releases-media-advisories/sba-is
sues-new-regulations-women-owned-small-business-federal-contracting-program
[https://perma.cc/W485-BTKZ].
245
246
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2020, end self-certification.250 Instead, the regulations allow for
WOSB or EDWOSB program-eligible firms to use either the
SBA’s free online certification platform or SBA-approved thirdparty certifiers.251
The elimination of self-certification addresses major flaws in
the program.252 A 2015 SBA Inspector General report on WOSB
set-asides “found that from a sample of thirty-four set-aside
awards, ‘[nine] of these [thirty-four] were awarded to firms that
did not provide required documentation to prove they were eligible for WOSBP.’”253 In particular, “[twelve] firms did not provide sufficient documentation to prove that a woman or women
controlled the day-to-day operations of the firm.”254 Overall,
“tens of millions of dollars” have likely been allocated to WOSBs
that were technically ineligible, but whose eligibility was not
monitored by the SBA.255 The proposed regulations implementing a new certification regime stand to help eligible WOSBs win
contracts that might have otherwise gone to ineligible
businesses.
As the SBA’s new certification process takes effect in 2020,
making self-certification less of a concern, the SBA must take
care to ensure that businesses do not continue to evade program goals by making false statements to the agency or its partners. The revised regulations continue to rely on third-party
certifiers, which have been in use since soon after the start of
the WOSB program.256 However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports indicate that the SBA performed
250 Id. The SBA announced the regulations would take effect in July 2020 and
October 2020. Id.
251 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, supra note 161.
252 Mee, supra note 77, at 735. When the SBA issued its 2010 rule implementing the WOSB program, self-certification was controversial. See id. (“Commenters
disagreed as to the certification procedures set forth in the rule. Many commenters believed that self-certification should not be allowed because they feared
it would be too easy to take advantage of the program.”).
253 Matthew Layman, Note, Mistake, Fraud, and Waste: Mass Inefficiencies in Small
Business Programs That Allow Self-Certification, 46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 167, 176–77
(2016) (quoting U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., NO. 15-10, EVALUATION REPORT: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN SBA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE WOMENOWNED SMALL BUSINESS FEDERAL CONTRACTING PROGRAM 4 (2015), https://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2019-07/Report_15-10_Improvements_Needed_
in_SBAs_Management_of_WOSBP.pdf [https://perma.cc/4372-GFBY]).
254 Id. at 177.
255 Id.
256 Federal Contracting Assistance Programs: Women-Owned Small Business Federal
Contracting Program, supra note 161.
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little oversight of these third-party certifiers since implementation of their use.257 As third-party certification remains in use
under the new regulations, the SBA must provide sufficient
oversight to ensure consistent and strict application of the program requirements.258 Similarly, the SBA must investigate further into claims made by WOSBs. For example, one means of
manipulating the SBA program has been to establish simple
WOSB ownership rather than true control.259 In a 2013 report,
NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that, out of
twenty contracts awarded to WOSBs, seven, or thirty-five percent,
“were awarded to [six] different firms that may not have met the
criteria for a woman-owned small business.” Specifically, those six
firms appeared to be run by the male spouse of the woman who
owned the business, violating the control requirements set forth
by the SBA.260

These evasions of program rules matter. The goal of the WOSB
program is to redress years of discrimination against women business owners and to empower women to grow and develop their
enterprises. Such opportunities are limited and should remain
with the intended beneficiaries. Therefore, despite the significant progress made through new SBA rulemaking, the agency
must continue to be vigilant as it now undertakes review of
WOSB program participants.
2.

SBA 8(a) Business Development Program Fraud

The SBA 8(a) Program provides exceptional benefits to 8(a)
certified small businesses. Perhaps because of this substantial assistance, some firms have engaged in program fraud by falsely
asserting eligibility in terms of economic status, socially disad257 Layman, supra note 253, at 176 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-15-54, WOMEN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM: CERTIFIER OVERSIGHT AND
ADDITIONAL ELIGIBILITY CONTROLS ARE NEEDED 7 (2014)).
258 The SBA has noted that, to ensure consistency between its review and thirdparty certifiers, “SBA is the final authority for all of the certification processes. . . .
[T]he foundation for all the processes is SBA’s Program eligibility requirements.”
Women-Owned Small Business and Economically Disadvantaged Women-Owned
Small Business Certification, 85 Fed. Reg. 27650, 27651 (May 11, 2020).
259 See, e.g., Layman, supra note 253, at 177.
260 Id. (“In total, the OIG estimated that these firms were awarded ‘approximately $74.5 million in contract obligations during fiscal year 2010 from 54
unique Federal procurement organizations,’ which as a result ‘may have overstated progress toward meeting woman-owned business contracting goals by the
same amount.’”).
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vantaged status, or small business size.261 For example, a 2010
GAO report “identified fourteen ineligible firms participating in
the 8(a) Program, that received $325 million of 8(a) contracts.
Eligibility issues included under reporting of net worth and salary, the principal’s false claim of racial ethnicity, . . . [and] management by [a] non-disadvantaged individual.”262 These
attempts to deceive SBA program officers occurred despite the
SBA’s direct review and certification of SBA 8(a) firms—unlike
the WOSB program, SBA 8(a) has not permitted selfcertification.263
Based on GAO recommendations, the SBA implemented
changes to the 8(a) regulations in 2011 to combat instances of
fraud.264 Such changes included consideration of SBA 8(a) applicants’ spouses’ financial assets and determination of whether
an individual’s immediate family member has previously participated in the SBA 8(a) Program.265 Other changes recommended by the GAO included fraud detection tools and
verification through third-party data sources.266 These improvements go far to help curb erroneous awards to ineligible firms.
Other fraud detection tools include regulations that permit
protests to challenge businesses’ SBA 8(a) certification. However, protests themselves cannot fully combat fraud given limitations to what aspects of SBA 8(a) certification may be protested.
For example, another offeror, the contracting officer, or the
SBA District Director may launch a size protest alleging that a
successful offeror for a competitive SBA 8(a) award does not
meet size specification to qualify as a small business.267 Yet the
overall “eligibility of an [SBA] 8(a) participant for a sole source
or competitive 8(a) requirement may not be challenged by another 8(a) participant or any other party, either to SBA or any
administrative forum as part of a bid or other contract protest.”268 There are certainly valuable reasons not to question an
individual’s socially disadvantaged status or to require concrete
proof of such status, which would force individuals to prove
261 E.g., Jeffrey F. Pan, Preventing Small Business Fraud, Including Small Business
Contracting Fraud Prevention Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 13 (2012).
262 Id. at 21–22.
263 Id. at 15.
264 Id. at 14.
265 Id. at 22.
266 Id.
267 FAR 19.813(c), 19.814.
268 FAR 19.813(a) (emphasis added).
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their racial or ethnic background at the request of disgruntled,
unsuccessful offerors. However, insufficient means exist to ensure eligibility requirements are met, and further tools to verify
proper eligibility would go far to reduce fraud and create more
opportunities for true socially and economically DBs.
The SBA should consider further study into 8(a) Program
abuse and the efficacy of protest mechanisms. The agency might
also consider increasing the availability and clarity of guidance
on non-SBA 8(a) opportunities so that ineligible firms have
clear alternative avenues to government funding. Additionally,
the government could decrease fraud by establishing stricter
sentencing guidelines for punishing the exploitation of government contracting programs—in essence, raising the stakes for
wrongdoing.269 These improvements to SBA 8(a) Program functioning might serve to preserve valuable government contracting opportunities for the SBA 8(a) Program’s intended
beneficiaries.
B.

EMPLOYING NASA’S OTHER TRANSACTIONAL AUTHORITY

In the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Space
Act), which created NASA, Congress endowed the agency with
the authority to enter into “other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of its work and on such terms as it may deem
appropriate.”270 The “founding father” of this authority, Space
Act drafter and former NASA General Counsel Paul Dembling,
intended the phrase “other transactions” to be a “‘catchall
phrase’ [that would] provide NASA freedom from traditional
269 Section 2B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines covers “economic
crimes” like fraud and forgery, and prescribes offense level calculations dependent in part on a calculation of loss. See Michael Sabo, Note, Affirmatively Ambiguous: Reforming the Fraud Federal Sentencing Guidelines Rules in “Affirmative Action”
Government Contracts, 43 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 157, 161–62 (2019). Currently,
many circuit courts use the “general loss rule,” which mitigates loss by factoring
in benefits the government received. Id. at 159. In contrast, under a “government
benefits rule,” often reserved for entitlement programs, the loss for sentencing
purposes is the entire total of the grant or contract awarded without any mitigation for legitimate services rendered. Id. Resolving the current circuit split in
favor of a government benefits rule would create a harsher punishment for government contracting fraud. Sabo argues that contract programs should be considered government benefits and that the U.S. Sentencing Commission should
revise the sentencing rules to ensure that those “who illegally exploit government
programs are held accountable for the full amount of money awarded by the
government regardless of any benefits or services provided.” Id. at 187.
270 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1958, Pub. L. 111314, § 20113(e), 124 Stat. 3328, 3334 (1958).
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procurement regulations and flexibility to structure agreements
in line with commercial business practices.”271 Presently, this authority, termed “other transaction[al] authority” (OTA), equips
NASA with flexible, additional contracting authority outside typical regulatory or contractual constraints,272 as “OTAs are legally
binding instruments [different and separate from] contracts,
grants, or cooperative agreements.”273 Since first envisioned at
NASA’s establishment, the authority to enter into other agreements as necessary has been extended to eleven other agencies,
subject to additional agency regulations.274 The DoD, the federal government’s largest procurer of goods and services,275 employs OTAs more than any other agency,276 often for its research
and development work.277
OTAs stand to greatly benefit WOBs and MOBs by providing
an easier, more flexible means of contracting with the government that bypasses some of the regulatory hurdles imposed by
contracting regulations. For example, OTAs circumvent regula271 Nathaniel E. Castellano, Other Transactions are Government Contracts, and Why
It Matters, 48 PUB. CONT. L.J. 485, 487 (2019).
272 Annejanette Heckman Pickens & Daniel J. Alvarado, Other Transaction Agreements: An Analysis of the Oracle Decision and Its Potential Impact on the Use of OTAs, 54
PROCUREMENT LAW., Fall 2018, at 1, 18.
There is a list of notable statutes that do not apply to OTAs, a few of
which are the Competition in Contracting Act, the Contract Disputes Act, and the Buy American Act. Most notably excluded from
application is the Bayh-Dole Act, which governs patent rights and
intellectual property (IP) for certain government-funded
inventions.
Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. NASA has broad OTA authority without any preconditions, as opposed
to the DoD. Castellano, supra note 271, at 502.
275 Federal Government Contracting for FY 2018, supra note 83 (showing that the
DoD had $358.3 billion in procurement obligations in 2018).
276 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 17 (“[B]etween FY 2015 and FY 2017
DoD spent nearly $21 billion through 148 OTAs.”).
277 Victoria Dalcourt Angle, Innovation in Government Contracting: Increasing Government Reliance on Other Transaction Agreements Mandates a Clear Path for Dispute
Resolution, 49 PUB. CONT. L.J. 87, 95 (2019). The DoD often uses OTAs for research and development purposes. Id. The agency has “authority to enter into
two types of other transactions: OTAs for basic, applied, and advanced research
and development projects and OTAs for prototype projects.” Id. “Prototype OTAs
have the potential to turn into follow-on production OTAs.” Id. In the FY18 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress announced “a ‘preference’ for the
use of OTAs for prototypes and research and development projects under 10
U.S.C. § 2371b and 10 U.S.C. § 2371.” Id. at 98 (quoting National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 867, 131 Stat. 1283,
1495 (2017)).
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tions such as the FAR, the CICA, and the Cost Accounting Standards, and provide the “freedom to negotiate intellectual
property rights outside the [constraints] of the Bayh-Dole
Act.”278 OTAs allow agencies to craft unique, individualized
agreements with a diversity of actors to meet agency needs. Traditionally, this authority has permitted “agencies to more readily
attract nontraditional contractors, such as commercially focused
technology companies, to research and development
projects.”279 It allows for agency partnerships “with firms that infrequently participate in government contracting due to industry perception that government contract regulations are overly
burdensome.”280 Despite these typical uses, OTAs can be used
for a variety of means—in fact, a survey of federal agencies
found that the main reason for their use is for the “flexibility”
the agreements provide.281
There are certainly benefits for women and minorities to
abiding by the FAR. FAR provisions set forth the very SBA programs that are key to ensuring WOSBs and MOSBs even receive
consideration for prime contracts. However, OTAs can supplement these contracting programs by allowing for additional,
non-traditional means of involving small businesses. For example, NASA Kennedy Space Center entered into a non-reimbursable agreement, under its OTA, with WOSB Craig Technologies
to take over the remains of the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot.282
This OTA provided Craig Technologies “the opportunity to
house and maintain the manufacturing equipment for a period
of 5 years and utilize it for any commercial purpose.”283 The
agreement, under which no money was exchanged, “was purely
an entrepreneurial opportunity” that provided an enormous
benefit to a WOSB.284 In fact, founder Carol Craig explained
that the profits secondarily derived from the agreement enabled
her to expand the business to include an aerospace solution diCastellano, supra note 271, at 488.
Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 19.
280 Angle, supra note 277, at 91.
281 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 19 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-209, FEDERAL ACQUISITIONS: USE OF “OTHER TRANSACTION”
AGREEMENTS LIMITED AND MOSTLY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 12
(2016)).
282 2016 NASA Small Business House Hearing, supra note 71, at 9 (statement of
Carol Craig, President and CEO of Craig Technologies).
283 Id.
284 Id.
278
279
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vision.285 These types of flexible arrangements, which in the present example required relatively little burden or financial
expenditure on NASA’s part, can be transformational for small
businesses seeking experience and resources.
Recent case law regarding OTAs does stand to somewhat limit
their use by decreasing agencies’ discretion to enter into these
agreements. In 2018, the GAO ruled in Oracle America Inc.’s
bid protest286 that “(1) GAO will review a timely protest that an
agency is improperly using its OTA authority and (2) GAO will
sustain a protest where an agency does not comply with statutory
requirements for the award of follow-on production work without competition.”287 As a result of the GAO’s ruling, agencies
must be more careful and adhere to stricter parameters when
entering into OTAs.288 Otherwise, GAO will review the agency’s
OTA use if “entered into without complying with [ ] statutory
requirements,” a decision likely to increase bid protests and
scrutiny of OTAs.289 Despite these new parameters, OTAs present a viable alternative option to traditional contracting under
the FAR, and could help encourage agencies to find new solutions to increase contractor diversity.
C.

SUPPORT

FOR

MINORITIES

IN

STEM

To even address improving the gender and racial diversity of
federal contract awardees requires a body of qualified WOBs
and MOBs in the first place. One source of the lack of diverse
companies contracting with NASA and other space-adjacent
agencies stems from the underrepresentation of women and minorities in STEM fields as a whole.290 As discussed in Part II,
women make up less than 30% of U.S. STEM employees.291 Racial minorities also face underrepresentation given that STEM
employees with bachelor’s degrees are only 6% Hispanic and
7% Black compared to a total U.S. workforce that is 16% Hispanic and 11% Black.292 Given these barriers, representation
could be improved by (1) supporting minorities by building
Id.
Oracle Am., Inc., B-416061, 2018 WL 2676823, at *1 (Comp. Gen. May 31,
2018).
287 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 22.
288 Angle, supra note 277, at 91 & n.26.
289 Pickens & Alvarado, supra note 272, at 22.
290 See supra Part II (describing the lack of diversity in STEM fields).
291 See Catalyst Data, supra note 42.
292 See FUNK & PARKER, supra note 15.
285
286
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upon existing programs assisting minority-serving institutions;
and (2) supporting women by enacting legislation meant to improve conditions for women in STEM.
1.

HBCU & Minority-Serving Institution Programs

Building strong and supportive academic departments at minority-serving institutions (MSIs)293 would encourage students
to enter STEM majors, better educate those students to ensure
their success in competitive job markets, and attract high-caliber
faculty to improve instruction and mentorship. NASA and the
DoD have designed programs to support minority institutions,
both of which have the capacity to improve diversity in STEM.
NASA’s Office of Small Business Programs manages the NASA
HBCU/MSI Program, which directs funds towards Hispanicserving institutions, Tribal colleges or universities, Alaska Nativeserving or Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, predominantly
Black institutions, Asian American and Native American Pacific
Islander-serving institutions, and Native American-serving nontribal institutions.294 NASA’s policy “is to attain an Agency-wide
goal of one percent of total contract value of prime and subcontracting awards for acquisitions to [HBCUs] and [MSIs].”295 Attaining this 1% goal, and setting even more ambitious goals
moving forward, would help drive resources towards minority institutions. Overall, NASA awarded $1.87 billion to educational
institutions in 2019; however, not one of the ten institutions receiving the greatest percentage of educational contracting
awards were HBCUs or MSIs.296 Investing more in university research programs has enormous potential to drive more STEM
293 Small Business Programs: Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) /
Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs), NASA OFF. SMALL BUS. PROGRAMS, https://
osbp.nasa.gov/hbcu-mi/index.html [https://perma.cc/VR2A-NGF3].
“Minority Serving Institution” must be an institution of higher education whose enrollment of a single minority or a combination of
minorities . . . exceeds 50 percent of the total enrollment. Minority
is defined, in 20 U.S.C. § 1067k, as American Indian, Alaskan Native, Black (not of Hispanic origin), Hispanic (including persons of
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Central or South American origin), Pacific Islander or other ethnic group underrepresented in
science and engineering.
Id.
294 Id.
295 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT: NASA FAR
SUPPLEMENT § 1826.302 (2015), https://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/procurement/
regs/NFS.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2HT-A5JZ].
296 NASA FY19 Procurement Report, supra note 1, at 24.
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majors to these schools or to foster an interest in majoring in
STEM amongst current students.
The DoD’s programs serve similar goals, with the agency demonstrating an interest in and commitment to supporting minorities in STEM. The DoD’s HCUs and MSIs Research and
Education program
enhances work in scientific and engineering disciplines critical to
the national security functions of DoD, improves the capacity of
HBCUs/MSIs to participate in DoD research programs and activities and increases the number of graduates, including underrepresented minorities, in the fields of science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics important to the defense
mission.297

In 2019, the DoD awarded $23.2 million to 59 MSIs to support
the acquisition of research equipment, which benefitted “24
HBCUs, 34 MSIs, and one Tribal College.”298 Continuing to support academic institutions, and prioritizing these institutions by
providing research support, awarding contracts, and hiring recent graduates, could help diversify the pool of STEM majors
and yield new STEM graduates interested in forming businesses
and contracting with the government.
2.

STEM Legislation
Given the notorious challenges for women working in STEM
professions, legislation aimed at improving working conditions
would help encourage women to enter into and stay in the
field.299 For example, in 2019 Congress passed the Building
Blocks of STEM Act (Building Blocks Act), which modifies National Science Foundation (NSF) grant programs that support
297 Press Release, Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Announces Fiscal Year
2019 Research Equipment Awards to Minority-Serving Institutions (Oct. 23,
2019), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/
1996576/defense-department-announces-fiscal-year-2019-research-equipmentawards-to-mino/ [https://perma.cc/5YYP-ANYD].
298 Id.
299 Beyond the legislation discussed in this section, other recent legislation includes attempts to deal with “cultural and institutional barriers to expanding the
academic and federal STEM workforce.” STEM Opportunities Act of 2019, H.R.
2528, 116th Cong. § 7 (2019). Section 7 requires the director of the NSF to develop written best practices for institutions of higher education and federal laboratories to conduct periodic climate surveys of STEM departments and divisions
“with a particular focus on identifying any cultural or institutional barriers to the
recruitment, retention, or advancement of women, racial and ethnic minorities,
and other groups historically underrepresented in STEM studies and careers.” Id.
§ 7(a)(1).
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STEM education.300 Specifically, the Building Blocks Act encourages participation of underrepresented populations in STEM
fields by prescribing research into whether and how teachers encourage or discourage participation of female students in STEM
activities in their classrooms, and what types of activities would
prompt more girls to consider STEM.301 This research makes an
important stride towards determining how and at what point women begin to feel discouragement from entering into these
fields in the first place.
Despite the progress legislation like the Building Blocks Act
represents in encouraging participation of women in the field,
more must be done. Proposed legislation, such as the Combating Sexual Harassment in Science Act of 2019, would make considerable strides towards addressing toxic environments and
behavior that render working in STEM unbearable for many women.302 The bill seeks “to provide for research on the causes,
consequences and prevalence of, as well as interventions for
preventing, sexual harassment in the STEM workforce. The bill
also directs coordination among Federal science agencies efforts
to address sexual harassment involving federally funded researchers.”303 It includes important protections for victims, such
as by directing “the Office of Science and Technology Policy to
consider policy guidelines for all federal science agencies . . . to
help victims reenter the workforce after being the target of harassment.”304 Congress should devote serious attention to this
bill, and similar initiatives, as an important means of improving
the STEM profession. Given the high prevalence of sexual harassment within science fields,305 greater protection for employees and better accommodations for survivors could provide the
300 Building Blocks of STEM Act, Pub. L. 116-102 §§ 2(1), 4(3), 133 Stat. 3263,
3263–64.
301 Id. § 4(3)(A).
302 Combatting Sexual Harassment in Science Act of 2019, H.R. 36, 116th
Cong. § 2 (2019).
303 H.R. REP. NO. 116-153, pt. 2, at 6 (2019).
304 Press Release, Congresswoman Lizzie Fletcher, Congresswoman Lizzie
Fletcher Supports Passage of Bill Combatting Sexual Harassment in STEM (July
23, 2019), https://fletcher.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
2159 [https://perma.cc/QPR2-EJNS].
305 NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENG’G AND MED., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WOMEN: CLIMATE, CULTURE, AND CONSEQUENCES IN ACADEMIC SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE 65 (Paula A. Johnson, Sheila E. Widnall & Frazier F. Benya
eds., 2018). “Greater than 50 percent of women faculty and staff and 20-50 percent of women students encounter or experience sexually harassing conduct in
academia.” Id. These rates are similar to other workplaces. Id. at 1–2. Women in
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support needed to ensure women feel comfortable remaining
and succeeding in the profession.
The three proposed solutions—fraud reduction, increased
use of other transaction authority, and improvements to the
pipeline through educational investment and legislation—
scarcely represent the only or best means by which to improve
diversity in government contracting for the space industry. However, the solutions do provide the government with options,
both within and outside the scope of the FAR and SBA programs, to better include disadvantaged American business owners in the work government agencies undertake.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Diversity matters. From a historical perspective, women and
racial minorities faced significant barriers and discrimination on
the path to business ownership; from a forward-looking perspective, wealth generation and the strengthening of minority communities through financial investment remains crucial for lifting
up disadvantaged groups. The space industry, notoriously dominated by white, male voices, stands to benefit immensely from
diverse perspectives and greater inclusivity. Government contracting provides one means by which the industry might diversify. Federal socioeconomic programs provide solid guidance to
COs as to how to allocate more federal resources to WOBs and
MOBs. These programs, in turn, help diverse business owners
create, innovate, and expand, and may lead to more diverse subcontracting as well. With improvements to the system such as
better WOSB and SBA 8(a) Program functioning, utilization of
unique contracting opportunities, and greater investment in
and support of women and minorities in STEM, federal government contracting programs could greatly improve the makeup
and inclusivity of the space industry.
STEM endure the highest rate of sexual harassment of any profession outside the
military. Id.
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ABSTRACT
In the last two decades, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented a variety of new screening and identity verification methods in U.S. airports through its various
agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In particular,
biometric technology has become a focal point of aviation security advances. TSA, CBP, and even private companies have started
using fingerprint, iris, and facial scans to verify travelers’ identities, not only to enhance security but also to improve the travel
experience.
This Comment examines how DHS, its agencies, and private
companies are using biometric technology for aviation security.
It then considers the most common privacy concerns raised by
the expanded use of biometric technology: data breaches, function creep, and data sharing. As biometric technology is new
and continually developing, the scope and extent of privacy
threats cannot be completely quantified. However, a combination of new legislation, technological solutions, and independent oversight may be an effective way to protect both biometric
data and traveler privacy while maintaining the benefits of enhanced security.
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INTRODUCTION

IR TRAVEL IS AN increasingly common way to travel. In
2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
screened more than 804 million aviation passengers—a 5% increase from the previous year.1 Millions of those Americans have
been willing to trade their biometric information for the prom1 About Face: Examining the Department of Homeland Security’s Use of Facial Recognition and Other Biometric Technologies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.,
116th Cong. 33 (2019) (prepared statement of Austin Gould, Assistant Administrator, Requirements and Capabilities Analysis), https://www.tsa.gov/news/
press/testimony/2019/07/10/use-biometric-technology-department-homelandsecurity [https://perma.cc/ZUQ6-2UKG] [hereinafter Biometric Technology
Hearing].
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ise of shorter airport security lines, safer flights, and a better
flying experience.2 However, biometric data collection raises serious questions about data security and traveler privacy.
Biometrics is the science used to identify or verify an individual’s identity “using physiological or behavioral characteristics.”3
Biometric technology is not limited to government use. Many
companies have started integrating biometric technology into
their products for both security and convenience.4 The consumer industry integrated biometrics into Americans’ everyday
lives.5 For example, iPhone users can now unlock their phones
with their fingerprint or their face instead of a traditional alphanumeric password.6
While increased use of biometric security measures can benefit airports in a multitude of ways, the rapid expansion of biometric technology has raised privacy concerns from both sides
of the political aisle.7 Privacy advocates question the government’s storage and use of biometric data.8 However, privacy and
security are not mutually exclusive—Congress and the private
sector can strike the proper balance between security and privacy. An effective solution might include federal legislation, improved technological protections, increased independent
oversight, or more effective opt-out procedures.
2 See Press Release, U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA PreCheck Reaches Milestone With 10 Million Members (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.tsa.gov/news/
press/releases/2020/03/02/tsa-prechecktm-reaches-milestone-10-million-mem
bers [https://perma.cc/N7CU-M27K].
3 JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589
(2007).
4 Nasir Memon, How Biometric Authentication Poses New Challenges to Our Security
and Privacy, 34 IEEE SIGNAL PROCESSING MAG., July 11, 2017, at 194, 196, https://
ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7974880&tag=1 [https://
perma.cc/64M2-CCA2].
5 Id. at 196.
6 Id.; Samuel Gibbs & Alex Hern, Apple Unveils iPad Air and iPad Mini With
Touch ID Fingerprint Scanner, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/oct/16/apple-unveils-new-powerful-ipad-air-ipad-minitouch-id-fingerprint-scanner [https://perma.cc/75DA-KWAC]; Sam Rutherford,
Touch ID Will Reportedly Return to iPhones in 2021 With Apple’s New In-Screen Fingerprint Sensor, GIZMODO (Aug. 5, 2019), https://gizmodo.com/touch-id-will-reportedly-return-to-iphones-in-2021-with-1836973588 [https://perma.cc/NWE5B9E8].
7 See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Edward Markey and Sen. Mike Lee to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (July 26, 2019), https://
www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DHS%20Biometric%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LV3P-PM6K].
8 Id.
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Part II of this Comment will discuss biometrics generally and
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) application of
biometric technology to aviation security. Part III will summarize
the federal laws authorizing the use of biometric technology and
the federal data privacy laws limiting these technologies. Part IV
will discuss the primary privacy concerns biometric security technology poses, and Part V will analyze solutions that promote security while preserving privacy.9
II.
A.

GENERAL HISTORY

HISTORY
OF

BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY

The U.S. government has been collecting Americans’ biometric data since the early 1900s.10 Law enforcement agencies first
started biometric collection by manually recording physical
characteristics, often called “soft biometrics,”11 “such as hair
color, eye color, height and weight.”12 Eventually, law enforcement began using fingerprinting to identify criminal suspects.13
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) national fingerprint
collection program dates back to 1924,14 and its database contains “almost 72 million criminal fingerprints, more than 50 million civil fingerprints, [and] more than 51 million facial
images.”15 Biometric data is now largely automated16 and includes everything from “fingerprints, DNA samples, iris or retinal scans, [and] voice recordings, [to] walking gait, typing
pattern of the fingers, 3D facial scans, and other forms of hand
geometry data.”17 In wide-scale public use applications, the best
9 The possible constitutional implications of biometric technology are outside
the scope of this Comment.
10 ELS J. KINDT, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION ISSUES OF BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 18 (Pompeu Casanovas & Giovanni Sartor
eds., 2013).
11 Id. at 35 & n.75.
12 Haydn Evans, The State of Biometrics Technology: The Uses, the Concerns, LAW360
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/950365/the-state-of-biometrics
-technology-the-uses-the-concerns [https://perma.cc/ZA3T-FQJ2].
13 Id.
14 Carra Pope, Comment, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: Exploring the Need For Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 769,
774–75 (2018) (citing Fingerprints and Other Biometrics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGAhttps://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-otherbiometrics/
TION,
[https://perma.cc/FQ45-HMR8]).
15 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SERVS., CJIS ANNUAL REPORT
2016, at 16 (2017).
16 KINDT, supra note 10, at 18.
17 Pope, supra note 14, at 773–74.
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biometric identifiers are “accurate, non-invasive, capable of accommodating large amounts of information, and accepted by
the general public.”18 Because these characteristics are “universal” to all human beings, “persistent” and unchanging over time,
and “unique” or distinctive to each individual, biometrics are an
incredibly useful security tool.19
1.

How Biometric Systems Work

Biometric data can be used for either verification or identification.20 All biometric systems, however, “start with an enrollment stage followed by a matching stage.”21 Enrollment involves
a person presenting an identifier (such as a passport) and linking a biometric identifier (like a fingerprint) to that identity.22
Verification—also called a “one-to-one comparison”23—uses a
person’s presented biometric identifier to verify his claimed
identity by matching it to a previously submitted and stored biometric template in a database.24 Essentially, verification confirms
a person is who he says he is.25 This process can take only a few
seconds.26 Although biometric databases can contain data “from
dozens to millions of enrolled templates[, they] are always predicated on matching an individual’s presented biometric against
his or her reference template.”27 Thus, biometric data systems
can verify one’s identity almost instantaneously.
By contrast, identification—also called a “one-to-many” comparison28—compares a person’s presented biometric identifier
“with all previously submitted and stored biometric characteristic[s] in one or more database(s) through a search.”29 A
18 Eric P. Haas, Comment, Back to the Future? The Use of Biometrics, Its Impact on
Airport Security, and How This Technology Should Be Governed, 69 J. AIR L. & COM.
459, 475 (2004).
19 KINDT, supra note 10, at 20–23.
20 Id. at 36–37.
21 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-785T, AVIATION SECURITY: CHALLENGES IN USING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2004).
22 Id.
23 KINDT, supra note 10, at 36.
24 Id. at 36–37.
25 Id.; Paul Rosenzweig, Alane Kochems & Ari Schwartz, Report: Biometric Technologies: Security, Legal, and Policy Implications, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 21, 2004),
https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/report/biometric-technologies-se
curity-legal-and-policy-implications [https://perma.cc/H6Y7-LRPA].
26 KINDT, supra note 10, at 732.
27 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 4.
28 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
29 KINDT, supra note 10, at 37.

480

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

“[p]ositive identification system” is used “to ensure [a person’s]
biometric is enrolled in the [particular] database.”30 In contrast,
a “[n]egative identification system” is used “to ensure a person’s
biometric information is not present in a [certain] database31—
like the No Fly List, for example.32
Identification systems and verification systems have different
databases. For identification to work, a database of stored biometric data is always necessary.33 With verification, storage of
only a single biometric characteristic is necessary.34 The biometric data may be stored in a database or stored locally35—for example, on an identification card.
2.

The Government’s Database

Biometric data collection is “only as useful as” the government’s ability to organize and access it quickly; thus, the effectiveness—and invasiveness—of this data collection “is directly
correlated to . . . the underlying database.”36 The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) maintains DHS’s biometric database.37 OBIM “supplies the technology for matching,
storing, and sharing biometric data.”38 OBIM’s database, the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), is the “largest biometric repository in the U.S. government.”39 According to
DHS, IDENT currently holds over 260 million “unique identities
and processes more than 350,000 biometric transactions per
day.”40 State and local law enforcement submit many of these
transactions.41 The stored information is used for a variety of
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 4 (emphasis added).
Id.
32 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT ON EFFECTS ON PRIVACY AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 4–5 (2006).
33 KINDT, supra note 10, at 37–38.
34 Id. at 38–39.
35 Id. at 37–38.
36 John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 69 (2002); Haas, supra note
18, at 478.
37 U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 2019 PRIVACY OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 2018–JUNE 30, 2019) 23, 47 (2019), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_privacy_office_2019_annual_
report-final-10-22-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD5V-YSRP].
38 Biometrics, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics
[https://perma.cc/EA3F-4T9V].
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Pope, supra note 14, at 778.
30
31

2020]

BIOMETRICS TAKES OFF

481

purposes: “national security, law enforcement, immigration and
border management, intelligence, and other background investigative purposes.”42 Further, IDENT allows interoperability and
data sharing between various federal agencies including the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Justice (DoJ), Department of State (State Department), and other agencies
within DHS including TSA and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP).43
B.

BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY

IN

AVIATION SECURITY

The DoD’s use of biometric technology for aviation security is
relatively new, and technology is still developing in this area.
TSA itself was created less than twenty years ago in response to
the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terror attacks.44 TSA is the DHS
agency primarily responsible for airline safety;45 however, CBP
also employs biometric technology in its programs for travelers
exiting and entering the United States.46 Additionally, TSA and
CBP are currently working together to bring facial recognition
to airports across the nation.47 Private companies also play a role
in biometric aviation security by establishing their own biometric authentication systems or partnering with DHS on existing
programs.48 This Part will discuss the various aviation security
programs that currently utilize biometric data.
1.

TSA PreCheck

TSA PreCheck (PreCheck) is one of TSA’s “Trusted Traveler”
programs.49 It is a voluntary, “expedited screening program” for
42 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-46, TSA MODERNIZATION: USE OF
SOUND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT PRACTICES IS NEEDED TO AVOID
REPEATING PAST PROBLEMS 24 (2017).
43 Biometrics, supra note 38; Pope, supra note 14, at 777 n.40.
44 Chase Hilton, Comment, Fingerprints: A New Means of Identification in Airport
Security Screening, 81 J. AIR L. & COM. 561, 567 (2016).
45 Id. at 590.
46 See infra Part II.B.4.
47 Biometrics Technology, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/biome
trics-technology [https://perma.cc/SAH9-R5VS].
48 See infra Part II.B.5.
49 DHS offers several other Trusted Traveler programs similar to PreCheck
that allow expedited screening for air and land travel. Trusted Traveler Programs,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://ttp.dhs.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ST6RLC5C]. Global Entry allows expedited entry into the United States from international locations, NEXUS allows expedited entry to the United States from Canada, and Sentri allows expedited entry into the United States from Mexico. Id.

482

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

“known and trusted travelers”50 that, according to TSA, serves
the dual purpose of enhancing security and providing “a better
travel experience.”51 TSA introduced PreCheck in 2011,52 and
currently, seventy-three airlines and over two hundred airports
participate in the program.53 Air travelers can apply for
PreCheck by filling out an online application, paying an $85 application fee, and providing personal identification documentation (such as a passport) and their fingerprints.54 The traveler’s
biometrics—fingerprints—are then linked to their identity.55 After approval, travelers are issued a “known traveler number,”
which they can add to their flight reservations.56 This in turn
prints a PreCheck indicator on the traveler’s boarding pass, and
grants the traveler access to expedited boarding lanes.57
Travelers’ fingerprints are not only used for background
checks at for enrollment, however. The fingerprints collected
are also enrolled in IDENT, and according to DHS, will be used
for “recurrent immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence
checks,” which includes checking enrolled prints against prints
associated with unsolved crimes.58 Further, the personally identifiable information collected, including fingerprints, may also be
shared with “other federal, state and local government, and private sector entities.”59
50 Transportation Security Timeline, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.
gov/timeline [https://perma.cc/RE4X-KZRU].
51 TSA PreCheck Factsheet, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/sites/
default/files/resources/tsaprecheck_factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX675S2M].
52 Transportation Security Timeline, supra note 50.
53 TSA PreCheck Factsheet, supra note 51.
54 TSA PreCheck FAQ, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/pre
check/faq [https://perma.cc/D558-B8PM].
55 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/TSA/PIA-041(A), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE TSA PRE✓ APPLICATION PROGRAM 4 (2016), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-041-a-tsa%20precheck
%20application%20program-february2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QMB9THZ].
56 TSA PreCheck FAQ, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 55, at 4.
59 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/TSA/PIA-041, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TSA PRE✓ APPLICATION PROGRAM 8 (2013), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_041_tsa%20
precheck%20application%20program_september%202013_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AEB9-3X8N].
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Traveler Verification Service

In 2018, TSA partnered with CBP to implement a number of
pilot programs in airports across the country to test the Traveler
Verification Service (TVS).60 TVS is a biometric entry and exit
program that uses facial recognition technology to verify passengers’ information as they enter or exit the country.61 TVS works
by checking “traveler[s’] live facial scans against their passport
photo to ensure they match.”62 If a traveler is verified as a U.S.
citizen, that person is “removed from the exit screening and
their photo is to be removed from the file.”63 However, DHS
does not disclose exactly how long it retains the facial data.64
CBP says that “the photo is discarded after a short period of
time,”65 as the agency is “committed to protecting the privacy of
all travelers.”66 But some critics point out that because regulation is lacking, “there is no guarantee that the government will
destroy the biometric data in a timely manner, or at all.”67
According to DHS, private companies, airlines, and airport
authorities, in partnership with DHS, may use their own technology to “facilitate identity verification.”68 The agency claims
that it does not allow these private companies to save the photos
collected, and it requires that the photos are deleted immediately after “transmittal and identity verification.”69 However,
DHS allows partners to elect to take photos with their own
equipment, so long as the photos are not retained “for their
own business purposes”70 and so long as the company provides
60 Biometric Technology Hearing, supra note 1; Pope, supra note 14, at 778; see also
Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
https://www.cbp.gov/travel/biometrics/biometric-exit-faqs [https://perma.cc/
M5UJ-KXTS].
61 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-056, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TRAVELER VERIFICATION SERVICE (TVS) 1, 15 (2018), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp030-tvs-november
2018_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DVZ-CTKJ].
62 Pope, supra note 14, at 778.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Deploys Biometric Exit
Technology to Chicago O’Hare International Airport (July 11, 2017), https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-deploys-biometric-exit-tech
nology-chicago-o-hare-international [https://perma.cc/B2MG-4A47].
66 Id.
67 Pope, supra note 14, at 778.
68 Biometric Exit Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note 60.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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“a separate public notice, such as signage, which does not link
that particular process to CBP.”71 While TVS and private partnerships are still in their early stages, DHS is focused on rapid
expansion of facial recognition technology—in April 2019, the
agency said it intends to scan 97% of departing passengers’ faces
within the next four years.72
3.

Secure Flight

Secure Flight and the No Fly List are TSA-created lists that
operate together to track individuals deemed to be a threat to
national security by U.S. intelligence agencies.73 The No Fly List
is an actual compilation of names of individuals who cannot fly
because they are deemed a security risk.74 Secure Flight is a
“watchlist match[ing]” program that prevents “the misidentification of passengers who have names similar to actual people on
the government watchlists,” such as the No Fly List.75 As of July
2019, TSA reported that it was assessing the benefits of combining the facial recognition identification results from TVS with
Secure Flight to “further improve the identity verification
process.”76
4.

Arrival and Departure Information System

The Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) is another government database maintained by CBP that matches biographic and biometric data to entry and exit information in
order to catch visa overstays,77 although the agency has since expanded the program “for all traveler encounters regardless of
citizenship.”78 In 2003, DHS created the United States Visitor
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FISCAL YEAR 2018 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT 4 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0417_
fy18-entry-and-exit-overstay-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X8G-4TQC].
73 Hilton, supra note 44, at 567.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 567–68 (citing Bob Burns, Secure Flight: TSA Now Performing 100%
Watchlist Matching for Domestic Flights, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. BLOG (June 11, 2010),
http://blog.tsa.gov/2010/06/secure-flight-tsa-now-performing-100.html [https:/
/perma.cc/PD4A-NFUX]).
76 Biometric Technology Hearing, supra note 1.
77 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-269R, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY: REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 ENTRY/EXIT OVERSTAY REPORT 18
(2019).
78 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-024(C), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE INFORMATION SYSTEM (ADIS) 1 (2020),
71
72
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and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program that collected digital photos and fingerprints of all persons
entering and exiting the United States—not only at border
crossings but also at airport terminals.79 US-VISIT managed
ADIS until 2013, when OBIM replaced US-VISIT.80 ADIS compiles information from “a variety of federal systems to create a
complete travel profile of an individual using his or her travel
history.”81 IDENT provides biometric information to populate
an ADIS record that includes fingerprints and facial images.82
5.

Private Companies

CLEAR is a company that offers a biometric authentication
system similar to PreCheck. In 2010, DHS first certified the privately-held CLEAR under the Safety Act to implement its system
in airports around the country.83 CLEAR professes to replace
travelers’ “ID[s] with [their] eyes and fingertips.”84 During enrollment, CLEAR collects travelers’ personal information and biometric data (images of travelers’ faces, irises, and fingerprints)
and transforms it into a unique “encrypted code.”85 Then, at the
airport, passengers bypass the TSA document checkpoint using
the CLEAR system that matches their live fingerprints and irises
to their “unique code” to verify their identity.86 CLEAR and
PreCheck are separate systems that can be used together:
“CLEAR speeds up the travel document check process, [and]
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-024c-adis-january2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CNM-ULGQ].
79 Pope, supra note 14, at 776.
80 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 78, at 2.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 4–5.
83 Approved
Technologies, SAFETY ACT, https://www.safetyact.gov/lit/at/aa
(search in keyword bar for “Alclear, LLC”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). The Safety
Act is part of the Homeland Security Act. Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2238 (2002).
The goal of the Safety Act is to “encourage the development and deployment of
effective anti-terrorism products and services by providing liability protections”
for providers of Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technologies. SAFETY ACT, https://
www.safetyact.gov/lit/h/p [https://perma.cc/8HCN-XTHV].
84 How Does CLEAR Work?, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/support/get
ting-started/how-does-clear-work [https://perma.cc/P7SP-MLD5].
85 How It Works, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/how-it-works [https://
perma.cc/3RLJ-EFXU].
86 Id.
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TSA PreCheck expedites the physical screening process.”87 After
CLEAR verifies a traveler’s identity, that traveler may enter the
PreCheck line for expedited screening.88 Although it is unclear
how the program’s database is operated and protected,
CLEAR’s privacy policy maintains that it protects biometric data
with “encryption, firewalls, and intrusion detection and prevention systems.”89
Airports around the country are also using biometric identification to regulate employees’ access. Both San Francisco International Airport and Ohio’s Toledo Airport have used hand
geometry devices to protect access to certain secure areas of the
airport.90 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been
testing biometric access control in airports since the late
1990s.91 And TSA also administers the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential, which is a “common credential for all
transportation workers requiring . . . access to secure areas of
the national transportation system,” including airports.92 Use of
this technology does not come without legal risk to employers,
however. Major airline companies, including Southwest Airlines
and United Airlines, have recently faced lawsuits by airline employees for improperly storing and collecting their biometric
data without their consent in violation of state privacy laws.93
III.
A.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

LEGAL AUTHORIZATION

OF

BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY

After 9/11, Congress took a variety of measures to enhance
aviation security, passing a myriad of laws and creating TSA and
DHS.94 However, several laws dating back to 1996 authorize the
various programs that allow DHS to collect biometric information at the border and at airports.95 For example, the Illegal ImHow Does CLEAR Work With TSA PreCheck?, CLEAR ME, https://www.clear
me.com/support/tsa-precheck/how-does-clear-work-with-tsa-precheck [https://
perma.cc/E2DS-TUG3].
88 Id.
89 Privacy Policy, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/privacy_policy [https://
perma.cc/L3R9-DKNX].
90 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 14.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Dave Embree, Southwest Airlines Latest Company to Face Suit Over Use of Biometric Data, 35:21 WESTLAW J. AVIATION 4, at *1 (2017), Westlaw WJAVIA.
94 Haas, supra note 18, at 459.
95 These laws include: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Enhanced Border Security
87
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migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
passed in 1996, was one of the first laws that authorized federal
agencies to collect biographical information on persons entering and exiting the country.96 IIRIRA authorization was supplemented in 2004 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, which integrated biometric technology for the
first time.97 Further, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Homeland Security Act) gave DHS broad authority to collect and analyze personally identifiable information and to share this
intelligence information with other federal agencies.98 However,
some question the government’s authority to use its facial recognition programs on American citizens at the border.99 One report notes that “Congress has passed legislation at least nine
times concerning authorization for the collection of biometric
data from foreign nationals, but no law directly authorizes DHS
to collect the biometrics of Americans at the border.”100
More recently, President Trump added to DHS’s biometric
mandate by signing two executive orders urging DHS to make
biometrics a priority and to expedite biometric development in
an entry-exit tracking system.101 Additionally, in 2018, Congress
and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004); Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007). U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
supra note 61, at 1 & nn.1–4.
96 Mark Skerry, Note, Protect America by Being Unique: How Changes in Biometric
Data Collection Procedures Can Improve US-VISIT, 2 CASE W. RESERVE J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 71, 73 (2011).
97 Id. at 74.
98 Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss:
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 465 n.323 (2012)
(citing 6 U.S.C. § 121(a)–(d)).
99 HARRISON RUDOLPH, LAURA M. MOY & ALVARO M. BEDOYA, GEO. L. CTR. ON
PRIVACY & TECH., NOT READY FOR TAKEOFF: FACE SCANS AT AIRPORT DEPARTURE
GATES 2 (2017), https://www.airportfacescans.com/sites/default/files/Biomet
rics_Report__Not_Ready_For_Takeoff.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB4D-GFJ6].
100 Id. at 7.
101 Christopher Reynolds, Airport Facial Recognition Tech Sparks Privacy Concerns,
GOVTECH (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/data/Airport-Facial-Recognition-Tech-Sparks-Privacy-Concerns.html [https://perma.cc/WX75-YJME];
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 7 (Jan. 27, 2017); see also U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 61, at 1; Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg.
13209 § 8 (Mar. 6, 2017); Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP Meets
with Privacy Groups to Discuss Biometric Exit (Feb. 2, 2018), https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-meets-privacy-groups-dis
cuss-biometric-exit-0 [https://perma.cc/YZ2G-9ZTQ].
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passed the FAA Reauthorization Act,102 which incorporated the
TSA Modernization Act.103 The TSA Modernization Act not only
included authority for biometrics expansion but also added reporting and compliance requirements, placing a limit on such
expansion.104 Although some argue that lack of funding will be
the real constraint on biometric technology’s expansion105 because the recent congressional mandates impose new costs without supplying extra funding, TSA will not be able to roll out this
technology as fast as they would otherwise like.106 Further, “the
new law requires considerable evaluation of the efficacy, privacy
issues, and expanded use of biometrics by TSA which must first
be detailed in reports to Congress—meaning Congress will be
the final arbiter of TSA’s biometric deployment plans, and what
gets fully funded or doesn’t.”107
B.

FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY LAWS

Four major federal laws provide the privacy framework for
agency biometric data collection: (1) the Privacy Act of 1974
(Privacy Act);108 (2) the E-Government Act of 2002 (E-Government Act);109 (3) the Freedom of Information Act of 1966
(FOIA);110 and (4) the Implementing the Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act).111
This Section summarizes the relevant parts of each statute and
discusses how each relates to the government’s use of biometric
technology.

102 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–254, 132 Stat. 3186
(2018).
103 Id. § 1901; Anthony Kimery, TSA’s ‘Biometric Roadmap’ May Need More Funding Under New Law, Former Deputy Administrator Says, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Oct. 23,
2018), https://www.biometricupdate.com/201810/tsas-biometric-roadmap-mayneed-more-funding-under-new-law-former-deputy-administrator-says [https://
perma.cc/5CAG-ED4Q].
104 Kimery, supra note 103.
105 Id. (quoting John Halinski, Former TSA Deputy Administrator).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
109 Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
110 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
111 Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
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Privacy Act of 1974

Currently, DHS, TSA, and CBP are operating under the Privacy Act,112 which is the only comprehensive federal data privacy
protection law; however, the Privacy Act does not explicitly
cover biometric data.113 Rather, it regulates federal agencies’
“collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance”114 of personally identifiable information, which has been interpreted to apply to biometric information including fingerprints and facial
scans.115 This law is the closest applicable law to regulating the
government’s collection of biometric data. Otherwise, the use of
“biometrics data . . . is largely unregulated”116 and is “one of the
most unprotected areas of our personal identity.”117
The Privacy Act has four main requirements applicable to biometric technology. First, it mandates that each agency publish in
the Federal Register a system of records notice for each database
of personally identifiable information it maintains.118 A description of the character, categories, and uses of the information
collected is required.119 However, this requirement only applies
to data contained in a “system of records”—defined as “a group
of any records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some
. . . other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”120
Second, the Privacy Act limits the circumstances under which
agencies can share personally identifiable information with
other agencies and third parties by requiring an agency to identify a particular enumerated condition of disclosure and state
the authority that authorizes “the solicitation of the information
and whether disclosure of such information is mandatory or voluntary.”121 However, the enumerated conditions are relatively
broad—information may be disclosed for routine agency use,
5 U.S.C. § 552a(a), (e).
Michael Monajemi, Privacy Regulation in the Age of Biometrics That Deal With a
New World Order of Information, 25 U. MIA. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 395 (2018).
114 Id.
115 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 23.
116 Evans, supra note 12.
117 Pope, supra note 14, at 770.
118 Katie Cristina, Comment, The TSA’s New PreCheck is Beginning to Look a Lot
Like CAPPS II: The Privacy Implications of Reviving the Tenets of the Failed Predecessor,
78 J. AIR L. & COM. 617, 635 (2012); Donohue, supra note 98, at 470.
119 Cristina, supra note 118, at 635 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)).
120 5 U.S.C. § 552a(5); Donohue, supra note 98, at 469.
121 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(4)–(5), (e)(3)(A); Margaret Hu, The Ironic Privacy Act,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1278–79 (2019).
112
113
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civil or criminal law enforcement purposes, or to achieve other
administrative objectives.122 Third, every time an agency changes
its system of records or wants to use its system in a new way, the
Privacy Act mandates that the agency publish a notice in the
Federal Register and allow interested persons an opportunity to
submit comments to the agency.123 Finally, the Privacy Act provides civil remedies and authorizes civil lawsuits against the government for violations.124
Privacy advocates argue that the Privacy Act does not adequately protect citizens’ biometric data because it contains several broad exemptions.125 First, it does not regulate state or local
governments, so the Privacy Act does not protect any biometric
information they collect.126 Second, the Privacy Act does not apply to private entities or private companies.127 This is potentially
problematic for two reasons: “First, there is no uniform federal
statute directed toward a private entity’s collection, use, and
storage of biometric information.”128 Second, DHS has partnerships with private companies, but it “has not published any
guidelines for or agreements with its private partners.”129 Nonetheless, DHS and its agencies acknowledge that the Privacy Act
remains the primary statute protecting government-collected biometric data.
2.

E-Government Act of 2002

The E-Government Act requires any agency “collecting personal information [to] issue a [Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA)] prior to developing or procuring technologies that collect, maintain, or disseminate personally identifiable information from or about members of the public.”130 Each time DHS
Hu, supra note 121, at 1278–79 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1), (3), (7)).
Id. at 1279 (citing § 552a(e)(4), (11)).
124 Id. at 1278 (citing § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4)(A)).
125 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING
§ 31:26, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019); Donohue, supra note 98, at
470–71.
126 Donohue, supra note 98, at 471 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)(A)).
127 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2)).
128 See Natasha Kohne, Isabelle Gold & Kamran Salour, Unique Biometric Data
Creates Unique Privacy Concerns, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/almID/1202749996053/Unique-Biometric-Data-Creates-U
nique-Privacy-Concerns/?slreturn=20200919124114 [https://perma.cc/HZU78TPY].
129 RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 14–15.
130 Donohue, supra note 98, at 476.
122
123
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creates a new program, it must issue a new PIA.131 PIAs are required to describe the “nature and source” of the collected information, the reasons for collection, and the “intended use” of
data collected.132 PIAs must also address how the information
will be shared, whether individuals may consent, and whether
the initiative falls under the Privacy Act.133 However, like the Privacy Act, the E-Government Act contains exemptions—one of
the most notable being that “public dissemination of the PIA”
may be protected as classified or suspended for national security
reasons.134
3.

Freedom of Information Act

The FOIA works in conjunction with the Privacy Act. In the
biometric data context, airline passengers may file complaints or
seek access to records about themselves to ensure the accuracy
of the information collected.135 One goal of the Privacy Act is to
ensure that individuals can verify the accuracy of their
records.136 To that end, the Privacy Act allows an individual to
request their own records through FOIA.137 However, insofar as
the Privacy Act relies on such requests to refine biometric
records, the process has been underutilized—from June 2018 to
June 2019, DHS received only thirty-one total requests.138
4.

Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007

The Homeland Security Act created the “first statutorily created privacy office in the Federal Government,”139 headed by a
Chief Privacy Officer (CPO), who is appointed by the Secretary.140 The Homeland Security Act was amended by the 9/11
Commission Act “to give new authorities to the Chief Privacy
Officer.”141 The CPO is responsible for DHS’s privacy policy,
which includes ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act, coor131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id.
Id. at 477.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 59, at 9.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).
Id. § 552a(d)(2).
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 37, at 47 fig.6.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 5.

492

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

dinating with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to
address privacy concerns, and ensuring Congress receives reports on civil liberties and privacy considerations.142 This office
is also responsible for responding to complaints submitted by
employees, other agencies, and the public.143 The CPO is also
responsible for DHS’s FOIA policy.144 According to DHS’s 2019
Privacy Report, DHS’s FOIA Program “receives the largest number of FOIA requests of any federal department or agency, more
than 40 percent of all requests within the Federal
Government.”145
IV.

PRIVACY CONCERNS

Biometric characteristics themselves are privacy neutral and
have been accepted for years; however, privacy concerns arise in
how biometrics are used and how technological advancement
affects such use.146 DHS promises passengers that it is “ensuring
appropriate privacy and cybersecurity safeguards are in
place.”147 However, the rapid expansion of biometric technology
in the last decade has raised serious concerns among privacy
critics about how biometric data is stored and safeguarded.
Unaddressed privacy concerns even have some airports banning
the use of facial recognition technology until proper privacy policies are created and implemented.148 Privacy advocates have
generally focused their concern in three major areas (1) data
breaches; (2) “function creep”; and (3) data sharing.149
A.

DATA BREACHES

In the last decade, the number and scale of cyberattacks have
been on the rise—“more than doubling between 2006 and 2012
6 U.S.C. § 142(a)(2), (5), (6).
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., supra note 37, at 45.
144 Id. at 54.
145 Id. at 55.
146 Steven C. Bennett, Privacy Implications of Biometrics, 53:3 PRAC. LAW. 13, 13
(2019), Westlaw PRACLAW.
147 Biometric Technology Hearing, supra note 1, at 34 (prepared statement of Austin Gould, Assistant Administrator, Requirements and Capabilities Analysis).
148 Christopher Reynolds, LAX Embraces Facial Recognition Tech, But Sea-Tac Airport Hits the Brakes, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/travel/
story/2019-12-12/lax-airports-facial-recognition-seattle-ban [https://perma.cc/
S7XK-8HH4].
149 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 21, at 23. Fourth Amendment and other generalized constitutional privacy concerns are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
142
143
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and leveling since.”150 The frequency of cyber breaches is approximate because so many are either “undetected or . . . intentionally unreported.”151 Data breaches have a variety of causes,
including “accidental publication; insider jobs; lost or stolen
computers or media; and patently malfunctioning security measures.”152 However, hacking has proved to be the most common
and most damaging cause of breaches, as hacking “results in
more stolen or compromised records than all other categories
combined.”153
The threat of a biometric data breach is not just a hypothetical fear—it is reality. In 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) suffered a data breach where 5.6 million
employees’ fingerprints were stolen.154 In June 2019, CBP suffered a similar data breach where “hackers had stolen an undisclosed number of license-plate images and travelers’ ID photos
from a subcontractor.”155 Vice, a Canadian-American magazine,
and The Register, a United Kingdom outlet, reported finding
“traveler data on the dark web in the hours after that breach,
including financial information, photos, and location information.”156 According to an official, this breach, unlike the OPM
breach,157 did not involve a foreign actor.158 The CBP breach
prompted Senators Mike Lee and Edward Markey to write to
150 Marian K. Riedy & Barlomiej Hanus, Yes, Your Personal Data is at Risk: Get
Over It!, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 11 (2016); see also 2015 Data Protection &
Breach Readiness Guide, INTERNET SOC’Y (May 16, 2016), https://
www.internetsociety.org/resources/ota/2016/2015-data-protection-breach-readi
ness-guide/ [https://perma.cc/XK95-AQKG] (“Victims included nearly every
segment of the population including consumers, government employees, and
children.”).
151 Riedy & Hanus, supra note 150, at 11.
152 Id. at 12–13.
153 Id. at 13, 15 (“[H]acking accounts for . . . an estimated 70% of all
breaches.”).
154 Pope, supra note 14, at 770.
155 Sidney Fussell, This Is Exactly What Privacy Experts Said Would Happen, ATLANTIC (June 11, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/
06/travelers-images-stolen-attack-cbp/591403/ [https://perma.cc/C8U7-5HXE].
156 Id.
157 Evan Perez, FBI Arrests Chinese National Connected to Malware Used in OPM
Data Breach, CNN (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/24/politics/
fbi-arrests-chinese-national-in-opm-data-breach/index.html [https://perma.cc/
YLB7-CMH2].
158 Drew Harwell & Geoffrey A. Fowler, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Says
Photos of Travelers Were Taken in a Data Breach, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/10/us-customs-border-protec
tion-says-photos-travelers-into-out-country-were-recently-taken-data-breach/
[https://perma.cc/QL7R-D2FR].
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DHS requesting the immediate issuance of a “report to Congress on the viability of DHS’s biometric identification technology.”159 Both Senators had previously called for DHS to “pause”
progress on biometric technology until DHS issued “formal
rules that address critical privacy and security concerns” including who has access to the data, how long it will be held, and how
it will be safeguarded.160
Biometric data security is also a concern across the globe. India has one of the world’s largest national biometric databases,
Aadhaar, which contains the biometric identifiers of more than
one billion people.161 Enrollment in the database is required for
citizens to receive government benefits, and India even requires
citizens to link their bank accounts to the database.162 In 2017,
the database was breached, and according to reports, approximately 130 million Indians’ Aadhaar numbers were exposed,163
highlighting the vulnerabilities of these systems. Similarly, in Argentina, hackers gained access to the Argentina Federal Police’s
database and leaked 700 gigabytes (GB) of data, which included
the biometric information of numerous police officers.164
These few examples highlight the reality of the risk to all
databases, not only from bad actors of foreign governments but
also from sophisticated cybercriminals who seek to exploit data
for financial gain.165 DHS itself has recognized that the aggregation of information located in IDENT makes it an attractive target.166 However, the potential uses of stolen biometric data are
largely unknown, as this technology is still in its beginning
159 Letter from Sen. Edward Markey and Sen. Mike Lee to Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec., supra note 7, at 1.
160 Id.
161 Pope, supra note 14, at 786.
162 Id.
163 Dell Cameron, 130 Million at Risk of Fraud After Massive Leak of Indian Biometric System Data, GIZMODO (May 3, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/130-million-atrisk-of-fraud-after-massive-leak-of-indi-1794856154 [https://perma.cc/62D47AJC].
164 Eugenia Lostri, Hackers Leaked Sensitive Government Data in Argentina—And
Nobody Cares, LAWFARE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/hackersleaked-sensitive-government-data-argentina-and-nobody-cares [https://perma.cc
/YS7Q-QNLP].
165 Riedy & Hanus, supra note 150, at 15.
166 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 4 (2006), https://www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3BW9-PPQ4].
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stages.167 In the aftermath of the OPM breach, OPM stressed
that it believed “the ability to misuse fingerprint data [was] limited,” but recognized that “this probability could change over
time as technology evolves.”168 Besides identity theft, some have
suggested that a person who has had their biometric data exposed or stolen in a breach “could be discriminated against or
lose out on a job opportunity because their information cannot
be considered secure.”169 The consequences of a massive breach
are potentially far-reaching and damaging, but it is ultimately
too soon to tell.
Finally, in the event of a data breach, the remedies available
to those impacted are limited—some have attempted to sue the
federal government for violating the Privacy Act; however, these
actions are largely unsuccessful and cannot satisfy the standing
requirement due to the difficulty of proving actual harm.170
B.

FUNCTION CREEP

Another common concern of critics and privacy advocates is
commonly referred to as “function creep.”171 Function creep is
the possibility of misuse or re-use of collected information—an
agency using data for purposes other than for which it was originally collected.172 This too is no hypothetical fear—there are examples of function creep already taking place. For example,
IDENT was created in 1994 as a system for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and DHS itself says that “the intended use of IDENT has expanded beyond that for which it was
initially designed.”173 Further, according to its 2018 Biometrics
Roadmap, TSA plans to expand the use of fingerprints by “supplement[ing] data of currently enrolled” PreCheck travelers
with that of other Trusted Traveler programs, including CBP
167 Allison Grande, OPM Fingerpring Hack Exposes Liabilities in Biometric Data,
LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/707030/opm-finger
print-hack-exposes-liabilities-in-biometric-data [https://perma.cc/K4XH-6WEA].
168 Press Release, U.S. Off. of Personnel Mgmt., Statement by OPM Press Secretary Sam Schumach on Background Investigations Incident (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/09/cyber-statement-923/ [https://
perma.cc/67VF-8XPJ].
169 Grande, supra note 167.
170 Id.
171 KINDT, supra note 10, at 377.
172 Id.
173 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 166, at 2.
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and State Department data.174 In the private, nongovernment
context, CLEAR has now expanded its services to sports venues.175 Spectators can now use their “face or fingerprints” as
their ticket to enter select baseball stadiums.176 These are only a
few of many examples of how function creep can easily morph
one application of data into another.
While the advancement of biometric technology potentially
keeps aviation safer and technological advancement is generally
a good thing, practical concerns remain. As biometric technology improves, there is a concern that DHS could go beyond its
legislative mandate by expanding particular uses of biometric
technology without explicit congressional authorization.177 For
instance, a report by Georgetown University’s Center on Privacy
and Technology suggests that the TVS biometric entry and exit
program may be beyond the scope of DHS’s mandate; although
Congress has authorized the collection of biometric data from
foreign nationals, it “has never explicitly authorized biometric
collections from Americans at the border.”178 Thus, the report
argues that DHS needs a new congressional mandate granting
express permission before it may collect data in new ways and
from American citizens.179
C.

DATA SHARING

The federal government’s collection of biometric data
through a number of federal agencies—not limited to DHS—
raises concerns about how these agencies share information, not
only with each other but also with private contractors.
First, data sharing between agencies, or interoperability, has
been emphasized by both Congress and the Executive.180 A fragmented system of incomplete information hurts the ultimate
purpose of biometric systems—enhanced security—and leaves
agencies unable to “connect the dots” in intelligence data. However, even DHS recognizes that a system with so many sharing
174 U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., TSA BIOMETRICS ROADMAP FOR AVIATION SECURITY
& THE PASSENGER EXPERIENCE 13 (Sept. 2018), https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default
/files/tsa_biometrics_roadmap.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYH3-VGS7].
175 You Are Your Ticket, CLEAR ME, https://www.clearme.com/ticketing [https:/
/perma.cc/9K3V-NWD3].
176 Id.
177 RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 7.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 16.
180 See Donohue, supra note 98, at 454.
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partners presents a risk of data sharing with entities that do not
have appropriate authority or an actual need for the data.181 For
example, IDENT users include CBP; Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; the U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; the State Department; the DoD; the DoJ; federal, state, and local investigative agencies; and even “[f]oreign
government law enforcement, intelligence, and criminal agencies, as well as international entities (such as the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)).”182 One of the
main criticisms of interoperability is that it “reflects diffuse accountability . . . [because] no one committee is tasked with considering the implications of the overall system.”183 Thus, overall
accountability is lacking.
Interoperability also increases the probability that the application of biometric systems will be expanded—by “link[ing] bits
and pieces of behavioral information about individuals enrolled
in widely different applications.”184 Some argue that, already,
without this biometric information, the government has the resources to monitor citizens in their daily lives with “omnipresent
video cameras; extensive databases replete with medical, financial, and criminal information; and facial matching technology.”185 Adding biometric data to this list presents additional
concerns to those who already fear an eventual surveillance
state.186
Second, in expanding its use of biometric technologies, DHS
has increasingly relied on private contractors, leaving travelers
vulnerable to tracking and data misuse by private companies.
For an example of these partnerships, the biometric entry and
exit program relies on “airlines and technology vendors for central components” of the program.187 To operate biometric exit
for JetBlue flights, DHS partnered with JetBlue and a private air
travel vendor.188 And while DHS entered into a Memorandum
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOBIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 8 (2012), https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-nppd-ident-december2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y2LB-3B9M].
182 Id. at 3–5.
183 Donohue, supra note 98, at 454.
184 DAVIDE MALTONI, DAVIO MAIO, ANIL K. JAIN & SALIL PRABHAKAR, HANDBOOK
OF FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 46 (2006).
185 Brogan, supra note 36, at 67.
186 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
187 RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 14.
188 Id. at 15.
181
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of Understanding with JetBlue, neither the memorandum “nor
any other agreement governing private entities’ use of biometric
exit data has been made public.”189 Congress encourages these
partnerships—the TSA Modernization Act required TSA to partner with at least two private sector entities to provide enrollment
services for Precheck.190 It is unclear what impact these partnerships have on data privacy; however, TSA says that private systems will be reviewed “to ensure they meet the latest
cybersecurity requirements.”191 Data stolen in the CBP breach
was taken from a CBP subcontractor, making concerns about
agency partnerships with subcontractors a reality.192
V.

STRIKING THE SECURITY–PRIVACY BALANCE:
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The choice between security and privacy is not binary. The
United States can strike a balance between privacy and security
with the right measures. Among the possible solutions to this
balance are (1) technological solutions; (2) legislative solutions;
(3) independent oversight; and (4) an increased focus on traveler notice and consent. A combination of these solutions may
also be the most effective. This Part first considers the preliminary question of whether biometric systems are actually keeping
the skies safer. It then considers each of the possible solutions to
the data privacy concerns and the possible efficacy of each.
A.

EFFICACY

OF

BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS

There is strong evidence that the biometric technology keeps
Americans safer. For example, CBP’s biometric exit, facial recognition “technology has enabled CBP to interdict more than
200 individuals who illegally attempted to enter the United
States by using the genuine travel documents of persons whom
they resemble.”193 One of the biggest threats to aviation security
Id.
Press Release, U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., Additional Vendors to Provide
TSA PreCheck Enrollment for Travelers (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.tsa.gov/
news/press/releases/2020/01/09/additional-vendors-provide-tsa-prechecktmenrollment-travelers [https://perma.cc/MT3U-PZBG].
191 Id.
192 Fussell, supra note 155.
193 Press Release, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., CBP and Privacy Groups Discuss Biometric Entry-Exit Mandate (Dec. 4, 2019) [hereinafter CBP Press Release], https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-and-privacygroups-discuss-biometric-entry-exit-mandate [https://perma.cc/HWG5-5RST].
189
190
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is allowing falsely identified passengers through TSA security,
and there is evidence to suggest that people’s—more specifically, TSA agents’—ability to correctly match an individual to a
presented photo identification is “incredibly fallible with error
rates between 10 and 20 percent under ideal laboratory-induced
conditions.”194 Thus, facial recognition technology is a promising way to reduce that error rate and increase security.
However, Senator Mike Lee of Utah and others have expressed concerns about the accuracy of facial recognition technology, arguing that even if this technology works 96% of the
time, one in twenty-five travelers would still be misidentified.195
A growing fear is that “gender and ethnicity increase the likelihood of being improperly flagged.”196 DHS has recognized
these concerns, and claims that “[t]he accuracy of facial recognition systems has improved significantly in recent years”; according to a 2018 report by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, “with good quality portrait photos, the most
accurate algorithms have ‘error rates below 0.2%.’”197 Congress
should keep in mind the efficacy of biometric technology and its
important role in aviation security while addressing privacy
concerns.
194 Hilton, supra note 44, at 564 (quoting Matthew Pryce, Dr. Megan Papesh,
Louisiana State University – Flaws of Facial Recognition Tech, WAMC NORTHEAST PUB.
RADIO (June 3, 2014), https://www.wamc.org/post/dr-megan-papesh-louisianastate-university-flaws-facial-recognition-tech [https://perma.cc/34WL-MG6B]).
195 Mike Lee, Invasive New Airport Screenings May Put Privacy at Risk, DAILY SIGNAL (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/12/28/invasive-new-air
port-screenings-may-put-privacy-risk/?mc_cid=d4c99ccc1c&mc_eid=7f301efaba
[https://perma.cc/4U3X-KNDL].
196 Id.; see also Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial Artificial-Intelligence Systems, MIT NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), http://news.mit.edu/
2018/study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212 [https:/
/perma.cc/NDA5-MLX2]; Drew Harwell, Amazon Facial-Identification Software Used
By Police Falls Short on Tests for Accuracy and Bias, New Research Finds, WASH. POST
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/25/ama
zon-facial-identification-software-used-by-police-falls-short-tests-accuracy-bias-newresearch-finds/ [https://perma.cc/5S5F-HW88].
197 DATA PRIV. & INTEGRITY ADV. COMM., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., REP. 201901, PRIVACY RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 8 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Report%202019-01_Use%20of%20Facial%20Recognition
%20Technology_02%2026%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/32ER-PNMP] (quoting PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., 8238, ONGOING FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 2: IDENTIFICATION 2 (2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8238.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MS9E-2G2X].
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TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS

Blockchain-based systems may be one way DHS can improve
its data storage to address hacking concerns.198 Companies such
as International Business Machines (IBM)199 and Zamna,200 a
blockchain startup, have already posed blockchain systems as a
solution. Zamna explains that the blockchain acts as a middleman between data sources and allows passengers’ biometric information to be verified without having to share the data with
third parties.201 Blockchain alone would not address all privacy
concerns; however, a blockchain system could be part of a larger
plan to address hacking and some data sharing concerns.
Currently, DHS is in the process of moving its biometric data
from IDENT to a new system: the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System (HART).202 This new system will be located within Amazon Web Services’ GovCloud; other agencies,
such as the DoD, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, already use HART to
store some of the government’s most sensitive data.203 Part of
the reason for this switch is “perceived security improvements”204 over the original IDENT system, which is now almost
twenty-five years old.205 To put that into perspective, the first
Jeremy Epstein, A Massive Biometric Breach Is Only a Matter of Time, VEN(Mar. 16, 2019), https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/16/a-massive-bio
metric-breach-is-only-a-matter-of-time/ [https://perma.cc/47KT-SFTB].
199 Kalonji Bankole, Implement an Automated Airport Security Control System, IBM
DEVELOPER (May 13, 2019), https://developer.ibm.com/patterns/blockchain-im
plement-automated-airport-security-control-system/ [https://perma.cc/HW2YUBTK].
200 Mike Butcher, Zamna Raises $5M to Automate Airport Security Checks Between
Agencies Using Blockchain, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 26, 2019), https://techcrunch.
com/2019/10/26/zamna-raises-5m-to-automate-airport-security-checks-betweenagencies-using-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/VG4B-H5VB].
201 Id.
202 Jack Corrigan, DHS to Move Biometric Data on Hundreds of Millions of People to
Amazon Cloud, NEXTGOV (June 19, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/2019/06/dhs-move-biometric-data-hundreds-millions-people-amazoncloud/157837/ [https://perma.cc/LP9D-ZQ4E].
203 Id.
204 Id.; see also Jack Corrigan, CIA Official: Cloud Is More Secure Than Old Tech,
Less ‘Soul-Crushing’, NEXTGOV (June 22, 2018), https://www.nextgov.com/itmodernization/2018/06/cia-official-cloud-more-secure-old-tech-less-soul-crush
ing/149211/ [https://perma.cc/3WJ9-DCRK].
205 Jack Corrigan, Legacy Systems Held DHS’ Biometrics Programs Back. Not Anymore., NEXTGOV (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/it-modernization/
2019/10/legacy-systems-held-dhs-biometrics-programs-back-not-anymore/1603
47/ [https://perma.cc/G9UP-FTQT].
198

TUREBEAT

2020]

BIOMETRICS TAKES OFF

501

iPhone was released thirteen years ago, and since then there
have been tranformative updates, demonstrating how rapidly
technology changes.206 To keep Americans safe and protect
their privacy and civil liberties, the government must keep its
biometric technology and its security mechanisms up to date
with modern-day capabilities.
C.

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

Although the Privacy Act covers the personally identifiable information collected by the government, there is no law that regulates how private companies may use and store biometric
data.207 In the absence of such legislation, many states have enacted their own biometric data privacy protection statutes.208
While a comprehensive federal law regulating private companies’ use of biometric data may alleviate some concerns surrounding the federal government’s partnerships with private
companies, federal legislation may not be the most efficient or
useful solution. Even the most comprehensive data privacy statute would almost certainly be inapplicable to regulate informa206 Compare Press Release, Apple, Apple Reinvents the Phone with iPhone (Jan.
9, 2007), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-thePhone-with-iPhone/ [https://perma.cc/Z6TY-7HJD] (describing the first iPhone
with a two megapixel (MP) camera and up to eight GBs of storage), with Press
Release, Apple, Apple Announces iPhone 12 and iPhone Mini: A New Era for
iPhone with 5G (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/10/
apple-announces-iphone-12-and-iphone-12-mini-a-new-era-for-iphone-with-5g/
[https://perma.cc/UK9Z-GV26] (describing the latest iPhone with professionalgrade twelve MP photography and video systems and up to 256 GBs of storage).
207 Ashley Deeks & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Facial Recognition Software: Costs
and Benefits, LAWFARE (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-software-costs-and-benefits [https://perma.cc/5VQY-64C2]; Frank
Ready, Privacy Laws Could Provide Blueprint for Approach to Facial Recognition Legislation, L. TECH. NEWS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2018/
12/12/privacy-laws-could-provide-blueprint-for-approach-to-facial-recognitionlegislation/ [https://perma.cc/P6LM-Z7JZ].
208 Illinois, Texas, Washington, California, New York, and Arkansas have biometric data legislation. Natalie A. Prescott, The Anatomy of Biometric Laws: What
U.S. Companies Need to Know in 2020, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/anatomy-biometric-laws-what-us-companies-needto-know-2020 [https://perma.cc/2RU7-UTG4]. There are several other states
(and even one municipality—New York City) considering passing laws of their
own including Florida, Massachusetts, and Arizona. Molly K. McGinley, Kenn
Brotman & Erinn L. Rigney, The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On: Biometric Legislation
Proposed Across the United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometric-legislationproposed-across-united-states [https://perma.cc/W7YN-UZES].
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tion collected for intelligence or national security purposes.209
Instead, clear legislative standards for data sharing between the
government and private companies should be pursued to allow
the government to partner with private companies for innovative advancements while protecting privacy and increasing confidence in the system. Further, renewed—and more specific—
authorization from Congress for new biometric programs involving American citizens may prove to be an effective component
of future reform, as it could require Congress to gather and
study more information on data privacy measures.210
D.

INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT

In order to guard against misuse, all biometric systems, and
the federal government’s use of these programs as a whole,
should have stronger audit and oversight protections.211 Several
oversight mechanisms within DHS are responsible for issuing reports on the various DHS programs and the privacy impact of
those programs. These include: (1) the Privacy Officer created
by the Homeland Security Act; (2) the E-Government Act’s public PIA requirement, which also invites notice and comment;
and (3) the Privacy Act’s System of Records Notice requirements.212 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assumes the primary “responsibility for overseeing
implementation of the Privacy Act and the PIAs.”213 However,
the OMB “has been extremely deferential to agencies exercising
their powers of exemption,” and there is no recourse to the
courts.214 Therefore, the public may benefit from an increased
oversight role by independent committees or agencies. However, Congress should not overburden DHS and its agencies
with excessive reporting and oversight requirements.
There are two independent bodies not located within DHS
that currently provide some oversight. The first is the Privacy
Deeks & Mercer, supra note 207.
See RUDOLPH ET AL., supra note 99, at 17 (“[The program] may implicate
serious privacy concerns. . . . If DHS persists with the program, significant reforms are vitally necessary.”).
211 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
212 See supra Part III; Lee Kair, Biometrics Can Protect our Borders—Along With Our
Privacy, HILL (May 9, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/442
722-biometrics-can-protect-our-borders-along-with-our-privacy [https://
perma.cc/X5GK-5WAY].
213 Donohue, supra note 98, at 477.
214 Id. at 477–78.
209
210
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and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB).215 The PCLOB is
an independent executive agency, established by the 9/11 Commission Act and composed of a bipartisan five-member board.
Current oversight activities are limited, however.216 In June
2019, the PCLOB voted to begin a new oversight project that
will examine “the use of facial recognition and . . . biometric
technologies in aviation security.”217 As of October 2019, the
PCLOB is also planning to review the pilot program at the Las
Vegas McCarran International Airport.218 This could be an important step toward meaningful privacy protections due to the
indepent and bipartisan nature of the PCLOB.
Second, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), a legislative agency within Congress, has issued a number of reports
and has previously found that the FBI—another federal law enforcement agency that uses biometric technology—had insufficient oversight over its use of facial recognition technology.219
However, the GAO covers a wide range of issues from fiscal policy to healthcare and energy.220 Thus, oversight by a more focused entity like the PCLOB may yield the most promising
results.
E.

NOTICE

AND

CONSENT

Some argue that an increased focus on notice and consent
may be more effective than new legislation or oversight.221 This
approach emphasizes the importance of putting travelers on notice that their biometric information is being collected and
stored, as well as providing meaningful opportunities for travelers to withhold consent. While some programs like PreCheck
215 History and Mission, PRIV. & C.L. OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/
About/HistoryMission [https://perma.cc/Q89Y-FZ7P].
216 Id.
217 Press Release, Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., “From Booking to Baggage
Claim:” Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to Examine Use of Facial Recognition and Other Biometric Technologies in Aviation Security (June 26, 2019),
https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/EventsAndPress/eb1405544fc7-4700-88d2-197d7fe45770/New%20projects%20announcement%20June_25_
%202019%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX26-ZHKE].
218 Mick Akers, Facial Recognition Technology Tested At Las Vegas Airport, LAS
VEGAS REV. J. (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-lasvegas/facial-recognition-technology-tested-at-las-vegas-airport-1859441/1/
[https://perma.cc/WW4R-SM2X].
219 Deeks & Mercer, supra note 207.
220 Key
Issues, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/
key_issues/overview#t=1 [https://perma.cc/L7AV-M8YG].
221 Ready, supra note 207.
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are voluntary, withholding consent of the facial recognition at
the airport may not even be possible. At best, “[o]pting out is
complicated” because there are multiple checkpoints at airports: airlines use facial recognition “as a boarding pass,” CBP
uses facial recognition when a traveler exits the country, and
TSA uses facial recognition to verify photo identification.222 At
worst, an opt-out feature may render the security purpose of biometric technology inoperable; therefore, some argue that it is
necessary for DHS to make biometric data collection a condition for participation.223 On the other hand, increased notice to
participants could be a valuable oversight method—the value of
an informed citizenry and the power of public opinion should
not be discounted.
F.

LOOKING OUTSIDE BIOMETRICS

Biometric security may not be the only way forward for aviation security. Others have even suggested that the United States
look in a completely new direction for airport security.224 Israel,
a country that faces a significant number of terrorist threats,
uses “behavioral profiling,” which involves questioning passengers at airports to isolate those exhibiting suspicious behavior.225
Those passengers are then subjected to a more “targeted interrogation and search.”226 This “profiling” is “conducted in a neutral manner” and “focuses on data such as how a passenger
bought their ticket, their past travels, recent actions, and behaviors.”227 However, some argue that volume, costs, and concerns
about ethnic and religious profiling prevent this from being an
effective alternative security solution.228
Jason Kelley, Fighting Back Against Face Surveillance in the Skies: 2019 Year in
Review, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2019/12/fighting-back-against-face-surveillance-skies-year-review-2019 [https://
perma.cc/7SZ7-3LE4].
223 Rosenzweig et al., supra note 25.
224 Cole Antolak, Comment, Airport Security: Over-Reaching New Heights, 18 U.
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 59, 77 (2018).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Ariel Schalit, Our View on Airport Screening: Why Israel’s Air Security Model
Wouldn’t Work in the USA, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2010), https://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-12-22-editorial22_ST_
N.htm [https://perma.cc/3D3U-CW3P].
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VI. CONCLUSION
The concerns posed by privacy advocates about data sharing,
function creep, hacking, and inaccuracies are serious and reasonable concerns. DHS appears to take those privacy concerns
seriously—it has issued numerous, detailed PIAs for its various
programs that use biometric information. It has also begun a
series of meetings with privacy and industry experts to discuss
the biometric exit mandate, and these meetings have already resulted in CBP instituting new privacy measures.229 However,
DHS and Congress ought to look beyond internal reporting requirements and institute additional measures either through
technology or independent oversight to strengthen and bolster
privacy protections and increase government accountability.
Even though biometric technology seems to be the way of the
future, it is still in its infancy. The scope and severity of the consequences of mass biometric data collection are yet unknown.
Biometric technology, and the government’s implementation of
such, may be moving faster than privacy solutions can keep up.
Biometric technology has the potential to revolutionize aviation
security; however, more study and consideration should be
given to the privacy implications and possible solutions in order
to protect data privacy adequately.
229

CBP Press Release, supra note 193.

BET ON THE FIELD: WHY FIELD PREEMPTION SHOULD
APPLY TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
JACK MILLIGAN*

ABSTRACT
One of the primary challenges facing the American aviation
industry is the issue of federal preemption. Although Congress
has a long history of heavy involvement in regulating the aviation industry, the Federal Aviation Act (FAAct) does not include
an express preemption provision, leaving states, courts, and industry members with little guidance about the proper reach of
federal and state regulations. The circuit courts are sharply divided on their approaches and answers to this question. The issue of preemption is especially important in the context of
aviation manufacturing, where the federal government has prescribed a litany of different safety standards, but state law product liability claims continue to be governed by state law
standards of care. Manufacturers are therefore subjected to a
variety of potential requirements across each state, which is
problematic for a number of reasons.
Exacerbating the issue, the Supreme Court recently declined
to hear two cases regarding FAAct preemption, each from a different side of the circuit split. Until this split is resolved, in the
interest of uniformity and certainty, undecided circuits should
adopt the Second Circuit’s field preemption approach and reject the Third Circuit’s conflict preemption approach. Field preemption is more consistent with both the intended purpose of
the FAAct and the unique nature of the aviation industry.
This Comment will analyze the differing approaches taken by
the circuit courts and will make the argument that the federal
design regulations establish a standard of care which should be
integrated into various state law claims. Uniformity is necessary
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2021. B.S., Economics, Texas
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for the aviation industry given its interconnection with interstate
commerce and will provide clarity for both manufacturers and
courts. Finally, this Comment will explain why and how other
circuit courts should adopt the field preemption approach while
awaiting Supreme Court guidance.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HE AVIATION INDUSTRY IS a vital sector of interstate
commerce in America, transporting millions of people and
products across the country every day. Although inherently national in scale, the industry is still subject to a variety of state laws
and regulations, particularly within the field of aviation safety.
Circuit courts are currently split on the issue of whether the Federal Aviation Act (FAAct) preempts only conflicting state laws or
the entire field of aviation safety.1 While the Third Circuit applied principles of conflict preemption to the FAAct, the Second
Circuit held that the FAAct preempts the entire field of state
aviation safety.2 The Supreme Court has declined to hear either
case,3 adding further uncertainty to the aviation industry. The
Court will likely resolve the issue within the near future, but in
the meantime, other circuits must choose between the two competing approaches to FAAct preemption. Because the Second
Circuit’s decision in Tweed allows for a uniform federal standard
of care for aircraft manufacturers, other circuits should follow
suit and hold that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire field

T

1 Compare Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 708–09 (3d Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016) (limiting the FAA rules application), with
Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020) (finding the FAA’s detemination overruled state
law).
2 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 708–9; Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75.
3 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 140 S. Ct. 2508; Sikkelee, 137 S. Ct. 495.
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of aviation safety. This Comment will begin by explaining the
historical background of both federal aviation regulation and
preemption law in Part II. Next, Part III discusses the current
state of federal preemption law with respect to the FAAct and its
amendments and analyzes the circuit split over the FAAct’s preemption powers. Part IV begins by explaining why the FAAct
should be interpreted to preempt the entire field of aviation
safety and concludes by explaining how other circuit courts
should incorporate Tweed into their own preemption analyses.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATION

The federal government’s history of aviation regulation began
in 1926 with the passage of the Air Commerce Act.4 This legislation gave the Department of Commerce oversight over (1) air
commerce; (2) issuance and enforcement of traffic rules; (3)
licensing and certification; and (4) airway control.5 Over the
next decade, as air travel became more prevalent, it became
clear that the federal government needed to exercise more control over aviation safety.6
In 1938, President Roosevelt signed the Civil Aeronautics Act,
which established both the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA)
and later the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).7 The CAA was responsible for air traffic control, certifications, safety enforcement, and airway development—making it the predecessor of
the modern Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).8 The Second World War ushered in significant improvements in aviation
technology, such as jet engines, making aviation safety even
more of a pressing concern for the federal government.9 Although air traffic had more than doubled in the decade followAir Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
Id. §§ 2–3, 5.
6 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://
www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [https://perma.cc/W4AV-PKWN]. Interestingly, the death of legendary Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne was
one of the primary catalysts for the sweeping changes made in the aviation safety
field. Id. Rockne was killed in a plane crash in 1931, and the resulting public
outcry prompted the federal government to take its oversight of aviation more
seriously. Id.
7 Id.; see 49 U.S.C. § 1131. CAB was the predecessor to the National Transportation Safety Board and was largely responsible for accident investigation, administrative rulings, and economic regulation. A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
8 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
9 Id.
4
5
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ing World War II, “little had been done to mitigate the risk of
midair collisions.”10
The Federal Aviation Agency (FAAgency) was established in
1958 with the passage of the FAAct.11 In creating the FAAgency,
Congress stated that its intention was “to create a Federal Aviation Agency, to provide for the regulation and promotion of
civil aviation in such manner as to best foster its development
and safety, and to provide for the safe and efficient use of the
airspace by both civil and military aircraft.”12 In a later amendment, the FAAgency was also given “exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”13 As the Second Circuit noted
several years into the FAAgency’s existence, the agency’s purpose was to “centraliz[e] in a single authority—indeed, in one
administrator—the power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the nation’s airspace.”14 The FAAgency was transferred to the newly created Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1966, and was renamed the FAA.15 Its role has only
expanded since then, and today, the FAA is responsible for
many aspects of aviation safety.16 Among other duties, the FAA
currently oversees aircraft licensing and certification; airport
regulations; air traffic control; aircraft noise control and other
environmental programs; commercial space regulation; aviation
research; and the testing and training of personnel across the
industry.17
For the purposes of this Comment, it is necessary to explain
the FAA’s regulatory control over aircraft manufactures. Under
the FAAct, aircraft manufacturers must first obtain three certificates: a type certificate,18 a production certificate,19 and an airworthiness certificate.20 The type certificate certifies that the
design of an aircraft or its parts performs properly and meets
the safety standards defined in FAA regulations.21 The FAA has a
baseline standard for certification for each type of product,
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
Id. pmbl.
49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1).
Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960).
A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11–.55 (2020).
Id. §§ 21.131–.150.
Id. §§ 21.171–.199; 49 U.S.C. §§ 44704(d), 44711(a)(1).
49 U.S.C. § 44704(a); 14 C.F.R. § 21.31.
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which designates all of the regulations and safety standards required to receive the type certification—essentially a standard of
care for manufacturers.22 Once a manufacturer has received a
type certificate for an aircraft or component, it must receive a
production certificate, certifying that a duplicate of the aircraft
or part will conform to the design certified in the type certificate.23 Finally, the FAA issues an airworthiness certificate for
each aircraft, which certifies that the aircraft conforms to its design and is safe for flight.24
The FAA also maintains regulatory control over the safety of
an aircraft for the duration of its operational life, which is accomplished primarily in three ways. First, the FAA regulates the
training and certification of mechanics and other maintenance
personnel.25 Second, manufacturers who have been issued a
type certificate cannot deviate from the certified design without
FAA approval.26 Third, if the FAA becomes aware of an unsafe
condition on a previously certified aircraft, it may correct the
problem by issuing an “airworthiness directive,” which manufacturers must comply with.27
B.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION

The doctrine of preemption allows Congress to avoid conflicts
between federal and state laws and is a vital part of ensuring that
the federal system runs smoothly. Preemption is widely assumed
to be rooted in the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution, although this assumption has been disputed.28 Though
written about less frequently than other constitutional law topics, it is perhaps the most commonly used constitutional law docSee 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.16–.17.
Id. §§ 21.131–.150.
24 Id. § 21.183.
25 Id. § 65.81.
26 Id. §§ 21.91–.101.
27 Id. § 39.5.
28 U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. Gardbaum argues that preemption is not a product of
the Supremacy Clause, but rather a means of effectuating Congress’s enumerated
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Gardbaum, supra, at 781–82.
22
23
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trine in practice.29 Congress can preempt state laws either
expressly or implicitly by indicating its intent to occupy a given
field to the exclusion of state or local laws, which is known as
field preemption.30 Such intent can be inferred when the pervasiveness of federal regulation precludes additional regulation by
the states, when the federal government’s interest in the field is
sufficiently dominant, or when the objective of federal regulation aligns with the character of the obligations it imposes.31
The Constitution’s Tenth Amendment creates a presumption
against preemption in areas of the law which states have traditionally occupied, and in the absence of a clear and manifest
intent to occupy an entire field of the law, the Supreme Court
has stated that state police powers should not be superseded by
federal law.32 Even absent a showing of intent, Congress can preempt state laws which conflict with federal law, either by making
it impossible to comply with both laws or by creating an obstacle
to the accomplishment of a congressional objective.33 Unsurprisingly, congressional intent is the cornerstone of any preemption
analysis, and preemption cases often involve intense scrutiny of
the legislative history behind the statute in question.34 Courts
will also look at the language, structure, and purpose of a statute
or regulation in order to develop an understanding of Congress’s intent.35
The FAAct employs both express and implied preemption.
For example, Section 41713 states,
Except [for certain Alaskan intrastate air transportation], a State,
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
or service of any air carrier that may provide air transportation
under this [subchapter IV].36

The General Aviation Revitalization Act, codified in an official
note to the Federal Aviation Act, provides for an eighteen-year
statute of repose for product liability claims against aircraft and
Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 768.
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1988).
31 Id. at 300.
32 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see U.S. CONST. amend. X.
33 Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300.
34 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999); US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 2010).
35 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
36 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
29
30
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aircraft component manufacturers.37 Finally, the FAAct contains
a “savings clause” designed to preserve state law remedies:
“Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the
provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.”38 Due to
the FAAct’s narrow express preemption provisions, its implied
preemption powers are much more meaningful to the federal
government. Any preemption of state aviation law outside of
these provisions must be implied by courts.
An important distinction to understand is the difference between preemption of a standard of care and preemption of a
claim. For example, there are four elements to a typical state law
negligence claim: standard of care, breach, causation, and damages.39 In FAAct cases, preemption has recently centered around
the standard of care.40 Thus, while the standard of care may be
preempted by federal regulations, the remaining three elements
are still governed by state law.41 In a negligence claim, the FAA
has prescribed a standard of care, which courts have generally
found to preempt any applicable state standard of care.42 Similarly, the requirements for receiving a type, production, or airworthiness certificate create a standard of care which
theoretically governs in product liability or defective design
claims.43 In practice, however, courts disagree about the extent
to which these standards actually preempt any parallel state law
standards.44
The Supreme Court has never spoken on the issue of negligence or products liability in an aviation law case. However, in
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, the Court provided a
framework through which lower courts could analyze FAAct preemption cases.45 In City of Burbank, the Court held that a city
37 General Aviation Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3(3), 108 Stat.
1552, 1553 (1994).
38 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
39 See, e.g., V & M Star Steel v. Centimark Corp., 678 F.3d 459, 465–66 (6th Cir.
2012).
40 Alexander T. Simpson, Standard of Care vs. Claim Preemption Under the Federal
Aviation Act, 27 AIR & SPACE L. 4, 4 (2014).
41 Id.
42 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”).
43 See Simpson, supra note 40, at 4.
44 See, e.g., Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 690 (3d Cir.
2016); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
45 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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noise prevention ordinance, which banned aircraft from taking
off between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m., was preempted by the FAAct, as
amended by the Noise Control Act of 1972.46 Although noise
prevention was an environmental regulation traditionally left to
states, the Court acknowledged the pervasive nature of the
FAA’s own aircraft noise regulation scheme and thus inferred
congressional intent to occupy the entire area of the law.47 The
Court stated that the FAAct required “a delicate balance between safety and efficiency,”48 and “[t]he interdependence of
these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal
regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the Federal
Aviation Act are to be fulfilled.”49 While the FAAct contained no
express preemption provision on this subject, its legislative history coupled with the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory
scheme led the Court to conclude it was intended to preempt
state law.50
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

There are two competing views on how the FAAct interacts
with state aviation safety laws under the doctrine of implied preemption. A court’s view of the FAAct’s preemption powers depends largely on its interpretation of the Act’s legislative
history—some see a clear intent to exclude state regulations
from the aviation safety field, while others see Congress exercising restraint.51 The way a court defines the term “aviation safety”
will also factor into its analysis.52 The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits have each held that the FAAct impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety law,53 while both the
Id. at 633.
Id.
48 Id. at 638.
49 Id. at 639.
50 Id. at 636–37. The Senate version of the Noise Control Act contained an
express preemption provision, but was never presented to the House. Id. at 636.
Instead, the House version was presented with amendments. Id. (citing 18 CONG.
REC. 35,886 (1972)). However, Rep. Harley Staggers, Chairman of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, argued on the floor, “We have
evidence that across America some cities and States are trying to pass noise regulations. Certainly, we do not want that to happen. It would harass industry and
progress in America.” Id. at 636–37 (citing 18 CONG. REC. 37,083 (1972)).
51 Compare Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999), with
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2016).
52 See, e.g., Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
53 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020); US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318,
46
47
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Third and Eleventh Circuits have held that the Act only
preempts conflicting state laws.54
Ironically, the Third Circuit is also the source of one of the
most influential opinions applying field preemption to the
FAAct.55 In Abdullah v. American Airlines, the Third Circuit found
that the FAAct impliedly preempted the entire field of aviation
safety law, applying the federal standard of care to an aviation
negligence claim brought under state law.56 Although federal
law preempted the state law standard of care, the court held that
state damage remedies still existed for the violation of the federal standard of care.57 The court determined that Congress intended for the FAAct to occupy the field of aviation safety law to
the exclusion of the states, basing its conclusion on both legislative history and persuasive authority from its sister circuits.58 The
court noted that Congress enacted the FAAct in response to a
series of “fatal air crashes between civil and military aircraft operating under separate flight rules.”59 Further, Senate Reports indicated that Congress intended to vest authority for aviation safety
solely in the FAA, not in the states.60 The court went on to cite a
number of cases in which other circuits found that the FAAct
preempted state or local regulations in a certain area, which it
felt indicated the pervasiveness of the federal government’s regulatory control.61 Abdullah also established that the federal standard of care in aviation-related claims preempted any state or
1322 (10th Cir. 2010); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir.
2007); Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005).
54 See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 683; Pub. Health Tr. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d
291, 295 (11th Cir. 1993).
55 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 364–65.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 365.
58 Id. at 367.
59 Id. at 368 (citing United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir.
1969)).
60 S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its relation
to the Federal Government—it is the only one whose operations
are conducted almost wholly within the Federal jurisdiction, and
are subject to little or no regulation by States or local authorities.
Thus, the Federal Government bears virtually complete responsibility
for the promotion and supervision of this industry in the public
interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
61 See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369–71 (citing Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l. v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d
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local standards of care.62 The court noted that FAA regulations
created a catch-all standard of care in the operation of aircraft,
and that it would be “illogical” for federal law to preempt state
law in matters such as pilot licensing, but not regulations relating to flight itself.63
The Third Circuit later clarified the extent of Abdullah’s holding in Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc.64 In Elassaad, a passenger
who was injured while disembarking from a plane brought a
state law negligence claim,65 which the court held was not preempted by the FAAct.66 Abdullah’s holding was not that common
law negligence claims themselves were preempted, only that the
state law standards of care used in those claims were preempted.67 The court noted that the regulations cited in Abdullah
established a standard of care for the operation of aircraft, but
the injury in Elassaad occurred while disembarking after the
plane had landed.68 The court admitted that the FAAct was designed to reduce accidents in air transportation, and that the
FAA “has sole discretion in regulating air safety,” but limited the
definition of air safety in Abdullah to in-flight operations.69 Because federal regulations did not establish a standard of care for
negligence outside of the operation of the aircraft either inflight or while taxiing on the runway, the state law standard of
care was not preempted.70
In Tweed, the Second Circuit recognized at the outset of its
analysis that the FAAct impliedly preempts all state aviation
safety laws, then turned to whether the state law in question fell
400 (7th Cir. 1974); British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1977); French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)).
62 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 372.
63 Id. at 371; 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2020).
64 613 F.3d 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2010).
65 Id. at 122.
66 Id. at 131.
67 Id. at 125.
68 Id. at 131.
69 Id. at 126 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
70 Id. at 127.
No person may operate an aircraft, other than for the purpose of
air navigation, on any part of the surface of an airport used by aircraft for air commerce (including areas used by those aircraft for
receiving or discharging persons or cargo), in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.
14 C.F.R. § 91.13(b).
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within the scope of the FAAct’s preemption.71 The state law at
issue limited the length of an airport’s runway, preventing the
airport from attracting new airlines.72 The airport claimed that
the statute was preempted by the FAAct, but was denied a declaratory judgment invalidating the statute by the district
court.73 The Second Circuit reversed, finding that a statute limiting the length of an airport’s runway did fall within the scope of
federal preemption “because of its direct impact on air safety.”74
The court found “localized, state-created limitation[s]” like the
runway statute to be “incompatible with the FAAct’s objective of
establishing a ‘uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation’ in the field of air safety.”75
The Tenth Circuit employed a two-pronged preemption approach in O’Donnell, concluding that a state law regulating alcohol service on aircraft was preempted by the FAAct.76 Like the
Second Circuit in Tweed, the court began its analysis with the
presumption that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire field
of aviation safety based on the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme.77 The first prong of the court’s field preemption
analysis was to identify the legislative field that the state law implicated.78 While the district court viewed the state law as only
regulating alcoholic beverage service on airplanes, the Tenth
Circuit recognized that it “necessarily implicate[d] the field of
airline safety.”79 The second prong of the test was to evaluate
whether Congress intended to occupy that field to the exclusion
of state regulations, and the court determined it did.80 Sidestepping a prior ruling that the FAAct did not preempt state tort
remedies because they were not named in the Act’s express preemption provision, the court acknowledged that such a provision does not exclude the possibility of implied preemption as
well.81 The court found that both the pervasiveness of the
71 Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020).
72 Id. at 69.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 74.
75 Id. (quoting Air Transp. Ass’n v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2008)).
76 US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1325–26 (10th Cir. 2010).
77 Id. at 1325.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1325–27.
81 Id. at 1326 (discussing Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1444
(10th Cir. 1993)).
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FAAct’s regulations and its legislative history indicated a clear
intent to regulate the aviation safety field exclusively, preempting the state alcohol regulations in question.82
In Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
held that federal aviation standards preempted a state law duty
to warn claim in a products liability case.83 Like the Tenth Circuit in O’Donnell and the Third Circuit in Abdullah, the Sixth
Circuit relied on the legislative history and pervasiveness of the
FAAct, determining that it was intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety.84 The plaintiffs in Greene argued that the
manufacturer breached its duty to warn aircraft users about
manufacturing defects by failing to maintain a database tracking
potential equipment malfunctions.85 However, the plaintiffs
made no claims under federal laws or regulations, and were unable point to any federal standard requiring a manufacturer to
maintain such a database.86 Therefore, the court found that the
additional state-imposed duty to warn of manufacturing defects
was invalid.87
The Third Circuit’s more recent decision in Sikkelee is seemingly incompatible with Abdullah’s holding that additional stateimposed standards of care in aircraft-related negligence cases
are preempted by the FAAct.88 In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit held
that field preemption does not apply to state law aircraft products liability claims and that the FAAct did not preempt stateimposed standards of care in such claims.89 Instead, the court
determined that in aviation products liability cases, the FAAct
only preempted conflicting state laws and regulations.90 Like in
Elassaad, the court drew a line between “in-air operations” and
the issuance of safety certificates to aircraft manufacturers, once
again limiting Abdullah’s broad holding.91 The court pointed out
that the regulations cited in Abdullah related only to actually operating an aircraft (i.e., flight), not its design or manufacture,
Id. at 1327.
Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir.
2005).
84 Id. at 794.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 372 (3d Cir. 1999).
89 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2016).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 689.
82
83
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which was at issue in Sikkelee.92 The driving factor behind this
distinction was the way the federal standard of care in Abdullah
was articulated.93 The in-flight negligence regulation in Abdullah
sounded in common law tort, which the court felt made it comprehensive and practical to incorporate into state law claims.94
The design and manufacture regulations, on the other hand,
were much more technical and part-specific, making them “exceedingly difficult to translate into a standard of care that could
be applied to a tort claim.”95 In Elassaad, the Third Circuit noted
that most of the FAAct regulations concerned aspects of safety
associated with flight, specifically mentioning the certification
and airworthiness requirements for aircraft components.96 This
makes the court’s conclusion that the FAA certification process
was unrelated to in-flight safety even more confusing. Although
certification and airworthiness requirements may not govern inflight operations, they clearly concern in-flight safety, which the
court identified as the purpose of the FAAct in Elassaad.97 The
folly of Sikkelee’s holding was further proven on remand, where
the district court found the plaintiff’s state law claims to be conflict preempted, as it would be impossible for the manufacturer
to comply with both state and federal regulations.98
Sikkelee formed the basis of a similar decision by the Washington Supreme Court, which held that the FAAct created only
minimum standards of care for aircraft manufacturers99 and
that state law remedies exceeding that standard of care were not
preempted by the Act.100 In Estate of Becker, the estate of a plane
crash victim brought a state law design defect claim against the
Id.
Id. at 694.
94 Id. at 695.
95 Id.
96 See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).
97 See id. at 126.
98 Sikkelee v. AVCO Corp., 268 F. Supp. 3d 660, 665 (M.D. Pa. 2017). However,
the Third Circuit reversed on appeal, holding that federal law did not conflict
preempt the state law claims. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701,
704 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 860 (2020). The court also reaffirmed its
prior holding that the FAA certification process does not establish a federal standard of care for aircraft manufacturers. Id. at 717.
99 48 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1) (“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing . . . minimum standards required in the interest of safety for appliances and
for the design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers.”).
100 Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
92
93
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manufacturer of a fuel system component in the aircraft.101 The
manufacturer claimed preemption as a defense, arguing that
fuel system manufacturing was pervasively regulated by the federal government.102 The court rejected the preemption argument, holding that the regulation in question was not designed
to replace state law, but only to establish a minimum design
standard.103
Like the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has also issued conflicting opinions about the reach of the FAAct’s preemption
powers.104 In Montalvo, the court held that the FAAct impliedly
preempted the entire field of aviation safety, dismissing the
plaintiffs’ consolidated failure to warn claims brought under
state law.105 Fourteen plaintiffs each brought negligence claims
against various airlines for failure to warn passengers about the
risk of deep-vein thrombosis, which airlines were under no federal obligation to do.106 The court recognized that in the absence of federal preemption of passenger warnings, each state
could mandate a different set of warnings, which could lead to
absurd outcomes.107 In Martin, however, the Ninth Circuit limited Montalvo’s holding to cases in which the federal regulations
in the field are pervasive.108 In Martin, the plaintiff brought a
design defect claim against an aircraft manufacturer, claiming
that the aircraft’s stairs were defectively designed because they
only had one handrail.109 In comparison to the FAA’s pervasive
regulations on passenger warnings, the only federal regulation
Id. at 1067.
Id. at 1068.
103 Id. at 1069.
104 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Martin
ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir.
2009).
105 See Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 468.
106 Id. at 467–68.
107 Id. at 473.
Congress could not reasonably have intended an airline on a Providence–to–Baltimore–to–Miami run to be subject to certain requirements in, for example Maryland, but not in Rhode Island or
Florida. It is equally as doubtful that Congress would have intended
the sufficiency of the Airlines’ warnings to hinge on where each
passenger on each flight was likely to file suit.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108 See Martin, 555 F.3d at 811.
109 Id. at 808.
101
102
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of aircraft stairs prohibited designing them in a way which might
block emergency exits.110
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Lake Aircraft was similar to
that of the Tenth Circuit in Cleveland, relying almost exclusively
on the FAAct’s express preemption provision.111 The court determined that Congress did not intend for the FAAct to preempt
state laws on matters unrelated to airline rates, routes, or services, and therefore, the Act did not preempt state law design
defect claims.112 Lake Aircraft was one of the earliest cases on the
subject, and circuit courts’ preemption analyses have since centered around either the Second Circuit’s field preemption approach or the Third Circuit’s newer conflict preemption
approach.113
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. THE CASE FOR FIELD PREEMPTION
Of all the industries regulated by the federal government, aviation is arguably the most in need of a uniform set of laws and
regulations. The aviation industry is so integral to interstate
commerce114 that it would be counterintuitive for it not to be
governed by a uniform set of laws and regulations. The alternative to field preemption, in which aviation manufacturers are
potentially subject to a patchwork of different state regulations
and standards of care, is simply incompatible with the industry’s
structure.115 There are several arguments to be made in favor of
field preemption. First, the FAAct’s legislative history and purpose indicate a clear intent to exclude states from regulating
110 Id. at 812. “It’s hard to imagine that any and all state tort claims involving
airplane stairs are preempted by federal law. Because the agency has not comprehensively regulated airstairs, the FAA has not preempted state law claims that the
stairs are defective.” Id.
111 Compare Pub. Health Tr. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.
1993), with Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1447 (10th Cir.
1993).
112 Lake Aircraft, Inc., 999 F.2d at 295.
113 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020); Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,
822 F.3d 680, 709 (3d Cir. 2016).
114 See generally Data & Statistics, AIRLINES FOR AM., https://www.airlines.org/
data/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
115 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007). “Aviation
transportation requires more national coordination than any other public transportation and also poses the largest risks. Regulation on a national basis is required because air transportation is a national operation.” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
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aviation safety.116 Second, field preemption allows for a uniform
federal standard of care without necessarily preempting state
law claims and remedies.117 Finally, field preemption is more
consistent with related Supreme Court precedent and the preemption doctrine’s constitutional roots.118
As previously mentioned, legislative intent is highly determinative of a federal law or regulation’s preemption powers.119 In
addition to legislative history, congressional intent to occupy an
entire field of law can be implied when federal regulation is sufficiently pervasive, when the federal interest in the field is sufficiently dominant, or when the objective of the federal
regulation and the character of its obligations show such a purpose.120 The sheer amount of regulations that the FAA has
promulgated within the aviation safety field makes it difficult to
understand how a court could view the FAA’s regulations as anything but pervasive.121 Another rule, which some courts seem to
have ignored, is often cited to when arguing that the FAA only
establishes a minimum standard for design and manufacture.122
Section 44701(e) governs the FAA’s acceptance of airworthiness
directives issued by foreign governments, yet makes no mention
of state governments.123 The FAA may accept foreign airworthiness directives only in the event that its foreign counterpart has
a certification system requiring an equivalent level of safety as
the FAA does.124 Allowing foreign aviation safety agencies, but
not states, to certify airworthiness seems to indicate that Congress intended to create a system in which there are only two
possible arbiters of aircraft safety—the FAA or its foreign
counterpart.125
Legislative intent is further clarified by looking at the legislative history associated with the FAAct. Congress emphasized the
unique nature of the aviation industry, which naturally made it a
federal concern:
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
See Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
See 14 C.F.R. §§ 1–1399.
49 U.S.C. § 44701(e).
Id.
Id. § 44701(e)(5)(A)(iii).
Id. § 41302.
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[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its relation to the Federal Government—it is the only one whose operations are conducted almost wholly within the Federal
jurisdiction, and are subject to little or no regulation by States or
local authorities. Thus, the Federal Government bears virtually
complete responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this
industry in the public interest.126

The circumstances prompting the FAA’s creation are also consistent with an intent to establish a uniform federal regulatory
system. Congress passed the FAAct in response to a series of “fatal air crashes between civil and military aircraft operating under
separate flight rules.”127 It would make little sense for Congress to
go to the trouble of passing such a comprehensive piece of legislation only to leave the very problem it sought to address unaddressed. In City of Burbank, the Supreme Court afforded
significant weight to the legislative history of the FAAct, which it
felt was clearly designed to establish uniform regulations.128
That the Court reached this conclusion even after acknowledging that noise control regulation was traditionally a state police
power speaks volumes about the weight of the FAAct’s legislative
history.129
One of the primary concerns with field preemption the Third
Circuit expressed in Sikkelee was that it “would have the perverse
effect of granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry.”130 However, because state law claims
should still be available in conjunction with the FAAct under
field preemption, this fear is misguided. The majority of circuit
courts have held that the federal standard of care in the operation of aircraft preempts any state law standards of care, while
leaving remedies for state law claims intact.131 Significantly, the
FAAct’s savings clause states that “[n]othing contained in this
[chapter] shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now
existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this
[chapter] are in addition to such remedies.”132 The language
S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958).
United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasis
added).
128 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 634–40 (1973).
129 See id. at 638.
130 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 695 (3d Cir. 2016).
131 See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
132 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798
(1958).
126
127
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here necessarily implies the existence of state law claims, as a
remedy could not exist without a claim.
Once again, it is important to remember the distinction between preempting a state law claim and a state law standard of
care. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Abdullah, federal law can preempt the standard of care while leaving state tort remedies
intact:
[W]e find no irreconcilable conflict between federal and state
standards. Nor do we find that imposition of a . . . standard in a
damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law.
Quite to the contrary, it is evident in both the savings and the
insurance clauses of the [FAAct] that Congress found state damage remedies to be compatible with federal aviation safety standards. The savings clause provides that a remedy under this part
is in addition to any other remedies provided by law. Clearly,
Congress did not intend to prohibit state damage remedies by
this language.133

In Ventress v. Japan Airlines, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by the FAAct, but did so in
a manner consistent with the reasoning set forth in Abdullah.134
In Ventress, the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of any applicable federal aviation safety standard, pleading only state law unlawful retaliation and constructive termination claims in
response to his termination.135 The court acknowledged that
while state law claims and remedies were hypothetically available
under Abdullah’s holding, the plaintiff’s failure to allege a claim
under any applicable federal standard warranted preemption.136
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Greene invalidated the entire failure to warn claim brought under state law because it hinged on
the existence of a federal standard requiring manufacturers to
maintain a malfunction database.137 Had there been both federal and state law standards requiring such a database, the federal standard would have preempted the state standard. Even
absent a federal equivalent, the state law standard was preempted because it was supplementary to the federal regulatory
scheme.138 In Sikkelee, the Third Circuit framed the issue as
Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375 (internal quotations omitted).
Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 723 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014).
135 Id. at 719–20.
136 Id. at 723 n.7.
137 See Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 794–95 (6th
Cir. 2005).
138 Id. at 795.
133
134
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whether the FAAct preempted state law product liability claims,
rather than just the standard of care.139 However, the court also
rejected arguments that federal regulations established an applicable standard of care for aircraft design and manufacturing.140
Its primary reasoning was that the design certification process—
type, production, and airworthiness certificates—only established the procedures for federal approval of aircraft and their
components, lacking the comprehensiveness to supply the standard of care in a products liability case.141
The federal certification process does exactly that, however.
The FAA’s design safety standard is actually set forth through
the type certification process.142 In addition to type certificates,
the FAA may issue special conditions to manufacturers if its standard regulations are inadequate for a product, such as a component the administration is unfamiliar with.143 The standard for
issuing a type certificate is exacting on manufacturers, and the
language within the regulation purports to establish a standard
for design:
Upon examination of the type design, and after completing all
tests and inspections, that the type design and the product meet
the applicable noise, fuel venting, and emissions requirements of
this subchapter, and further finds that they meet the applicable
airworthiness requirements of this subchapter or that any airworthiness provisions not complied with are compensated for by factors that provide an equivalent level of safety.144

Prior to this testing phase, an applicant for a type certificate
must also show compliance with all applicable requirements.145
Even if not explicitly, 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.20–.21 seem to establish an
across-the-board standard for aircraft design and manufacture.
Had the Third Circuit recognized this distinction, it could have
simply applied this federal standard of care to the state law
claim, rather than relying on a state law standard requiring additional design considerations.
The Supreme Court has held that federal regulations establish a uniform standard of care in the design and manufacture
See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 692 (3d Cir. 2016).
See id. at 694.
141 Id.
142 Lauren L. Haertlein & Justin T. Barkowski, Applying a Federal Standard of
Care in Aviation Product Liability Actions, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 743, 760 (2017).
143 Id.
144 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (2020) (emphasis added).
145 Id. §§ 21.20–.21.
139
140
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of oil tankers, which is governed by a regulatory scheme similar
to that of the aviation industry.146 In Ray, a Washington state law
established safety standards exceeding those required by the
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).147 Much like
the FAA, the DoT oversaw a pervasive regulatory system including certification of oil tanker design and inspections for ongoing compliance under the PWSA.148 Especially significant is how
the Court addressed the issue of “minimum standards” in the
PWSA.149 Courts that reject field preemption argue that federal
regulations establish only a minimum standard for design and
manufacture.150 In Ray, however, the Court found that the pervasive nature of the PWSA regulatory scheme established more
than just a minimum standard.151 The Court noted that in addition to the power to promulgate safety standards, the PWSA
gave the federal government authority to ensure compliance
through certificates and inspections, prompting its conclusion
that the PWSA preempted the entire field of marine safety
regulations.152
This indicates to us that Congress intended uniform national
standards for design and construction of tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state requirements. In particular, as we see it, Congress did not anticipate that
a vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary’s design
and construction regulations . . . would nevertheless be barred by
state law from operating in the navigable waters of the United
States on the ground that its design characteristics constitute an
undue hazard.153

The similarities between the two federal regulatory schemes
are readily apparent: both establish a comprehensive certification process in design and manufacture, and federal control of
American waters is analogous to federal control of American airSee Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 163 (1978).
Id. at 154.
148 Id. at 161–62.
149 Id. at 161. The Court noted the PWSA requires promulgation of “comprehensive minimum standards of design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, and operation” for certain vessels. Id.
150 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 2016);
Estate of Becker v. AVCO Corp., 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (Wash. 2017).
151 Ray, 435 U.S. at 163.
152 Id. at 162–63.
153 Id. at 163–64.
146
147
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ways.154 Much like the Court observed in Ray, it would make little sense for aircraft meeting federal design standards to be
subject to liability in certain states with more stringent standards. The Court cited the legislative history of the PWSA, which
also indicated an intent to preempt state law: “The original
Tank Vessel Act, amended by Title II, sought to effect ‘a reasonable and uniform set of rules and regulations concerning ship
construction.’”155 The FAA’s parallel aircraft certification system
should therefore indicate an equal intent. The FAAct and PWSA
also mirror each other in their acceptance of foreign safety certifications.156 The PWSA contains a nearly identical provision allowing the federal government alone to accept the safety
certifications of foreign vessels,157 which the Court also felt indicated congressional intent to preempt the entire field of maritime safety law.158
Given that the federal design certification process establishes
a standard of care for design and manufacture, it is much
harder to reconcile the Third Circuit’s distinction between inair operations and pre- or post-flight regulations. The court
noted in Sikkelee that the examples of the pervasive regulations it
had cited in Abdullah only applied to in-air operations, leaving
certain regulations, such as those applying to type certificates,
outside the reach of the FAAct’s preemption powers.159 According to the court, the design regulations governing type certificates were not as comprehensive as those governing pilot
certification and other aspects of in-flight operations, therefore
the FAAct established only minimum safety standards rather
than a catch-all standard of care for design and manufacture.160
Naturally, the court pointed out that the FAAct grants the FAA
the authority to prescribe “minimum standards” required “in the
interest of safety” and “necessary for safety.”161 The existence of
“minimum” federal standards, however, does not necessarily imply that states have the power to supplement those standards.
Rather, the use of the word “minimum” was intended to strike
154 Thomas J. McLaughlin, Mary P. Gaston, & Jared D. Hager, Navigating the
Nation’s Waterways and Airways: Maritime Lessons for Federal Preemption of Airworthiness Standards, 23 AIR & SPACE LAW. no. 2, 2010, at 5, 9.
155 Ray, 435 U.S. at 165–66 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 74-2962, at 2 (1936)).
156 McLaughlin, supra note 154, at 9.
157 46 U.S.C. § 3303.
158 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 163.
159 See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 2016).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 693; 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a) (emphasis added).
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an optimal balance between adequately ensuring safety in aircraft design and manufacturing, and facilitating economic
growth by avoiding overly burdensome regulations.162 It would
make little sense for the federal government to prescribe inadequate safety regulations and allow each state to decide whether
to supplement them. If that were the case, Congress would be
knowingly risking the lives of passengers on aircraft designed or
manufactured in a state which declined to supplement the minimum federal standard of care. Such a result would be clearly
inconsistent with Congress’s stated goal of ensuring “maximum
possible safety and efficiency” through the FAAct.163
Field preemption is necessary in order to establish a uniform
federal standard of care for aircraft manufacturers. This is the
primary problem with the Third Circuit’s holding in Sikkelee—
the FAAct does not prevent plaintiffs in product liability claims
from also bringing state law claims supplying their own standards of care.164 Allowing plaintiffs to bring tort claims under
state laws applying different standards of care subjects aircraft
manufacturers to a patchwork of different standards, making it
impracticable—if not impossible—to realistically comply with
each of them.165 Because aircraft manufacturers have essentially
zero control over where an aircraft goes after its sale, forcing
them into compliance with both a federal design standard and
potentially fifty different state standards is simply unreasonable.166 Allowing state law to govern the standard of care in an
aviation products liability claim is also problematic because it
displaces the expertise of the FAA. The FAA employs a highly
technical certification process which governs manufacture and
design throughout the life of the aircraft.167 In contrast, state
standards of care developed through litigation allow the FAA’s
complex certification process to be second-guessed by expert
witnesses, judges, and juries.168
Applying the federal standard of care to state law product liability claims provides more predictability for aircraft manufacturers, while also ensuring a more accurate outcome in each
case. Under state law, the standard of care in a negligence claim
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

See Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 759.
H.R. REP. NO. 85-2360, at *3747 (1958).
See id.
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 757.
Id. at 758.
Id.
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would be established primarily through expert testimony and a
strict liability claim would hinge on whether the jury finds a design defect.169 This usually involves weighing the feasibility of alternative designs, which may or may not be relevant to the
specific issue being litigated.170 A jury verdict against a manufacturer thus means that the product design was unsafe for operation, even though the design was approved by the FAA when it
issued a type certificate.171 Thus, the court supersedes the FAA’s
role in certifying aircraft and imposes a duty on the manufacturer to comply with a design standard which may be inconsistent with those prescribed by the FAA.172 This lack of uniformity
increases litigation costs due to the reliance on expert witnesses,
while forcing manufacturers to spend more on insurance to protect themselves from such inconsistent standards.173 Manufacturers will ultimately pass these higher costs along to consumers,
negatively impacting both sides of the market.174
By integrating the federal standard of care set forth through
the certification process into state law claims, the focus at trial
instead becomes whether the product met the FAA’s standards,
rather than those established by expert witnesses.175 The issuance of a type certificate would constitute prima facie evidence
that no defect exists, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to show
that the manufacturer failed to comply with the basis of its certification in that instance.176 Although this may present a hurdle
for plaintiffs, the federal standard of care provides a more accurate definition of a product defect, while also giving manufacturers more certainty from state to state.
As a starting point in any future Supreme Court case on the
issue, the presumption against federal preemption should not
be so powerful. The presumption primarily applies to the extent
that Congress attempts to preempt state law in an area that the

Id. at 765–66.
Id. at 766.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Geoffrey M. Hand, Should Juries Decide Aircraft Design? Cleveland v. Piper
Aircraft Corp. and Federal Preemption of State Tort Law, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 741, 743
(1995).
174 Id.
175 See id. at 785–86.
176 Id. at 802.
169
170
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states have traditionally occupied.177 This concern is typical to
preemption cases, but is likely irrelevant in the aviation context.
The Supreme Court has already acknowledged that the presumption against preemption does not apply to federal maritime safety regulation,178 a field with a similar history of federal
control. The Third Circuit in Sikkelee somehow failed to find a
significant history of federal involvement in aviation safety regulation, stating that “aviation torts have been consistently governed by state law” before citing an aviation safety case decided
under state law—in 1914.179 While the court then cites to additional cases decided under state law, this line of jurisprudence—
on its own—could hardly be considered convincing evidence
that aviation law is an area of traditional state occupation. The
federal government did not begin regulating aviation safety until 1926,180 primarily because it was a fledgling industry. Since
1926, however, Congress has exhibited a marked interest in regulating American airways, and its regulatory schemes have
shown an intent to exclude states from further regulation.181
From a constitutional perspective, when applied to the FAAct,
field preemption is more appropriate than conflict preemption.
Regardless of the doctrine’s source—the Supremacy Clause or
the Necessary and Proper Clause—field preemption seems to be
the clear choice. The Supremacy Clause route is rather simple:
Congress has spoken on the issue, therefore excluding states
from further regulation. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution and federal laws are the supreme law of the land.182 If
the FAA purports to establish standards for aircraft manufacture
and design, as it has through its detailed certification system,183
states should naturally be excluded from imposing additional
standards. The FAA’s multi-level certification system establishes
a comprehensive safety standard for not only the aircraft, but
each of its components as well.184 Therefore, allowing standards
177 See John C. Nettels, Jr. & Jerrick L. Irby, Standard of Care Preemption in Aviation Litigation: Halting Steps to a Coherent Analysis, 76 J. AIR. L. & COM. 327, 335
(2011).
178 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“An assumption of nonpreemption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has
been a history of significant federal presence.”).
179 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 690 (3d Cir. 2016).
180 See Air Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
181 See A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 6.
182 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
183 See supra Part II.A.
184 Haertlein & Barkowski, supra note 142, at 764.
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of care defined by states to govern in aviation product liability
cases would undermine the federal regulatory scheme, which
has already established a standard of care for aircraft design and
manufacturing.185 Relying on principles of conflict preemption
would provide little clarity in comparison with the current regime—although federal law may preempt conflicting state statutes, it would be up to the courts to decide when exactly this
preemption has occurred, which could lead to inconsistent
outcomes.186
Though the Supreme Court has often stated that preemption
is rooted in the Supremacy Clause,187 preemption can also be
viewed as a product of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as Professor Stephen A. Gardbaum argues.188 The crux of his argument is that the supremacy of federal law means that when both
state and federal law within a certain area are valid, the federal
law overrides the state law.189 Therefore, under the Supremacy
Clause, state law still has full effect provided it avoids conflicting
with federal law.190 Preemption, on the other hand, means that
states have no power to act in the given field, regardless of
whether they conflict with any federal laws.191 Gardbaum argues
that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, preemption is simply a means of allowing Congress to effectively exercise its enumerated powers.192 This often requires a uniform set of laws or
regulations to accomplish, especially when regulating interstate
commerce.193 Aviation safety is no exception—as an integral
part of interstate commerce,194 it should be governed by a uniform set of laws and regulations. Aviation is a fundamental interstate industry which was quite literally invented to travel across
state and national borders, making it uniquely suited for federal
regulation. This is precisely what the Supreme Court made clear
in City of Burbank: if the congressional objectives underlying the
FAAct are to be fulfilled, balancing safety and efficiency requires
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id.
See supra Part II.B.
See, e.g., Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 781–82.
Gardbaum, supra note 28, at 770.
Id.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 782.
Id. at 781.
Data & Statistics, supra note 114.
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a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation.195 However one chooses to interpret the source of preemption, field
preemption is more consistent with the Constitution when applied to the field of aviation safety.
B.

APPLYING Tweed to Other Circuits

Given both the importance of uniform aviation regulation
and the degree to which the circuits differ in their analysis of
FAAct preemption, the Supreme Court will likely speak on the
issue in the near future. Although the denial of certiorari for
Tweed was certainly disappointing for the aviation industry, the
silver lining is that a future decision may provide more clarity
than one tailored to Tweed’s facts. The Second Circuit was clear
in its view that the FAAct was intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety, but it never indicated whether that included the applicable standard of care for design and manufacture.196 Thus, a Supreme Court decision in Tweed may have been
limited to the runway statute at issue in the case rather than
addressing the broader question of the FAAct’s overall preemption power.197 Although Tweed will not be heard before the Supreme Court, its preemption analysis should guide other circuit
courts.
The preemption analysis in Tweed is also much simpler than
the Third Circuit’s approach in Sikkelee, making it easier for
other circuit courts to apply. The Second Circuit began by acknowledging its own precedent that the FAAct impliedly preempted the entire field of aviation safety.198 Thus, the question
became whether the statute fell within the scope of preemption
by having a direct impact on air safety.199 The Third Circuit had
also previously held that the FAAct preempted the entire field of
aviation safety in Abdullah,200 but limited “aviation safety” to in195 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
196 See Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2508 (2020).
197 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tweed, 930 F.3d 65 (No. 19-375). The
question presented to the Court was “[d]oes the Federal Aviation Act preempt a
state law limiting the length of an airport runway, thereby depriving a State from
determining the size and nature of a local airport?” Id. at ii.
198 See Tweed, 930 F.3d at 74 (citing Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. E. Haddam
Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210–11 (2d Cir. 2011)).
199 See id.
200 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
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flight operations in Elassaad and Sikkelee.201 This narrow definition of aviation safety requires courts to perform a preemption
analysis for any aviation safety law not directly governing inflight operations. Under the Tweed approach, a court has only
one question to answer: does the law directly impact aviation
safety?
Of course, circuits yet to decide on the issue have little directly applicable precedent with which to start their FAAct preemption analysis. In the interest of uniformity, these circuits
should adopt the majority view that the FAAct impliedly
preempts the entire field of aviation safety law. These courts
could undertake their own preemption analysis or simply side
with the weight of persuasive authority, which the Second Circuit did in Goodspeed.202 After adopting the majority view, the
court need only determine whether the law in question falls
within that field.
This simpler analysis is preferable for several reasons. First,
analyzing aviation safety laws under the presumption of field
preemption ensures more consistent application of the law nationwide. Analyzing congressional intent and the pervasiveness
of regulation in every subset of aviation safety law runs the risk
of contradicting the federal government’s interest in uniformity.
Second, the requirement that a state law must directly affect aviation safety in order to fall within the scope of preemption provides more certainty to state and local authorities about the
extent of their regulatory power. This is especially important in
the absence of a Supreme Court decision, as it will conserve
state and local government resources which might otherwise be
spent litigating preemption challenges brought by private parties. Finally, agreement among circuits will benefit the aviation
industry by providing more geographic uniformity for manufacturers regarding design and manufacturing standards.
The Tweed analysis is also compatible with establishing a uniform federal standard of care for aircraft design and manufacturing. Preempting additional state-based standards of care
would require proving that the federal regulations directly impact aviation safety, which is not too high a burden. FAA type
certificate regulations require that aircraft and their compo201 Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 689 (3d Cir. 2016);
Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010).
202 See Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 210 n.5.

534

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

nents meet a “level of safety,”203 which seems to be an obvious
case for preemption under Tweed. Imposing a uniform federal
standard of care does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing product liability or design defect claims under state law. Rather, only
state law standards of care would be preempted by the FAA regulations, as they directly impact aviation safety. The focus at trial
then shifts from establishing a design defect through expert testimony to proving that the manufacturer failed in that instance
to comply with the requirements of its FAA certification.204 This
should allow for a more accurate determination of whether a
design defect actually exists. This also ensures aircraft manufacturers will not be subjected to different standards of care based
on where an accident occurs, which is almost entirely out of
their control.
V.

CONCLUSION

The American aviation industry requires a set of uniform laws
and regulations in order to operate at maximum efficiency. As it
stands, aircraft manufacturers are subject to a wide variety of
safety standards governed by state tort law—a system which is
simply incompatible with the nature of the aviation industry.
Field preemption is more consistent with both the intended purpose of the FAAct and the unique nature of the aviation industry. Unique as it is, the industry’s regulatory scheme is also very
comparable to regulations on maritime safety, which has proven
to be an industry suited for uniform federal control. Courts that
have declined to apply field preemption to the FAAct have done
so in a misguided manner, either misinterpreting the purpose
of the FAAct or misunderstanding the nature of the aviation
industry.
Integrating federal design and manufacturing standards into
state law tort claims is the optimal regulatory approach for the
aviation industry, as it would provide clarity and certainty for
manufacturers while also simplifying the trial process in negligence and products liability claims. Insulating manufacturers
from the patchwork of different standards of care will lower
203 14 C.F.R. § 21.21(b)(1). The FAA may issue a type certificate if it “finds that
they meet the applicable airworthiness requirements of this subchapter or that
any airworthiness provisions not complied with are compensated for by factors
that provide an equivalent level of safety.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id.
§ 21.21(b)(2) (requiring “that no feature or characteristic makes [an aircraft]
unsafe”).
204 See Hand, supra note 173, at 743.
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both their litigation and insurance costs, savings which can be
passed onto consumers. Uniform federal standards would also
ensure that the subject matter experts, not judges and juries,
decide whether an aircraft or component met the applicable design standards in each case.
Ideally, the Supreme Court will step in and resolve the circuit
split in the near future. Until then, the Second Circuit’s decision in Tweed should serve as a template for other circuit courts
that have yet to decide on the issue. This will ensure maximum
possible uniformity in federal aviation regulation and will benefit the judicial system, state and local governments, the aviation
industry, and ultimately, the consumer.
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ABSTRACT
The lack of a clear and consistent federal standard across the
country harms both airline carriers and aviation employees—
carriers who grapple with a myriad of regulations and airline
employees who are unsure of their rights and how to exercise
them. As states with expansive labor laws continue to assert extraterritorial authority to enforce their laws on airline workers
who may only temporarily pass through their borders, the confusing thicket of conflicting state and federal laws only worsens.
There is a clear need for an updated federal framework that
takes into account the airline industry and the needs of workers
in the present day; while the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA)
may have served its purpose in stabilizing the nascent airline industry in the 1930s, the aviation industry has outgrown its usefulness. To replace the RLA and standardize the labor rights of
workers in the aviation industry, this Comment proposes amending Title 49 of the U.S. Code (Title 49) to include a chapter on
labor. Because of the direct impact of the labor rights of airline
workers on the safety of the aviation industry, legislation dealing
with these rights falls squarely within the purview of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). Through the proposed amendment, the aviation industry will be made safer, workers will receive greater protections, and the squandering of judicial
economy through needless litigation over the thicket of conflicting local, state, and federal law will cease.
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I. INTRODUCTION
OR MOST EMPLOYEES, the question “Where do I work?” is
not one that ever comes to mind. But for some workers, particularly those in the airline industry, a thicket of conflicting local, state, and federal laws, along with work that regularly takes
them across state lines, raises serious questions about where exactly the work is being performed—and more importantly, what
rights and protections apply. While workers can be certain that
some federal laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA) or Railway Labor Act of 1926 (RLA) apply to them no

F
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matter where they work in the country, the applicability of state
and local labor laws that provide additional protections like California’s wage and hour laws or New York City’s paid sick leave
law is much less certain. This confusion has only been magnified
by some states’ recent assertions of extraterritorial authority to
apply their wage and hour laws to workers located outside of
their borders. In light of this uncertainty and the growing number of cases stemming from it, there exists a clear need for legislative intervention to preempt conflicting state and local labor
laws and to bring uniformity to the field.
Part II of this Comment provides the historical background of
federal wage and labor law, with a particular focus on how it has
developed for workers in the railway industry, and how that history shaped the field of airline labor law. Part III examines the
current state of the conflicting federal, state, and local laws, the
recent cases arising out of such conflict, and the assertions of
extraterritorial authority. Part IV advocates for nationwide uniformity in labor law for aviation workers, divorcing the labor
rights of airline workers from the RLA, and outlines the policy
implications of letting the current thicket of conflicting laws
worsen. Part V proposes an amendment to Title 49 of the U.S.
Code (Title 49) that would grant the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) the authority to regulate the labor of airline workers and establish a comprehensive framework of labor and wage
laws that will preempt state and local regulations.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Though the development of labor law in the United States has
a long and storied history dating back to the slave trade, the
modern statutory framework finds its roots in several critical
pieces of legislation in the early twentieth century. Prior to the
passage of these seminal pieces of legislation, courts around the
country were striking down protections for workers as unconstitutional, including laws limiting the number of hours an employee could work in 1905,1 prohibiting conditioning
employment on an agreement to not join a union in 1915,2
prohibiting child labor in 1918,3 and establishing minimum
wage standards for women and children in 1923.4 Subsequent
1
2
3
4

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561–62 (1923).
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acts like the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)5 and
the FLSA6 were radical grants of rights and protections to employees in a legal environment that had previously been inimical
to them. These two acts built on the foundations of others like
the RLA,7 which provided much needed protections only to
workers in certain industries—that is, the railroad industry, and
later, airline industry. These acts, and the subsequent court decisions upholding them, signaled a sea change in American jurisprudence toward protecting the rights of workers and, to this
day, serve as the foundation of labor law in the United States.
A.

FOUNDATIONS OF AIRLINE WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE INHERITED HISTORY OF RAILWAY
WORKERS’ COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

One of the first instances of collective bargaining and its subsequent suppression by the judiciary came out of Pennsylvania
in the late 1700s. There, a group of shoemakers formed a protounion to respond to the increasing labor hardships of an industrializing society and to secure fair wages for its members.8 This
union, however, did not have a long lifespan, and after just ten
years, a suit was brought against members of the union for the
criminal charge of conspiracy in Commonwealth v. Pullis.9 Eight
of the union’s leaders were found guilty of the crime of illegally
conspiring to raise their wages, effectively criminalizing unions
in Pennsylvania.10 The result of Pullis left the legal status of unions in question in other parts of the country, and there were at
least eighteen other instances of early union members being
prosecuted for conspiracy over the course of the next three
decades.11
It would not be until 1842 that a court would declare that
labor unions were in fact legal enterprises and not criminal conspiracies.12 That case, Commonwealth v. Hunt, coincidentally also
dealing with shoemakers, set the stage for the legality of collecNational Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–03.
7 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88.
8 Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 166–67 (1931).
9 3 Doc. Hist. 59 (Phila. Mayor’s Ct. 1806); Omar Swartz, Defending Labor in
Commonwealth v. Pullis: Contemporary Implications for Rethinking Community, 8
HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 79, 80 n.10 (2004).
10 Id. at 80.
11 Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826 (1926).
12 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 136 (1842).
5
6
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tive bargaining in the United States,13 and Chief Justice Shaw’s
majority opinion is widely regarded as “the Magna [Carta] of
American trade-unionism.”14 In Hunt, Chief Justice Shaw made
the distinction between the mere concept of a combination of
workers seeking to use collective bargaining to regulate their
wages—a union—and the methods a union might employ to secure higher wages or other protections.15 By drawing such a
line, Chief Justice Shaw reframed the debate from whether a
union itself amounted to an illegal conspiracy to whether the
objectives sought by the union and methods used to accomplish
such objectives were themselves legal.16 Though the debate over
the precise demarcation of when union action crosses into illegal territory continues to this day, Chief Justice Shaw’s formulation would prove highly influential, with only three conspiracy
cases in the subsequent twenty years brought against workers.17
Though Chief Justice Shaw laid the groundwork for the legality
of unions and their ability to strike lawfully, his opinion would
do little to stem oncoming tides of conflict between workers and
their employers in an increasingly industrial society.18
Strikes would prove to be the tool of choice for American
workers in combatting poor working conditions, low wages, and
overall governmental hostility to the interests of workers.19 The
tensions between workers and their employers came to a head in
1877, when workers—frustrated with repeated pay cuts, shouldering the burden of an economic depression, and the efforts of
employers to stifle the potency of unions—staged what would be
the first nationwide strike in American history, with estimates of
nearly 500,000 workers walking out from their jobs in July
1877.20 Characterized as the “Great Strike” or the “Great Insurrection,” the strikes of July 1877 began along America’s extensive railroad system.21 No longer constrained to a mere local
group of disgruntled shoemakers like the unions in Pullis and
Hunt, the Great Strike involved workers of the railroad corporaId.
LEONARD LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
183 (1957).
15 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
16 Id.
17 LEVY, supra note 14, at 206.
18 Witte, supra note 11, at 828.
19 MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, 1877: AMERICA’S YEAR FOR LIVING VIOLENTLY 144
(2010).
20 Id. at 145.
21 Id.
13
14
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tions—some of the largest and most influential corporations in
America at the time—the same corporations that played a critical role in America’s rapid industrialization.22
The increased stakes and heightened impacts of the railway
worker strikes resulted in an increase in the severity of the response—this time, rather than taking the striking unions to
court, corporate leaders resorted to force almost immediately.23
When local police forces and state militias—many of them holding sympathies to the cause of the striking workers24—were unable or unwilling to enact the will of corporate leaders, the
leaders turned to recently inaugurated President Rutherford B.
Hayes.25 Indebted to the corporate leaders who had supported
his presidential campaign, President Hayes authorized federal
troops to suppress the strikes—a rarely used option—and the
Great Strike marked the first time federal troops were used on a
nationwide scale to quash a strike.26
President Hayes’s decision to acquiesce to the demands of
railway corporations and authorize the use of federal force
would ultimately end the strikes, but not without bloodshed,27
destruction of property,28 and the garnering of much public
support for the unions.29 The victory of the corporations would
prove to be a Pyrrhic one, as the landscape of labor relations
had been forever changed.30 It had become clear to the workers
that they could not rely on the current governmental institutions to side with their interests over those of the wealthy railway
owners,31 and it had become clear to the nation’s elite that the
influence and power of a unified working class could have devastating results for the country.32
Responses to the new landscape were mixed; some industrialists raised wages in order to keep their workers happy and
loyal,33 while others like Andrew Carnegie saw only the dangerous aspects of unions and conditioned hiring workers on their
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

145–46.
145.
149.
146.
145–46.
175.
155–58.
156.
190.
179.
175.
168.
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agreement to not join one34—a practice that would later become known as a “yellow-dog contract.”35 Workers who had lost
faith in elected public officials turned to the ballot box in order
to secure their rights.36 And, having witnessed the existential
threat that a striking railway workforce imposes on the country’s
economy,37 it became imperative for the political leaders to prevent such a massive strike from occurring again. The federal
government’s early attempts to mediate the interests of the railway owners and workers would take place through a series of
failed legislation that ultimately culminated in the still extant
RLA in 1926.38
B. THE LEAD UP TO MODERN LAW GOVERNING AIRLINE
EMPLOYEES: BACKGROUND TO THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Still hot on the heels of the Great Strike of 1877, political
leaders in state governments had great incentive to encourage
harmonious resolution of disputes between unions and employers. To facilitate such resolution, several states began passing
legislation to arbitrate labor disputes as early as 1878, though
the state statutes ultimately proved to be feckless.39 However,
these statutes provided the groundwork for a federal statute’s
inception. Given the recent history of railway strikes and the railway industry’s susceptibility to such strikes, the impact those
strikes had on the national economy, and the fact that railways
were clearly engaged in interstate commerce, it is of little surprise that the first federal law on labor arbitration would arise in
the context of railway labor disputes.40 As a result, President
Grover Cleveland signed into law the Arbitration Act of 1888
(Arbitration Act), which provided an arena for voluntary arbitration of railway labor disputes.41 However, much like the previously ineffective state laws, voluntary arbitration failed to solve
the disagreements between the unions and railway owners: in
the Arbitration Act’s ten-year lifespan, voluntary arbitration was
Id. at 154.
Joel I. Seidman, The Yellow Dog Contract, 46 Q.J. ECON. 348, 348 (1932).
36 BELLESILES, supra note 19, at 187–88.
37 Id. at 175.
38 Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early
Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 373, 386 (1983).
39 Id. at 380–81.
40 Id. at 382.
41 Id.; Arbitration Act of 1888, Pub. L. No. 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1888) (repealed 1898).
34
35
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not used once.42 The Arbitration Act’s requirement of impartial
and disinterested mediators, slow-moving bureaucracy, and inability to bring both sides to the table resulted in a wholly ineffective piece of legislation, which was quickly replaced.43
The Arbitration Act’s follow-up, the Erdman Act of 1898
(Erdman Act),44 sought to correct the deficiencies of the Arbitration Act.45 The Erdman Act removed the requirement of having impartial mediators and established a permanent
commission with the power to prevent strikes and firings during
an investigation.46 With the exception of a single failed attempt
to invoke an arbitration proceeding, the Erdman Act was not
used at all during the first eight years of its existence.47 But this
changed beginning in 1906, and it was invoked in sixty cases
from 1906 to 1913.48 The most important change was perhaps
the ability to appeal arbitration rewards to federal courts.49 Unfortunately, the increased use resulted in increased disapproval
of the Erdman Act, as decisions affecting millions of dollars and
thousands of workers were often made by an outside mediator
with little to no knowledge of the industry.50 Eventually, dissatisfaction with the mediators’ decisions led to both unions and railway leaders refusing to use the Act, and threats of an incoming
strike galvanized Congress to pass yet another version of the
bill.51
The 1913 edition of the legislation, the Newlands Labor Act
(Newlands Act),52 again sought to correct perceived deficiencies
in the previous versions, this time establishing a permanent
three-member board of remediation and conciliation utilizing
mediators from within the industry.53 This version received
more use than previous iterations, handling seventy-one disputes between 1913 and 1917, though it ran into an impasse in
1916 after unions asserted that their demand for an eight-hour
Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 382.
Id. at 383.
44 Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (repealed 1913).
45 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 383.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 383–84.
49 Id. at 385.
50 Id. at 384.
51 Id.
52 Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration Between Carriers and Employees,
ch. 6, 38 Stat. 103 (1913) (repealed 1926).
53 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 384–85.
42
43
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workday was not a question suitable for the three-member board
to resolve.54
With the threat of yet another strike mounting, Congress
passed the Adamson Eight-Hour Act of 1916 (Adamson Act),55
which established an eight-hour workday and overtime pay for
railway workers.56 Fervently contested by railway owners, the
Adamson Act was litigated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
and, in 1917, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of Congress
to regulate the workday and overtime compensation for interstate railway workers,57 a surprising change of pace for a Court
that had struck down New York’s attempt to limit the amount of
hours worked in a bakery to ten hours a day as unconstitutional
just twelve years prior.58
While the goings-on of the railway industry had largely been
an insular affair, in 1918, the mounting need for a nationally
unified railway entity due to the demands of World War I resulted in the nationalization of the railway industry under the
Railway Administration Act.59 The nationalization of the country’s railway system would last a few years, until 1920, when the
railways returned to private ownership.60 However, the relative
harmony in which railways operated for the years of nationalization signaled that improvements still could be made to the Newlands Act, and as a result, Congress passed yet another version,
the Transportation Act of 1920 (Transportation Act).61
The Transportation Act, however, largely regressed from the
improvements made in previous iterations, with both labor unions and railway executives seeking to replace the legislation.62
The Transportation Act mandated use of arbitration proceedings, but the decisions were ultimately toothless because they
were not legally enforceable.63 However, contrary to prior laws,
the Transportation Act was widely used, and the newly established board was inundated with nearly 14,000 cases over its fiveId. at 385.
Adamson Eight-Hour Act, Pub. L. No, 64-252, 39 Stat. 721 (1916) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 28301–02).
56 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
57 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917).
58 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905).
59 Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 65-107, 40 Stat. 451 (1918) (repealed 1920); Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 385.
60 Id.
61 Id.; Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920).
62 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
63 Id. at 385.
54
55
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year lifespan.64 The dissatisfaction from both railway owners and
union officials led the parties to begin drafting their own version of the law, which was then proposed to Congress.65 That
version was ultimately passed in 1926 as the RLA.66
The RLA, further amended in 1934 to fix some deficiencies
and again in 1936 to include the airline industry within the Act’s
purview, remains the governing law over labor relations in both
the railway and airline industries to this day.67 The RLA governs
the handling of disputes within the industries, utilizing a single
organization, the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(Board).68 As a result of comprehensive negotiations, the RLA
contains significant concessions for both sides: labor unions
largely gave up their ability to strike without first going through
the Board, but gained the ability to sue employers in federal
court for violations of the RLA.69 The ability to bring suits for
violation of the RLA on their own volition distinguishes railway
and airline workers from most other employees in the country,
who are subject to the NLRA of 1935, which gives the National
Labor Relations Board exclusive standing to sue.70 This right is a
direct result of the long-fought history of railway workers in the
early stages of an industrializing United States.
While the 1934 amendments sought to correct several deficiencies of the original Act, the 1936 amendments were added
to extend the Act to the fledgling airline industry.71 The RLA
was extended to the airline industry for a myriad of reasons: similar to the railway industry, the airline industry dealt with interId.
Id. at 386.
66 Id.; Railway Administration Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88).
67 Nolan & Abrams, supra note 38, at 386.
68 Id. at 387.
69 Id. at 387–88.
70 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or
any person subject to the Railway Labor Act as amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 A. J. Harper II, Major Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 35 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 3 (1969).
64
65
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state commerce, making it ripe for federal legislation, and the
airline industry had an immediate need for thorough and effective regulations, which the RLA could provide.72 By doing so, it
established uniformity between the industries.73 Additionally, by
1936, nearly every other facet of the airline industry was subject
to close regulation, and there was no compelling reason to exclude labor from the norm.74 However, while the RLA undoubtedly provided a much-needed framework at the industry’s
emergence, the airline industry has continued to be burdened
by a system that was not designed with its needs in mind.75 As
will be discussed in Part IV.A, the modern needs of the airline
industry have only exacerbated its growing pains within the
framework of the RLA, and either an amendment to existing
federal frameworks or a new statute is required to adequately
respond to the current landscape.
C.

NON-UNION LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS: THE RISE
FALL OF THE LOCHNER ERA

AND

While the development of the RLA was largely a fifty-year process of iterative legislation insulated from other labor developments in the United States, the modern rights of both railway
and airline workers are further enmeshed in a broader net of
protections, combining the RLA, Supreme Court precedent,
and other federal legislation such as the FLSA of 1938.
Around the same time that the Supreme Court upheld the
Adamson Act in 1917, limiting the working day of railway employees to eight hours, the Court had been consistently striking
down other extensions of protections to workers.76 Dubbed the
“Lochner era” after the Court’s ruling in Lochner v. New York
(striking down a state law limiting the working day to ten
hours), the Court’s decisions in this era were characterized by a
laissez-faire approach to the labor market.77 Strictly protecting
the principle that individuals were free to enter into contracts of
Id.
Id.
74 James B. Frankel, Judicial and Regulatory Decisions, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 461,
461–62 (1951).
75 Id. at 477–79.
76 See supra Part II.
77 Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1991).
72
73
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their choice, the Lochner Court rejected the idea of a “paternal
government” interfering with the liberty of contract.78
However, the Lochner era began on shaky ground, as it was not
fully supported by precedent, and it would be a mere three decades before the Lochner jurisprudence fully collapsed in 1937.79
The laissez-faire principles undergirding the Lochner era stood at
odds with an earlier ruling in Holden v. Hardy, which upheld regulations preventing individuals from contracting in ways that
harmed themselves.80 In fact, it would only be twelve years
before Lochner’s specific holding regarding the validity of maximum hours legislation would be overruled, though the pernicious logic behind its reasoning would persist.81 In Bunting v.
Oregon, the Court upheld a state law limiting the working day to
ten hours and providing time-and-a-half overtime for hours
worked past the limit, overruling the particular holding in
Lochner.82
Despite Bunting overturning Lochner, the era would continue
with some of its most notorious decisions in the years to come.
Just a year after Bunting, the Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting the sale of products made by child labor in interstate commerce in Hammer v. Dagenhart.83 The decision in Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital soon followed, where the Court struck
down another federal law providing protections for workers, this
time mandating a minimum wage for female employees in the
District of Columbia.84 Grasping at straws to distinguish the decision from that of Bunting, the Court focused on the difference
between laws regulating wages and those regulating hours as sufficient grounds to differentiate it from Bunting.85 The Lochner
era’s tenuous grasp of logic would soon lead to its downfall, and
the overruling of Adkins sounded the death knell of the era. In
1937, the Court heard yet another case regarding the minimum
wage, and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Court struck the
killing blow to the Lochner jurisprudence and upheld a minimum wage.86
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 9.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 19–20, 19 n.78; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 439 (1917).
247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560–61 (1923).
Id. at 550–51.
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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With the looming threat of the Court striking down labor regulations finally over, hardly a year elapsed between the fall of
the Lochner era and the passage of a comprehensive set of federal labor regulations. The FLSA established a national base
level minimum wage, prohibited the employment of children,
capped the work week at forty-four hours, and provided timeand-a-half overtime pay on work past the cap—a monumental
expansion of worker protections, and one that President Franklin D. Roosevelt characterized as the most important piece of
New Deal legislation next to the Social Security Act.87 The FLSA
would be challenged shortly after on the grounds that it could
not proscribe child labor given the precedent of Hammer v.
Dagenhart, and the Supreme Court was given a chance to strike
down the FLSA. However, in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
the Court unanimously upheld the FLSA, abolishing the last vestiges of the Lochner era and overturning Hammer.88 While the
FLSA has been amended many times since its passage, the core
of the legislation nonetheless persists as the national bare minimum of worker rights and protections for employees engaged in
interstate commerce.
III.

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Bolstered by both the RLA and the FLSA, in addition to applicable state and local laws, it would seem at first glance that airline workers must be some of the most protected workers in the
country. While airline workers benefit in some areas from the
years of collective labor bargaining that led to the passing of the
RLA, the RLA was written with railway workers in mind, and it
continues to be a poor fit for the airline industry. For employees
in the airline industry, the multi-jurisdictional nature of their
work, combined with conflicting state and local laws and the
lack of a uniform federal standard to preempt such laws, subjects airline workers to a confusing thicket of inconsistent laws
that can obfuscate their rights.

87 Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Dec. 2000, at 32, 32, 36; see also Jared Bernstein
& Ross Eisenbrey, Eliminating the Right to Overtime Pay, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 25,
2003), https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_flsa_jun03/ [https://
perma.cc/V49R-7LTK].
88 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
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At odds with the age-old legal maxim of ubi jus ubi remedium
(where there is a right, there is a remedy),89 there can be no
remedy if a worker does not know that she has that right to begin with. Especially given the fact that federal legislation like the
RLA or FLSA merely sets out the bare minimum protections
that are often exceeded by state and local laws like California’s
wage and hour law90 or Washington’s Paid Sick Leave Act
(PSLA),91 an airline worker uncertain of her rights may in fact
end up with fewer protections than a worker who never leaves
the city or state and is certain of her rights.
A.

THE BARREN FIELD: A LACK

OF

CLEAR FEDERAL PREEMPTION

A critical issue for a worker in determining her rights is the
lack of clarity on what laws apply when and the overall absence
of unambiguous federal protections. On the whole for workers
outside of the airline industry, the lack of federal preemptive
standards tends to benefit workers given the bare minimum
standards presented in the federal statutes and the additional
protections workers receive through more comprehensive state
and local laws. Many states have passed higher wage and hour
rates than the FLSA base level, with twenty-nine states (plus
Washington, D.C., Guam, and the Virgin Islands) exceeding the
federal minimum wage.92 The ability of states to pass higher
standards was clearly an intentional feature of the FLSA and is
laid out in § 218(a) of the Act. Colloquially referred to as the
“savings clause,” the FLSA states that “[n]o provision of this Act
or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance” establishing a
higher minimum wage or shorter maximum work week.93 As has
been held by the Third Circuit, “the statute’s plain language
evinces a clear intent to preserve rather than supplant state law.”94
The savings clause allows states and local municipalities to ex89 Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 71, 78 n.47 (2001).
90 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090 (2020).
91 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
92 See Consolidated Minimum Wage Table, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIV.
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/mw-consolidated [https://
perma.cc/5YX7-RP4X].
93 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
94 Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added); see also Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 614 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“According to § 218(a), . . . state law supersedes the collective bargaining
agreement.”).
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tend greater protections to workers in their jurisdiction than
would otherwise be available through the FLSA.
Though the RLA does not have a corollary to the savings
clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that RLA
preemption “extends only as far as necessary to protect the role
of labor arbitration in resolving [collective bargaining agreement] disputes.”95 In line with this precedent, the RLA only
preempts state law when a state law claim arises entirely from or
requires construction of a collective bargaining agreement.96 As
such, the RLA does not preempt state law claims to enforce
rights independent of a collective bargaining agreement, such
as minimum labor standards.97
Since neither the FLSA nor the RLA preempt state law in the
vast majority of circumstances, this would ordinarily simplify the
analysis—a worker is subject to the standards in the RLA or
FLSA, then any standards in the state or municipality of her job
that exceed the federal baseline. However, this analysis is confounded when an employee does work in multiple jurisdictions,
such as an employee who spends most of her time working in
Dallas, Texas, but who attends a trade conference in Los Angeles, California. In that scenario, the labor laws of both Dallas
and Texas would apply to the worker as she does her work in
Dallas, but when she arrives in Los Angeles, she becomes subject
to the laws and protections of California and local laws of Los
Angeles. As the Supreme Court has held, “[a] basic principle of
federalism is that each state may make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its
borders.”98 This principle was upheld in Sullivan v. Oracle, where
the California Supreme Court held that the California Labor
Code’s overtime protections applied to work performed in California by out-of-state plaintiffs on short-term trips.99
However, dealing with airline employees who can potentially
cross hundreds of state borders in each pay period pushes this
scenario to its logical extreme, with potentially multiple different and conflicting labor standards applying to employees
95 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 913–14 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1445 (2019); see also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,
512 U.S. 246, 262–64 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
413 (1988).
96 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2016).
97 Norris, 512 U.S. at 256.
98 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
99 Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 241 (Cal. 2011).
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within a span of minutes. This issue is only confounded further
by states that then assert extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply
their wage and hours laws to workers who are neither residents
of the state nor employees of a resident employer. The RLA’s
inability to deal with this problem through federal preemption
only furthers the need to divorce the airline industry from this
outdated and ill-fitting piece of legislation.
B.

THE STICKY HAND: EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTION
WAGE AND HOURS LAWS

OF

STATE

Some states have begun to apply their wage and hour statutes
to employees who live or work outside of the state’s jurisdiction.
Unlike the FLSA, which expressly limits its application to work
performed within the United States and its territories,100 many
state wage and hour statutes hold no such geographic limitations. There have been four categories of these laws being applied extraterritorially to: (1) “out-of-state employees working
in-state for resident employers”; (2) “out-of-state employees
working out-of-state for resident employers”; (3) “resident employees working in-state for out-of-state employers”; and (4) “resident employees working out-of-state for resident employers.”101
First, in terms of laws being applied extraterritorially to out-ofstate employees working in-state for resident employers, California,102 Illinois,103 and Massachusetts104 have extended their protections to all instances of work performed in the state,
100

Id.

29 U.S.C. § 213(f).
Employment in foreign countries and certain United States territories: The provisions of sections 206, 207, 211, and 212 of this title
shall not apply with respect to any employee whose services during
the workweek are performed in a workplace within a foreign country or within territory under the jurisdiction of the United States
other than the following: a State of the United States; the District of
Columbia; Puerto Rico; the Virgin Islands; outer Continental Shelf
lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act . . . ; American Samoa; Guam; Wake Island; Eniwetok Atoll; Kwajalein Atoll;
and Johnston Island.

101 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application of State Wage
and Hours Laws, 29 A.L.R. 7th, art. 7 (2017).
102 Maez v. Chevron Texaco Corp., No. C 04-00790 JSW, 2005 WL 1656908, at
*2, *8–9 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2005) (rejecting Defendant’s argument that California law was inapplicable); Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
103 Adams v. Catrambone, 359 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Illinois
law).
104 Dow v. Casale, 989 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013).
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regardless of the resident status of the employee. Second, for
out-of-state employees working out-of-state for resident employers, Kansas,105 Kentucky,106 and Washington107 have held that
their state wage and hour statutes may apply to protect employees who may never have even set foot in the state as long as their
employer was based in that state. Third, instances of resident
employees working in-state for out-of-state employers and having access to the wage and labor laws of the state have been
found in some capacity in Connecticut,108 Delaware,109 and
Massachusetts.110
The fourth category, and perhaps the most relevant category
for workers within the airline industry, deals with the extraterritorial assertion of wage and labor laws for resident employees
working out-of-state for a resident employer. So far, California,111 New York,112 Pennsylvania,113 and Washington114 have extended such rights in some capacity. Bernstein, out of the
Northern District of California, dealt precisely with the issue of
whether flight attendants, who are based in California but spend
only about a quarter of their time in the state, have access to the
broad protections provided by California’s wage and labor
laws.115 The court held that the workers fell under the protec105 Harlow v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226–27 (D. Kan.
2008) (applying Kansas law).
106 Himmelheber v. ev3, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-593-H, 2008 WL 360694, at *11
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2008) (applying Kentucky law).
107 Woods v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Line, Inc., No. 3304-6-II, 2008 WL 496803, at
*2 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2008).
108 Goldberg v. Goodwill Indus., No. CV054009642, 2006 WL 224124, at
*14–15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006).
109 Redick v. E Mortg. Mgmt., LLC, No. 11-1260-GMS-CJB, 2013 WL 1089710,
at *1–2, *41–42 (D. Del. Mar. 15, 2013).
110 Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 409 (Mass. 2013).
111 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 1049, at 1055–56, 1063–64
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (applying California law); Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 927 P.2d 296, 309 (Cal. 1996).
112 Heng Guo Jin v. Han Sung Sikpoom Trading Corp., No. 13-CV-6789 CBA
LB, 2015 WL 5567073, at *25–26 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (denying summary
judgment on Defendant’s extraterritoriality argument because “[n]either party
has briefed the choice of law analysis”).
113 Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., No. 07-01702, 2009 WL
2015126, at *10–11 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (noting that “[n]othing within the
language of the statute implies that work performed in a foreign country by a
Pennsylvania resident does not deserve the same protections as work performed
within Pennsylvania by the same resident and for the same company”).
114 Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 153 P.3d 846, 858 (Wash. 2007); Miller v. Farmer
Bros. Co., 150 P.3d 598, 606 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
115 Bernstein, 227 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.

554

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[85

tion of California’s laws and rejected the idea that “job situs [is]
the dispositive factor to determine whether California’s wage
and hour laws apply.”116 This view, read in conjunction with the
California Supreme Court precedent coming out of Sullivan v.
Oracle, covers both those who are based in the state but perform
the majority of their work outside the state, and those based
outside the state who perform some work within the state.117
The holdings in Bernstein and Sullivan were reinforced in
Goldthorpe v. Cathay, which dealt with pilots who were based in
California but spent the majority of their time either in federal
airspace or outside the country.118 The court held that the pilots
were still under the protection of California’s wage and hours
laws, reasoning that there was:
no categorical rule that California’s wage and hour protections
can only apply if most of an employee’s work is performed within
the state, and the presumption against extraterritorial application does not prevent the application of California wage and
hour law to transportation workers based in California who travel
interstate. Absent such a categorical rule, and absent the presumption against extraterritorial application, it is difficult to
think of a reason why California law should not apply in this situation. After all, California’s wage and hour laws . . . were designed to protect workers, and to prevent employers from
exploiting their bargaining advantage by denying workers fair
wages and tolerable working conditions. Courts must construe
these laws “with an eye towards the purposes [they] were meant
to serve, and the type of person they were meant to protect.”119

While this bodes well for airline workers who live or frequently
work in California, what of airline workers across the country?
For airline workers in Washington, the question is much more
complicated, and they only receive the benefits of Washington’s
PSLA if they are a “Washington-based” employee.120 This is an
ad hoc determination and considers a multitude of factors such
as: (1) where the employment agreement was made; (2) the employee’s domicile; (3) the location of the employer’s base of operations; (4) the location of the employee’s base of operations;
Id. at 1059–60.
Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 243 (Cal. 2011).
118 Goldthorpe v. Cathay Pac. Airways, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1005 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
119 Id. at 1004–05 (internal citations omitted).
120 Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Wash. Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1162,
1168 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
116
117
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(5) whether the employer maintains a work site in Washington;
(6) whether the employee leaves Washington as part of the job;
(7) where work assignments come from; (8) where supervisors
are located; (9) the amount of work done in Washington; and
(10) the length of the contract to work in Washington.121
Though Washington is willing to give less weight to certain factors depending on the circumstances, e.g., “[f]or flight crew,
who do not spend very much time working in any one place,
[Washington Department of Labor & Industries] has indicated
that location of work is given less weight,” even a seemingly dispositive factor like being domiciled at a Washington airport
would not be enough to grant flight crew protections under the
law without satisfying other factors.122 Given the relative stringency of Washington’s determination for granting protections
compared to the leniency of California’s, it does not take much
to imagine a scenario in which an airline worker whose base of
operations is out of a Washington airport and who is a resident
of Washington, but whose employer is based out of California
and who frequently travels to California as a result, receives
much greater protections under California labor laws than those
of her own home state of Washington.
Thus arises the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction—
though California is seeking to increase the rights and protections of workers, the thought that an out-of-state domiciled and
working employee would have greater protections in California
than in her home state runs contrary to common sense. And a
right without the knowledge that one has it is hardly a right at
all.
Additionally, this confusion harms employers as well as employees. While employees may not know their rights, the only
thing they lose for that ignorance is their ability to exercise the
right. However, the stakes are much higher for airline corporations, who can rack up massive civil liability to their employees if
found to have violated provisions of either the FLSA or state
law.123 In the case of Bernstein, Virgin Airlines racked up over
$85 million in backpay and civil and statutory liabilities.124 Employers are stuck wading through the murk to try to figure out
Id.
Id.
123 E.g., John Petrick, Virgin America Calls Bid for $85M in Wage Case ‘Excessive’,
LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1102248 [https://
perma.cc/7SZM-6PN7].
124 Id.
121
122
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which laws are applicable to their employees, which quickly becomes a Sisyphean task as their workers may work in any number of states in a single pay cycle. The only recourse airlines have
against potential wage and hour violations would be to adopt
the highest standard of all the jurisdictions where they do business, which could become a financially ruinous undertaking.
C.

THE COVERAGE GAP: INADEQUACIES IN THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACT

At approximately 9:00 a.m. on June 30, 1956, United Airlines
Flight 718 and Trans World Airlines Flight 2, both regularly
scheduled passenger flights to the Midwest, took off from Los
Angeles International Airport.125 A mere hour and a half later,
the two planes collided over the Grand Canyon, destroying both
aircraft and resulting in the deaths of all passengers and crew,
with 128 lives lost.126 Both pilots followed the existing protocol
and reported to communication stations that they would be flying over the Grand Canyon at the same altitude at the same
time, but the flight controller with that information was under
no obligation to inform the pilots of their impending crash
course.127 In the pre-FAA world, it was the responsibility of the
pilots alone to keep clear of other aircraft.128 This crash went
down in history as the deadliest commercial aviation collision at
the time and marked the first instance of a commercial airline
collision resulting in more than 100 deaths.129 However, the
deaths were not completely in vain, as public outrage over the
outdated and ineffective air traffic control system that resulted
in the crash would galvanize the creation of the Federal Aviation
Agency (later known as the FAA).130
NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., REP. NO. SA-320/1-0090 MIDAIR COLLISION, ACCIINVESTIGATION REPORT, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES LOCKHEED 1049A N6902C
AND UNITED AIR LINES DOUGLAS DC-7 N6324C, OVER THE GRAND CANYON, ARIZONA, JUNE 30, 1956, ¶¶ 2, 7 (1957), https://www.fss.aero/accident-reports/
look.php?report_key=1251 [https://perma.cc/L3DP-QTAL].
126 Id. ¶ 1.
127 1956 Grand Canyon Airplane Crash a Game-Changer, CBS NEWS (July 8, 2014),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1956-grand-canyon-airplane-crash-a-gamechanger/ [https://perma.cc/N4XY-RF8P].
128 Id.
129 Grand Canyon Collision Declared a National Historic Landmark, GRAND CANYON
VISITOR CTR. (May 1, 2014), https://explorethecanyon.com/grand-canyon-collision-declared-a-national-historic-landmark/ [https://perma.cc/ZMV3-59HN].
130 Id.
125

DENT
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Just two years after the 1956 Grand Canyon collision, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (FAAct) into law.131 The FAAct’s purpose was to regulate
the safety and efficiency of the airways, providing a comprehensive series of regulations that covered most aspects of the airline
industry.132 The agency would later become known as the FAA
when it was consolidated into the Department of Transportation
(DoT) in 1967, and the FAA continues to be the governing body
for commercial airline regulation and standards.133
The field of airline safety was uniquely ripe for federal regulation because air travel takes place almost entirely within federal
jurisdiction, requires more coordination than any other form of
public transportation, and poses the largest risk to safety when
done carelessly.134 “Regulation on a national basis is required
because air transportation [itself] is a national operation.”135 As
the court in Montalvo held, “[t]he FAA, together with federal air
safety regulations, establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and international air transportation that are
not subject to supplementation by, or variation among,
states.”136 In other words, the FAA is used to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety—“[f]ield preemption occurs if federal law
‘thoroughly occupies’ the ‘legislative field’ in question, i.e., the
field of aviation safety. . . . Such a purpose properly may be inferred . . . where the federal interest in the field is sufficiently
dominant.”137 The Third Circuit succinctly summarized it as follows: “[F]ederal law establishes the applicable standards of care
in the field of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire
field from state and territorial regulation.”138 Despite the FAA’s
broad authority in the field of air safety, the administration is
entirely silent on the issue of wage and labor laws for employees
within its industry.

A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.
faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/#birth [https://perma.cc/9QAN-7B9V].
132 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, pmbl., 72 Stat. 731, 731 (1958).
133 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 131.
134 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 473 (9th Cir. 2007).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 474.
137 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
138 Id.
131
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THE NEED FOR REFORM IN AIRLINE LABOR
LEGISLATION

In an industry where nearly every facet is now closely regulated on a federal level, the thicket of conflicting and confusing
law surrounding airline labor rights is truly an anomaly. This
Comment proposes adding federal legislation that would expressly preempt state wage and hour laws. The current system
fits poorly within the RLA, causes needless litigation, and obfuscates the rights of workers. A uniform legislative framework will
better provide for the needs of workers, increase the overall
safety of the industry, and minimize litigation between workers
and airlines over disagreements about pay and rights.
A.

TAKING

THE

TRAINING WHEELS OFF: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
HAS OUTGROWN THE RLA

Though the RLA may have provided a useful legal framework
for the airline industry in the 1930s, changes in society, new
technological advancements, and the growth of the industry as a
whole have evinced a need for an updated legal framework tailored to the needs of the airline industry. Two critical factors
interfere with the RLA’s ability to serve the needs of the airline
industry: its bespoke past and its age.
Not only have there been massive changes to the industry in
the interim, but the 1936 amendment to the RLA bundled the
rights of airline workers into an act “designed by and for the
railroad industry.”139 As discussed in Part II, the RLA was the
particular product of half a century of railway strikes, negotiations between railway unions and owners, and legislative attempts to balance the interests of the parties, and the final draft
of the RLA itself was written by the railway unions and owners
together.140 The unique past of the RLA makes it especially unsuitable for application to a new industry, and whether it actually provided a benefit to the nascent aviation field is subject to
some controversy, as other transportation industries developed
labor protections without the need of specialized treatment like
the railroad industry.141 Because the RLA was drafted to deal
with the specific intricacies of railway labor relations, it contains
several oddities that were the result of concessions made in ne139 James B. Frankel, Airline Labor Policy: The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 18
J. AIR L. & COM. 461, 461 (1951).
140 Id. at 466–67.
141 Id. at 471.
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gotiations between unions and owners. For example, as early as
1952, commentators were concerned with the RLA’s inapplicability to a fledgling industry:
the lack of a remedial forum for both employees and employers
that can expertly administer the relationships intended by the
[RLA] and both interpret and enforce its provisions is a basic
weakness. . . . Such a framework would not seem to be conducive
to the development of the most sensible labor-management relations in a new and growing industry, however satisfactory in the
more stabilized railroad industry.142

Second, not only was the RLA drafted to deal specifically with
the railway industry, but it was drafted close to a century ago
with few amendments. The airline industry of the modern-day
shares little in common with its predecessor in 1936—it has
faced changing levels of regulation and deregulation, has encountered technological developments, and has struggled to
deal with bankruptcies and mergers.143 In addition, the impact
of the September 11th terror attacks permanently changed the
landscape of the airline industry, with air carriers being forced
to shoulder many of the costs of compliance with increased
safety regulations.144 These changes have reached the critical
point where “the RLA is no longer adequate to ensure protection for airline employees.”145
This is not a problem that is necessarily unique to the RLA—
the need to respond to changes in the rapidly evolving aviation
field spurred the Montreal Convention of 1999 (Montreal Convention). With striking similarities to the need to replace the
outdated RLA and standardize labor rights for workers throughout the country, the Montreal Convention supplanted the outdated Warsaw Convention of 1929 (Warsaw Convention) and
standardized the field of airline liability on international
flights.146 The Montreal Convention was an acknowledgement
that the concerns that faced the start of the airline industry in
the early twentieth century—at the Warsaw Convention, the
142 Malcolm A. Macintyre, The Railway Labor Act—A Misfit for The Airlines, 19 J.
AIR L. & COM. 274, 288 (1952).
143 Lisa Catherine Tulk, The 1926 Railway Labor Act and the Modern American
Airline Industry: Changes and Chaos Outline the Need for Revised Legislation, 69 J. AIR
L. & COM. 615, 627 (2004).
144 Id. at 628.
145 Id. at 645.
146 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air preamble, opened for signature May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S.
309.
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concern was limiting liability in order to foster growth of the
nascent industry147—were not the same concerns that faced the
present industry. For many of the same reasons that the RLA
needs to be updated or replaced, calls to ratify the Montreal
Convention over the Warsaw Convention focused on the present
system of fractured and disparate laws depending on the jurisdiction, and the ability of a uniform standard to “simplify, clarify
and expedite the fair resolution of [disputes].”148
And, much like the Warsaw Convention, the RLA’s inadequacies have led to a fractured field of law because there is no unifying authority. The RLA only preempts state law when a state law
claim arises entirely from or requires construction of a collective
bargaining agreement.149 As such, the RLA does not preempt
state law claims to enforce rights independent of a collective
bargaining agreement, such as minimum wage standards or sick
leave.150
Nearly a century old, the RLA simply cannot do enough to
support the modern-day aviation industry, and ought to be replaced. Part V proposes new legislation that would supplant the
RLA and bring the labor rights of workers in the aviation industry into the twenty-first century.
B.

THE INTERSECTION OF LABOR LAWS AND PASSENGER SAFETY:
INCREASED PROTECTIONS FOR AIRLINE WORKERS WILL
DIRECTLY TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED SAFETY
FOR PASSENGERS

The airline industry is uniquely situated as one of the most
closely regulated industries in the country, and the vast majority
of its operations are conducted within federal jurisdiction—the
airspace. Airlines are heavily regulated by the FAA, which was
formed in order to have a single, uniform system for regulating
airline safety after a series of fatal crashes between civilian and
military aircraft.151 The catastrophic impact of mismanaged
flights was the key impetus in forming the FAA, and the Supreme Court has characterized FAA regulations as striking “a
delicate balance between the safety and efficiency” of planes in
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546 (1991).
David E. Rapoport & Hans Ephraimson-Abt, A 73-Year Odyssey: The Time Has
Come for a New International Air Liability System, 2002 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y
22,151, 22,171 (2002).
149 Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016).
150 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256 (1994).
151 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F. 3d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2007).
147
148

2020]

WHOSE RIGHTS ARE THEY ANYWAY?

561

the sky and maintaining protections for persons on the
ground.152 This delicate balance and the interdependence of
the safety of persons in the sky and on the ground justified the
requirement of a “uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the congressional objectives underlying the [FAAct] are
to be fulfilled.”153
However, one facet of airline safety has slipped through the
cracks and has not been regulated by the FAA—sick days and
vacation days of airline staff. While perhaps not what immediately comes to mind when one thinks of airplane safety—considering devices such as oxygen masks, parachutes, and chairs that
function as floatation devices—pilot fatigue represents “one of
the biggest threats to air safety.”154 Hardly a decade has passed
since the tragic crash of Continental Flight 3407 outside of Buffalo, New York in 2009.155 Fatigue was cited as a cause of the
crew’s failure to adequately respond to the rapidly declining
plane, which ended up stalling and plunging into a house—killing the pilots, flight attendants, all the passengers, and a man on
the ground—resulting in fifty deaths overall.156 While the odds
of a commercial flight crashing are extremely low, “figures show
that 80% are a result of human error, with pilot fatigue accounting for 15–20% of human error in fatal accidents.”157 In the accident report conducted on the crash, the National
Transportation Safety Board compared fatigue impaired performance with alcohol impairment:
[S]leep loss is at least as potent as ethanol in its performanceimpairing effects and two hours of sleep loss equates to a breath
ethanol concentration of approximately .05% . . . correlat[ing]
prolonged wakefulness with impairment, such that being awake
for 16 hours is equivalent to a .05 [blood alcohol content].158

Despite the clear link between crew fatigue and increased risk of
harm, the FAA has not stepped in to guarantee sufficient time
152 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638–39
(1973).
153 Id. at 639.
154 Keith Moore, Pilot Fatigue ‘One of the Biggest Threats to Air Safety’, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-19837178 [https://
perma.cc/85FJ-4FFE].
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/AAR-10/01, PB2010-910401, ACCIDENT
REPORT, LOSS OF CONTROL ON APPROACH COLGAN AIR, INC. OPERATING AS CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT 3407, at 3 (2009).
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off for airline crews. This leaves states and municipalities to fight
with airline corporations over the amount of leave allowed.
Dispute over Washington’s PSLA centered around this concern.159 In addition to the risk presented by fatigue, the district
court in Washington also considered how the airline’s unforgiving time-off policies led to the increased spread of germs, as
“flight attendants have attested to working while sick to avoid
acquiring [demerits].”160 This led to “research show[ing] that
flight attendants’ interactions with passengers make them both
the most likely source and recipient of disease on flights.”161
And, in past attempts to alleviate this problem during the 2009
H1N1 “Swine flu” outbreak, the Association of Flight Attendants
(AFA) raised concerns with the FAA and the House Subcommittee on Aviation that airline carriers should be required to “allow
flight attendants with flu-like symptoms themselves to call in sick
without risk of discipline.”162 The AFA turned to seeking federal
intervention due to its concern that “airline management [was]
more concerned with the appearance of flight attendants than
with the health of the public and the flight crew.”163 Without a
definite federal standard to guarantee labor protections for
workers, history has shown that airline carriers will sacrifice the
health of passengers and crew if it benefits their bottom line.
In Washington, though the airlines described being forced to
comply with the PSLA as an unreasonable burden, evidence
from when airlines were first subjected to New York City’s
Earned Sick Time Act (ESTA), which has similar provisions to
the Washington law, showed that “for the first two years after
Virgin began complying with ESTA, cabin crew delays only increased by .16 percentage points, an amount that is almost irrelevant compared to the Airlines’ overall delay rates of 15 to 20
percent.”164 With empirics showing that the airlines’ argument
of the unreasonable burden to comply was without merit, the
Air Transp. Ass’n Am. v. Washington Dep’t Lab. & Indus., 410 F. Supp. 3d
1162, 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
160 Id. at 1177.
161 Id.
162 Courtney Clegg, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communicable
Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 460–61 (2010)
(citing Aviation Consumer Issues: Emergency Contingency Planning and Outlook for
Summer Travel: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 22–24 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. Friend, International President, AFA)).
163 Id. at 461.
164 Air Transp. Ass’n Am., 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1176.
159
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court in Washington held that airline workers were under the
protection of its PSLA.165 This same debate rages on in New
York City over the city’s ESTA, as both Delta166 and American
Airlines167 fight against complying with it.
Without federal intervention through legislation, airline carriers have shown they will continue putting the health and safety
of crew, passengers, and people on the ground at risk. Airline
carriers will go to any measure to maximize profits at the cost of
safety with no hesitation. The FAA is primed to combat this type
of profit-over-safety mindset, and a congressional grant of authority to amend Title 49 to include some sort of provision in
line with either Washington’s PSLA or New York’s ESTA would
end the debate over the amount of leave given to workers, increase safety, decrease the spread of germs, and combat the issue of pilot fatigue.
C. NAVIGATING THE MAZE: THE CURRENT THICKET OF
CONFUSING AND CONTRADICTING STATE AND LOCAL
LAW RESULTS IN NEEDLESS LITIGATION COSTS
The litigation in Bernstein is a quintessential example of litigation as deadweight loss—an economic term describing an inefficient allocation of resources that results in a cost to society as a
whole.168 That is to say, it is a needless waste of time, money, and
judicial economy. Embroiled in a multi-year class action wage
lawsuit with its former flight attendants for failure to pay for all
hours worked, overtime or provide accurate wage statements,
and waiting time penalties to discharged employees, Virgin Airlines (Virgin) continued to rack up costs as it (1) paid its own
legal fees; (2) was sanctioned to pay the legal fees of the class
action plaintiffs as a result of its misconduct in discovery;169 and,
ultimately, (3) paid approximately $77 million to members of
the class—nearly double from the starting amount of $45.4 milId. at 1177.
Linda Cheim, NYC Insists Paid Sick Leave Law Doesn’t Harm Delta, LAW360
(May 1, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1269513 [https://perma.cc/
K9NF-NGKZ].
167 Reenat Sinay, American Airlines Challenges NYC Paid Sick Leave Law, LAW360
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184444/american-airlineschallenges-nyc-paid-sick-leave-law [https://perma.cc/Z7WH-9KFQ].
168 Alicia Tuovila, Deadweight Loss, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 24, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deadweightloss.asp [https://perma.cc/4D4VW9P5].
169 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., No. 15-cv-02277-JST, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
201712, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018).
165
166
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lion in damages and restitution for wage and hour violations as a
result of civil and statutory penalties.170 And while these costs
were mostly avoidable—namely, if Virgin had paid its employees
legally, or at the least complied in the discovery process—Virgin
ultimately will not be the party responsible for paying the fees,
as that cost gets passed on to society through increased costs to
consumers.
While it is certainly plausible that Virgin was genuinely mistaken as to the correct amount to pay its flight attendants who
worked in California as a result of the thicket of overlapping and
conflicting law discussed in Part III.B, that does not excuse the
bad faith dealing the business engaged in over the course of the
lawsuit. However, in a world with a clear, uniform, federally preemptive statute instead of the hodgepodge of state regulations,
this lawsuit may have not existed at all. Virgin is far from the first
corporation embroiled in a suit like this, however—wage and
hour class action suits are an increasingly common tool for low
wage employees to fight back against predatory employers and
are by far the most common type of class action claim filed in
federal court.171 In 2017, employers paid out over $1.2 billion in
wage and hour lawsuits,172 and while Virgin’s $77 million judgment may seem like a paltry amount in comparison to the total,
it represents nearly one-fifteenth of the total amount paid out by
all employers across the country that year.
Federally preemptive legislation can be used to stem the increasing tide of wage and hour class action lawsuits. With a clear
and national uniform standard, employers are aware of the exact amount that will be owed to each employee without having
to figure out the different wage and hour calculations for employees in each state. And, under a clear and uniform standard,
employees know exactly how much they should be earning, allowing them to monitor their income for discrepancies and notify their employer as soon as a discrepancy is noticed, thereby
alleviating the need for massive class-action lawsuits. Increased
information would only serve to benefit both parties, more effi170 Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980, 985, 993 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
171 Daniel V. Dorris, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State Wage-and-Hour
Law Claims, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2009).
172 Wage and Hour Claims: 2018’s Top Litigation Risk For Employers, THATCHER L.
FIRM BLOG (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.thatcherlaw.com/blog/2018/02/wageand-hour-claims-2018s-top-litigation-risk-for-employers.shtml [https://perma.cc/
V2MR-X5PY].
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ciently putting wages back in the workers’ pockets to begin with,
saving employers money that would otherwise go to fighting
wage-and-hour class actions, and keeping price lower for consumers as a result.
V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO TITLE 49

This Comment proposes an amendment to Title 49, which
governs transportation laws, establishes the DoT,173 and is the
current source of the FAA’s authority.174 Given the FAA’s wide
control of all aspects of aviation safety, and the massive safety
implications of labor standards in the industry, as discussed in
Part IV.B, an amendment to Title 49 will solve the current gap
in the FAA’s coverage of safety regulations. Placing labor under
the ambit of Title 49 falls squarely within its policy goal of “assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the
highest priorities in air commerce.”175 This Comment proposes
adding a new chapter to Title 49 (Transportation), Subtitle VII
(Aviation Programs), Subpart III (Safety). The following proposed amendment is modeled after Washington’s PSLA,176 with
modifications made to align it with the language in Title 49.
Chapter 455—Paid Sick Leave (§§ 45501–45504)
§ 45501. Paid Sick Leave—Every air carrier177 must provide
each of its airmen178 or flight attendants179 paid sick leave as
follows:
173 49 U.S.C. §§ 101–727. Subtitle I of Title 49 establishes the DoT, its goals,
and its duties. Id.
174 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–50105. Subtitle VII of Title 49 sets out regulations for
the aviation industry. Id.
175 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1).
176 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.46.210 (West 2020).
177 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (defining “air carrier” as “a citizen of the United
States undertaking by any means, directly or indirectly, to provide air
transportation.”).
178 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(8). Title 49 defines “airman” as
an individual—
(A) in command, or as pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew,
who navigates aircraft when under way;
(B) except to the extent the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may provide otherwise for individuals
employed outside the United States, who is directly in
charge of inspecting, maintaining, overhauling, or repairing
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; or
(C) who serves as an aircraft dispatcher or air traffic controltower operator.
Id.
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(a) An airman or flight attendant accrues at least one hour of
paid sick leave for every forty hours worked as an airman
or flight attendant. An air carrier may provide paid sick
leave in advance of accrual provided that such front-loading meets or exceeds the requirements of this section for
accrual, use, and carryover of paid sick leave.
(b) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for the following reasons:
(1) An absence resulting from an airman’s or flight attendant’s mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; to accommodate the airman’s or flight attendant’s need for medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or an airman’s or flight attendant’s need
for preventive medical care;
(2) To allow the airman or flight attendant to provide
care for a family member with a mental or physical
illness, injury, or health condition; care of a family
member who needs medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of a mental or physical illness, injury, or health
condition; or care for a family member who needs
preventive medical care; and
(3) When the airman’s or flight attendant’s place of business has been closed by order of a public official for
any health-related reason, or when an airman’s or
flight attendant’s child’s school or place of care has
been closed for such a reason.
(c) An airman or flight attendant is authorized to use paid
sick leave for absences as a result of domestic violence as
defined in Title 34 of the United States Code.180
179 9 U.S.C. § 44728(g) (defining “flight attendant” as “an individual working
as a flight attendant in the cabin of an aircraft that has twenty or more seats and
is being used by an air carrier to provide air transportation.”).
180 See 34 U.S.C. § 12291(a)(8).
The term “domestic violence” includes felony or misdemeanor
crimes of violence committed by a current or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares
a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has
cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or intimate partner, by a
person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiving grant monies, or by any other person against an adult or youth victim who is
protected from that person’s acts under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction.
Id.
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(d) An airman or flight attendant is entitled to use accrued
paid sick leave beginning on the ninetieth calendar day
after the commencement of his or her employment.
(e) Air carriers are not prevented from providing more generous paid sick leave policies or permitting use of paid
sick leave for additional purposes.
(f) An air carrier may require airmen or flight attendants to
give reasonable notice of an absence from work, so long
as such notice does not interfere with an airman or flight
attendant’s lawful use of paid sick leave.
(g) For absences exceeding three days, an air carrier may require verification that an airman or flight attendant’s use
of paid sick leave is for an authorized purpose. If an air
carrier requires verification, verification must be provided to the air carrier within a reasonable time period
during or after the leave. An air carrier’s requirements
for verification may not result in an unreasonable burden
or expense on the airman or flight attendant and may not
exceed privacy or verification requirements otherwise established by law.
(h) An air carrier may not require, as a condition of an airman or flight attendant taking paid sick leave, that the
airman or flight attendant search for or find a replacement worker to cover the hours during which the airman
or flight attendant is on paid sick leave.
(i) For each hour of paid sick leave used, an airman or flight
attendant must be paid the greater of the minimum
hourly wage rate established in this chapter or his or her
normal hourly compensation. The air carrier is responsible for providing regular notification to airmen or flight
attendants about the amount of paid sick leave available
to the airman or flight attendant.
(j) Unused paid sick leave carries over to the following year,
except that an air carrier is not required to allow an airman or flight attendant to carry over paid sick leave in
excess of forty hours.
(k) This section does not require an air carrier to provide financial or other reimbursement for accrued and unused
paid sick leave to any airman or flight attendant upon the
airman or flight attendant’s termination, resignation, retirement, or other separation from employment. When
there is a separation from employment and the airman or
flight attendant is rehired within twelve months of separa-
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tion by the same air carrier, whether at the same or a different business location of the air carrier, previously
accrued unused paid sick leave must be reinstated and
the previous period of employment must be counted for
purposes of determining the airman or flight attendant’s
eligibility to use paid sick leave under subsection
45501(d) of this section.
§ 45502. Family Member Defined—For purposes of this chapter,
“family member” means any of the following:
(a) A child, including a biological, adopted, or foster child,
stepchild, or a child to whom the airman or flight attendant stands in loco parentis, is a legal guardian, or is a de
facto parent, regardless of age or dependency status;
(b) A biological, adoptive, de facto, or foster parent, stepparent, or legal guardian of an airman or flight attendant or
the airman or flight attendant’s spouse or registered domestic partner, or a person who stood in loco parentis
when the airman or flight attendant was a minor child;
(c) A spouse;
(d) A registered domestic partner;
(e) A grandparent;
(f) A grandchild; or
(g) A sibling.
§ 45503. Limitations on Policies—An air carrier may not
adopt or enforce any policy that counts the use of paid sick leave
time as an absence that may lead to or result in discipline
against the airman or flight attendant.
§ 45504. Air Carrier Retaliation—An air carrier may not discriminate or retaliate against an airman or flight attendant for
his or her exercise of any rights under this chapter including the
use of paid sick leave.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The lack of a clear and consistent federal standard across the
country harms both airline carriers and aviation employees—
carriers as they grapple with a myriad of regulations and airline
employees who are unsure of their rights and how to exercise
them. There is a clear need for an updated federal framework
that takes into account the airline industry and the needs of
workers in the present day; the RLA served its purpose in stabilizing the nascent airline industry in the 1930s, but the aviation
industry has outgrown its usefulness. To replace the RLA and
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standardize the labor rights of workers in the aviation industry,
this Comment proposes amending Title 49 to include a chapter
on labor. Because of the direct impact of the labor rights of airline workers on the safety of the aviation industry, legislation
dealing with these rights falls squarely within the purview of the
FAA. Through the proposed amendment, the aviation industry
will be made safer, workers will receive greater protections, and
the squandering of judicial economy through needless litigation
over the thicket of conflicting local, state, and federal law will
cease.

SMU LAW REVIEW
The subscription price for four issues is $42.00 per year; foreign subscriptions are $49.00 per year. Regular single issues are available at
$16.50 per copy. Add 8.25% tax on single issue orders within the
State of Texas. Tax-exempt institutions must include copy of exemption certificate with order. An additional charge will be made for
single issues for postage and handling.
Mail to:
SMU LAW REVIEW
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas 75275-0116

JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A Publication of the SMU Law Review Association

Published since 1930, the Journal is the world’s foremost scholarly
publication dealing exclusively with the legal and economic aspects
of aviation and space. The quarterly Journal is edited and managed
by a student Board of Editors. Each volume features comprehensive
leading articles; a review of items of current international interest; a
sizable section of student comments, case notes, and recent decisions; book reviews; and a bibliography of current aviation and space
literature.
The Journal also conducts the annual SMU Air Law Symposium.
The 56th Annual Symposium will be held March 24-25, 2021, in
Dallas, Texas.
Single Issue Rate:
$16.00
Annual Subscription Rates:
Domestic $43.00; Foreign $50.00
Address inquiries to:
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas 75275-0116

CHANGE

OF

ADDRESS

Please notify us of any change of name or address:
New Address:

(Name of Firm or Individual)

(City)

Old Address:*

(State)

(Zip Code)

(Name of Firm or Individual)

(City)

(State)

(Zip Code)

* Give your old name and address as it appears on the most recent
mailing label.
Complete and mail this form to:
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Dedman School of Law
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, Texas 75275-0116

